

! An excerpt is given according to: Dashichev V.I. Bankruptcy strategy of German fascism: Historical essays: Documents and materials. T. 2. Aggression against the USSR. The fall of the "third empire", 1941-1945 - M: Voenizlat, 1973. Pp. 399-418.

? VA-MAVN 24-35/69.

From 17.8.43, the Hagen line should be ready for a solid defense. The operation receives the code name "Autumn Trip". All official correspondence is top secret documentation.

2. The corps frontier line and the plan-scheme of the Hagen frontier are indicated in the appendix.

3. Implementation of the operation "Autumn trip" is planned in 4 areas (green, red, yellow and blue). Each section includes several lines of defense. March throws should average 10-12 km per day.

4. Command.

The timely creation of perfect defense lines is a matter of extreme importance. Therefore, it is necessary to create reserves and mobile antitank defense in advance. Military operations in individual areas of defense must be carried out with sufficient forces (dedicated for this purpose and constantly replenished) of divisions.

5. The defense of seams (frontier sectors of corps, divisions) is ensured by special measures of both neighbors (responsible officers with subunits for the defense of seams and mobile tank defense). The exact definition of border sections or joints in the defense is carried out with direct agreement with the corps. The coordinated frontier sections should be immediately reported to the command in the operational department (Ta) of the 2nd Panzer Army.

6. The following preparatory measures should be carried out immediately:

a) evacuation of all redundant rear services and subunits and supply units of divisions and corps in sectors west of the Hagen line;

6) reconnaissance, entering into the plan, correction and further adjustment of all through (intersecting) routes of traffic;

c) repair of all bridges on the march.

7. Movement to the Hagen line begins on day X, at

20.00. Day X is announced on day X-1, no later than 23.00, with the title "Autumn trip approved".

8. The decisive factor in the success of the operation is the exact execution of the route plan.

The 2nd Panzer Army, in accordance with this plan, occupies the green, red and yellow sectors (the corresponding areas are shaded on the map. - E. Shch.).

The formations of Gollnik's group arrive first (from 30.7. 24.00) at the disposal of the 11th Army Corps.

It is planned that after reaching the yellow line (height of the Gostinets cell), the command of the XXSH Army Corps will take over the leadership of all formations of the 2nd Tank Army involved in the front.

The command of the 1 1st army corps in this case will be located at the Hagen line. With regard to the command of XXXXX] of the tank corps and XXXI of the army corps, an appropriate order will be received in a timely manner.

9. Special instructions to the order for the army No. 1 for moving to the line "Hagen":

a) barriers and demolition works;

6) Communication;

c) Traffic regulation and control by a special headquarters under the command of Bornemann;

d) for supply (including eviction and relocation of the population).

On the rear lines, immediately begin organizing warehouses of ammunition and food supplies from personal depots.

10. Further transmission of this order is permitted only in an incomplete form, with the strictest observance of the basic regulations on the secrecy of transmitted information. Full information about the operation "Autumn Trip" is provided to individuals only on the personal orders of the commanders. Divisions transmit orders to lower divisions only orally.

11. Messages about the plans for the "Autumn trip" 29.7.43, until 21.00.

Model".

"Top Secret

Application No. 1

SPECIAL PROVISION ON COMMUNICATION

Command of the 2nd Panzer Army Operations
Department (1a). No. 1225/43. 28.7.43

Telephone communications

For direct communication between the army and the corps, the relevant services should be ready to lay a communication line from an uninsulated and field telephone cable for long-distance communication. Connect housings to this communication line. The order about when and where to lay communication lines and connect to them will come in time.

The order to blow up the lines of uninsulated cable from the command of the 2nd Panzer Army. The corps may, in exceptional cases, use these lines to communicate with their subordinate divisions, in which case they are responsible for the subsequent destruction of the lines of communication provided to them.

XXXU Army Corps, Trout's group and Gollnik's group immediately cut off the communication line along the Orel-Optukha, Orel-Zolotarevo, Orel-Zmievka railways, since the order was given to blow up these sections of the road, regardless of the existing communication lines.

VdenX plus 2 hours The 21st division disconnects all subscribers of the local switching network, prepares an explosion and the complete destruction of all communication installations located in Orel. The time of explosion and destruction is determined by the commandant of the garrison after the order of the command of the XXXU of the army corps.

Radio communication

Outgoing units from the front need to maintain radio silence. However, you should be ready to provide radio contact at any time. (The main reception wave must be free.) Immediately respond to radio calls from the army command.

Signalers of divisions sent from the front to new areas must immediately report themselves to the responsible communications officer at the headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Army command in order to receive new radio documents.

238

Formations on the march, use any

I will have an opportunity to report on the place of deployment and the state of affairs in the Igtab of the 2nd Panzer Army. To transmit these reports to the divisions through whose sectors the formation passes.

Communication intelligence

Reconnaissance by means of communications is of particular importance during a retreat, since it will probably become the only means for the command to obtain information about the actions of the enemy. Therefore, it is necessary to immediately and exclusively fully transfer all the results of reconnaissance to the command headquarters in the intelligence department (1s).

Before the last transition to the Hagen line, the divisions need to transfer and bury the listening devices in time so that reconnaissance by means of communications can immediately continue collecting information about the deployment of enemy units in their new positions.

Communication equipment The communication park in Naryshkino is closed on 31.7.43. A new place for issuing devices from 1.8 in Bryansk, in the post office building.

Commander of the Staff of the 2nd Panzer Army
Signature.

“ONLY FOR COMMAND!

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2nd copy

Order for the hull

Regarding the line "Hagen" (code
name of the operation "Autumn trip")

Command of the XXXU Army Corps

Operational department (1a). No. 361/43. 29.07.43, 01.00

Command post

1. To obtain reserves, it is planned to further reduce the front line. The operation is given the code name "Autumn Journey". All official correspondence is completely confidential.

2. For this, two groups are created:

| until X + -2 24.00 in the same composition.

Trout's group (right) | 3 24.00 consisting of: 78th assault | | Howling Division, 299th Infantry Division and : Assault Gun Units

tea motorized regiment of the 8th TD and troops in accordance with paragraph 7a

Bodenhausen group (left) | SH + 3 24.00 consisting of the 12th Panzer |

divisions and the 262nd Infantry Division. With regard to the 36th Infantry Division, after-

|

| Until 2 24.00 in the same line-up, including 1

|

|

|

|

|

|

| | blowing order

3. Dividing lines for battles, reconnaissance, march, routes, as well as the estimated distribution of time - see map 1: 100,000.

4. It is important for the command to put the respective lines of defense on full alert for defensive battles. In accordance with this, provide for the creation of a reserve and mobile anti-tank defense. To ensure accurate and timely determination of positions, as well as planning the battle formation of troops. Report with a 48-hour lead - to the General Command.

The defense of the joints should be ensured by special measures for both neighbors (responsible officers), with subunits and mobile anti-tank guns.

This order applies to all units up to the dorotas.

5. Trout's group withdraws its divisions by rapid transitions from one line of defense to another.

Bodenhausen's group introduces the 36th Infantry Division on the X+3 day in the Oka sector (southern exit from Orel) - in the direction southeast, railway station st. Eagle.

The 262nd Infantry Division creates an additional rearguard on the X + 4 afternoon in the Oka sector (Orel-South) - Te

legino.

240

After the passage of Trout's group through Orel (south) and after the 12th Panzer Division had taken the defense line for X + 4 days, the 36th Infantry Division would link up with the 262nd Infantry Division at an intermediate defensive line, which should be held until the 12th Panzer Division occupies the defensive line for X + 5 days. Then the 36th and 262nd Infantry Divisions would withdraw through the positions of the 12th Panzer Division and, at the place for which the order was received, would be withdrawn from the Bodenhausen group.

In order to facilitate the movement of formations, when one of them crosses the location of the other, an accurate plan should be developed taking into account all the details, as well as the teams (subdivisions) that regulate the movement of transport and direct the maneuver.

On difficult sections of the road, organize teams to help transport.

Roads for groups are designated as follows:

for the Trout group - road "T",

for the Bodenhausen group - road "B".

With further retreat, eliminate the road

signs.

Wheeled vehicles unable to move on marching tracks due to weather conditions should use the Orel-Karachev highway. Report to the command and directly to the head of the traffic control headquarters Borneman about the place, time of the start of movement, the number of vehicles and the name of the column commander with a lead of at least 48 hours.

6. All parts that are not necessarily needed for military operations should be sent to the Sinezerka-Pervo Maysky region (railway Bryansk-Lokot).

Before July 31, the 262nd Infantry Division must send a combat-capable command headquarters to Sinezerki, which will dispose of all units located there on behalf of the General Command.

7. It is necessary to carry out the following preparatory rearrangements:

a) On the night of July 29-30, the 12th Panzer Division occupies

241

stock of the 14th assault regiment of the 78th assault division; The 1st battalion of the artillery regiment of the 36th division and the 3rd mortar battalion of the 51st regiment come under the command of the 12th tank division.

6) Trout's group with the 195th and 14th assault divisions until 24:00 on 31.07. occupies the cut-off position Orel (Plot Stish).

The 299th Infantry Division, retreating to the cut-off position Orel, is introduced in the sector Oka - Olydany (south) - Orel (south).

In addition, special instructions will be announced to the order for moving to the Hagen line regarding:

a) barriers and demolition works;

6) communications;

c) traffic regulation and control;

d) supply and evacuation.

8. Further transmission of this order is permitted only in incomplete form, with the strictest observance of the basic regulations on the secrecy of transmitted information.

The transfer of the order from divisions to lower units is carried out only orally.

Commander
Signature".

"Secret
Command of the 2nd Panzer Army Telegram
No. 27 dated 28.07.43 Document No.
2290/43. 07/28/43

35th Muarmey Corps

For artillery units of the 305th artillery group

Regarding dislocation

1. The 1st Battalion of the 20th Artillery Regiment to immediately advance on the march across the Orel in the direction of Karachev, the regiment comes under the command of the 293rd Artillery Regiment of the 293rd Infantry Division. The division of motorcyclists was sent to the combat position of "Great Germany" in Lenivka (Karachevka settlement).

2. 422.635 and 709th artillery units in full force and with all weapons are withdrawn from subordination

242

35th Corps and at dawn on July 29 are sent through Orel in the direction of Karachev to the Alymov-Sviridovo region, where they are placed at the disposal of MD "Great Germany". Arrival time is 12 noon, Arco altitude, for further instructions."

Signature".

"Secret
Command of the 2nd Tank Army Operations
Department (1a). 365/43 dated 29.07.43 to the 35th Army Corps

Regarding the line "Hagen"

To expand and equip the Hagen line, immediately put forward on the march all the Russian work columns (men and women) at the disposal of the troops, providing them with commanders and supervisors, in accordance with a top secret document (No. 02987/43 of 07/25/43, command of the 2nd tank army). Work columns in the places provided for this are transferred to the disposal of the construction detachments of the special headquarters "Ha gen". Columns need to have the tools needed to equip defensive trenches.

Signature".

Analyzing this brief but very tense and far-reaching period of the battle, Baghra-myang notes in My Memoirs:

"We were close to the goal - someone to cut off the entire Orlov group from its communications. But, unfortunately, we had very, very little strength left for this: only two weakened divisions were advancing on Khotynets.

Fulfilling the order of the front commander, formations

The 8th Guards Rifle Corps resumed their offensive on the morning of July 26 and began to slowly move forward. Some time later, the 11th Tank and 6th Guards Mechanized Corps of the 4th Tank Army, overtaking the combat formations of rifle formations, rushed to

243

attack. At the turn of Prilepa, Lunevo, Malaya Chern, and Shumovo, they ran into a very powerful anti-tank defense of the enemy. Both corps suffered serious losses in combat vehicles, mainly from the fire of buried and camouflaged German tanks and self-propelled guns. On that day, despite all the energy of General V.M. Badanov, the tankers made little progress. The next morning, from behind the left flank of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, the vehicles of the 30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps burst forward. They were led by yesterday's Ural workers, people of desperate courage. They attacked enemy positions with a terrible avalanche. Neither air raids on the Urals, nor fierce counterattacks saved the Nazis. They started to leave. Tankers rushed into pursuit.

Reading the memoirs of our commanders, you think: how well they did everything, how nicely they fought, especially the troops of Bagramyan's 11th Guards Army. On the morning of July 26, they resumed their offensive and began to slowly move forward. On July 26, two of his corps (36th and 8th), as well as two corps of Badanov's army, not only slow, but generally had no advance to the west (see above - the events of the first day of the offensive - July 26).

It should be borne in mind that at that time the fighting was carried out not only by the Ural tank corps, practically the entire 4th tank army, as well as formations of the 5th and 25th tank, 8th and 36th rifle buildings.

In order to concentrate the entire Soviet grouping in the northwestern and eastern sections of the Oryol bridgehead and for closer interaction between the troops advancing on Orel, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided: to transfer all troops operating in the Oryol and Bryansk directions into the hands of one commander - general-colonel M.M. Popov. At that time, he was the youngest commander of the largest front - Bryansk, which at that time included about 800

thousand people.

! Bagramyan I.Kh. My memories. - M.: Yerevan: Hayastan, 1980. Pp. 531.

244

No. 30154
July 28, 1943
01h1Yumin

Commander of the Western and Bryansk fronts on changes in the composition of the fronts.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders: the army of Bagryan, the 4th Panzer Army of Badanov and the 2nd Guards. Kryukov's cavalry corps as part of the troops of the Bryansk Front.

<...>

6. About receiving and giving orders to losti.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. Stalin

A. Antonov.

f**f*

On the basis of Hitler's instructions, which he accepts on July 26 at a meeting at his Headquarters, Colonel-General Model urgently begins to withdraw his combined group of troops from the Oryol "bag". The departure was supposed to be carried out in the period from July 31 to August 17 to a depth of more than 100 km. For its organization, four main and several intermediate milestones were outlined. Why exactly on July 31, and not on the 28th, as indicated in some sources. The fact is that Model, realizing the possibility of encircling his group, even earlier made an independent decision to withdraw troops from the Orlovsky bridgehead. And the first, at the beginning of the second decade of July, began to move the infrastructure of the rear to the west in order to prepare bases in depth for receiving a huge number of troops, numbering at least 700 thousand by this time. "There can be no question of a headlong withdrawal!" » Git said.

1 TsAMORF, f. 3, op. 11596, d. 13, l. 198.

245

ler. "We must definitely rely on the Karachev positions, at least as the backbone of the defense," von Kluge, commander of Army Group Center, echoed him.

As you can see, on July 26 at the Headquarters of Hitler, and on July 28 at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, general decisions are made regarding key

the first event of the summer of 1943 - the battle for the Orlovsky bridgehead.

It was precisely the fate of the "Karachev positions" (the German defense line running from Bolkhov, through Znamenskoye and Khotynets to Karachev) that was being decided these days west of Bolkhov. On the third day of the offensive, the troops of the Badanov group cut "one connecting thread" - the Bolkhov-Khotynets road. Now the German units were leaving Bolkhov and making their way along country roads to the main communication line Orel-Karachev on foot or by transport in a roundabout way - through Orel.

Let us now return to the actions that were taken directly at the front.

On July 29, the 4th Tank Army, by decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, was withdrawn from the Western Front and transferred to the operational subordination of the Bryansk Front, the Military Council of which set the following task for the army troops:

"1. Cover from the west and east, destroy the opposing enemy, having the immediate task of forcing the river. Nugr. By the end of July 29, 1943, go to the area (claim) Pokrovskoye, (claim) Selikhovo, Zlyn, Skorodumka, (claim) Sharapovo.

2. The enemy, under the blows of the troops of 4 TA, with the main forces on July 29, retreated to a new defensive line:

Etd - high. 232.6, 214.8, app. env. Kuzminka,

10 TD - Kuzminka, sowing. env. Lokna,

20 td - Bol. Niello, (suit.) Ozerki,

25 TD - Ozerki, Skorodumka, Churilovka, Borilovo "I.

5th Panzer Corps

5th motorized rifle brigade

"28.07. At 19.00, an order was received to speak in the district of Krutitsky, Yachnoye, Yachny, Stolbchee, in the outgoing. district - ravines.

| TsAMORF, f. 4th Guards TA, op. 4756, d. 12, l. 11-12.

246

V. Stolbchee and, on a signal, go on the offensive behind the tanks of the 24th brigade.

On July 29, by 0500, they reached the Krasnoye line, continuing to push the pr-ka in the direction of Vetrovo, Rudnevo. By 13.00, the Rozhkovo-Krivusha militia came out with a fight, fought for the crossings. The 1st Motor Rifle Brigade, together with the 24th Tank Brigade, captured Tsymbulovo, Tskan, saddled the highway and captured the bunker crossing. Tskan'.

24th tank brigade

"At 18.00 on July 29, 1943, on the basis of an oral order from the commander of the 5th TC, I received the task: from the line of the southern outskirts of Stolbchee, advance in the direction of Krasny, Vetrovo, Rudnevo and, having captured Rudnevo, hold the Bolkhov-Karachev highway.

At 20.15, on a signal from the 5th shopping mall, the units went on the attack on Krasny, Vetrovo. 265 TB by order of the corps commander stop. in reserve"?.

During the day and night, the brigade conducted reconnaissance of the crossing and the opposite bank of the river. Engineer units, under the cover of several tanks that got stuck and knocked out at the crossing, equipped a crossing over the Nugr.

At 22:00, a brigade of 14 tanks: M4-A-2 - 8, MK-3 - 4 pcs. and T-34 - 2 pcs. - approached the crossings in the area west of Bolshaya Chern.

25th Panzer Corps

Parts of the 175th tank and 20th motorized rifle brigades were in reserve "in the west. env. Narrow, zap. env. Annikovo with the task: with the release of parts of the corps and units of the 169th rifle division to the outside: Uspenskoe - Novaya Zhizn, go out the Volobuevo area and secure the left flank and rear of the corps, with the exit of the tanks of the corps and units of the 169th division of the Gnezdilovo division - to hold Uspensky and part of the forces of Volobeevo, cover the parts of the 25th mk from the left.

1 TsAMORF, f. 5 MSBR, op. 1, d.4, l. 7-8. 2 Ibid., f. 24 brigade, op. 1, d. 8, l. 78.

247

FROM THE JOURNAL OF BATTLE
ACTIONS OF THE 175TH TANK NOVOGRAD-
VOLYNSK RED BANNER ORDER OF THE SUVOROV BRIGADE:

"At 0300, an order was received to attack on 28.07 at 05.05 in the direction of Pervomaisky, Lozinka, Pristan, Znamenskoye. The brigade set out at 6.30 and reached Lozinka, was met by strong enemy artillery fire from behind a height of 222.2. The tanks took up firing positions at the line reached, and at 10.30 the brigade entered Lozinka. SMEs occupied trenches pr-ka 800 m north of Lozinka.

Brigade losses per day of fighting: T-34 - 8 pcs. Wounded - 60 people, 15 killed.

The enemy suffered damage during the day of fighting: destroyed: 6 weapons

enemy action, one self-propelled gun, 2 vehicles, 1 tank and up to 2 infantry companies.

07/29/43 By order of the shtakor, the brigade concentrated at 3.00 in Annikovo, Uzkoye, took up defenses in the west. env. Annikovo in the composition - 2 T-34 tanks, 2 T-70 tanks, SMEs - 1 gun, 2 machine. machine guns, 9 anti-tank rifles, 4 mortars and 50 riflemen.

At 16.00, as a result of artillery fire, the brigade headquarters was destroyed. The duty lieutenant on duty Usachev received a severe bruise, and the driver of the car, Red Army soldier Rybakov Ivan Fedorovich, was wounded.

We learn about how this 6 km deep line was overcome from the memoirs of the senior sergeant of the medical service of the 30th motorized rifle brigade of the Ural Tank Corps Evgenia Alekseevna Bezgodova-Trapeznikova:

"It was 1943. At the end of the nursing courses at the Molotov ROKK? the city of Sverdlovsk, me and my girlfriends: Zoya Yakovleva, Kapa Vakhmyanina - were sent to the Ural volunteer corps, to the 30th motorized rifle brigade. I was sent to the third battalion, the third company as a sanitary instructor. |

The time of formation of the corps has passed, and at last we are in battle. For many volunteer fighters, he was the first.

1 TsAMORF, f. 3238, op. 1, d. 1, l. 18. ? Regional Society of the Red Cross.

248

I remember the foreman of the company (I don't remember his last name). His family was in Fagist captivity, and he learned that the Germans brutally dealt with her. The sergeant-major called me a lochkoy. We took the next battle on the river Ors. The terrain was poorly accessible for tanks, the battle was going on in high rye, here and there the groans of wounded soldiers were heard. I no longer made out where our company was, everything was mixed up, and the soldiers of the second battalion were also here. Here they broke ashore, and there is absolutely nowhere to hide here. The commander of the platoon Mikhail Methodiev was wounded: blood spurted from his throat like a fountain. I quickly provide assistance - and cover. The sergeant-major raises the people to the vataku. But somewhere, apparently, there was a sniper. He hit him right in the head - the foreman falls, I run up, but he does not need my help: he is killed. Dear comrade, you were like a father to me, goodbye, we are leaving to avenge you and your family. The fighters are already on the other bank, I see: our tank is stuck across the river, we run across its armor to the opposite bank. Having fortified in the settlement, we waited for the approach of the rear. Ammo is running out.

I was summoned by the battalion commander Captain Gatsulyak. It was he who did not want to accept me in Molotov because of the fact that I was small in stature and that I would cry in the first battle. But now he's convinced

that I'm not cowardly. The captain told me that he was introducing me to the corden. Thanking the battalion commander, I left for the unit. I didn't think it was the last time I'd see him.

But nothing, the battle went well, and by evening we had crossed the Nogr River. In this battle, helping the wounded, our Sverdlovsk woman Anya Dultseva died a heroic death. Lieutenant Karpyshyn ran up to me with a broken arm. Having helped him, I, together with the fighters, ran forward, into the very thick of the stuboy. Our company was commanded by Senior Lieutenant Gaiko, a brave commander. Together with him, his wife Lusya Gaiko, our company clerk, voluntarily went to the front. It was she who, when we drove the Germans out of the trenches, killed the German with a sapper shovel.

By evening, the Germans went on the offensive again. Our soldiers went on the attack. When the cartridges ran out, the battalion commander ordered: "Knives and volunteers from the Urals

249

ttsy rushed at the Germans with black knives, the battalion commander was killed on their noses. Later, the Germans threw out leaflets: devils with "black knives" appeared. And fifteen kilometers we had to catch up with the Germans - so they fled from fear.

In the battle near the village of Zlyn, I was wounded, but I did not leave the battlefield. When the company commander and his wife Lyusya were wounded, I left them and returned to the village of Zlyn, where brig commander Smirnov saw me and gave me his car. We - all the wounded - were taken to the medical platoon. But soon I ran away from there, my legs are intact and everything is in order, and the fragments were pulled out of my head. During a short respite, the fighters and officers of the unit were awarded, among them I was also awarded the Order of the Red Star.

11th Panzer Corps

During the night of July 29, the engineer battalion made three crossings across the river. Ors.

By the end of July 29, parts of the corps captured Rudnevo and Dolbilovo.

12th motorized rifle brigade

"The whole day of July 28, there were stubborn battles, during which the brigade managed to come close to the north-west. env. Vetrovo.

At midnight, a company of submachine gunners and a company of anti-tank rifles infiltrated in small groups into Vetrovo and entered into close combat with a numerically superior enemy. Here the submachine gunner Suvorov distinguished himself. Having stumbled in the darkness on the German anti-tank gunnery, Suvorov fired point-blank at his crew and, turning it, smashed the machine gun of the pr-ka with direct fire, which prevented our submachine gunners from entering Vetrovo with his fire.

A company of submachine gunners and anti-tank riflemen set fire to several houses with Germans and sent a messenger with a report, after which they took up defensive positions on the northwestern outskirts of Vetrovo. Deputy brigade for combat unit Lieutenant Colonel Sokolov and IN! Intelligence officer Major Khokhlov, wanting to check the accuracy of the message of the PTR company commander, made their way to the southwestern outskirts of Vetrov and in the dark stumbled upon a trench

! Memoirs of the personal archive of the author.

250

pr-ka. In a short skirmish, Major Khokhlov was shot at point-blank range, and Sokolov managed to escape to his own.

At dawn, destructive artillery and mortar fire was opened on Vetrovo both from our side and from the side of the avenue.

Groups of submachine gunners and anti-tank rifles, suffering heavy losses, began to retreat from Vetrovo, some of the fighters could not get out and held out until the very occupation of it by parts of the brigade.

One of the groups of submachine gunners who retreated from Vetrovo ran into the position of our 45-mm cannon 200 meters west of Vetrovo, the crew of which was killed, and, having taken up defense around the cannon, also held out until the occupation of Vetrovo.

At 2 p.m., the enemy launched a counterattack with tanks and self-propelled guns; remnants of the 83rd Guards. SD began to retreat and exposed the left flank of the brigade. This circumstance caused confusion among some of the fighters, but the bulk showed stubbornness. Without stepping back, the brigade took the blow and repelled the enemy's counterattack.

REPORT ON HUMAN LOSSES OF THE 11TH TANK CORPS

S20P029.07.1943

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195 559 792 | ° | 5 3

1187033 | 80

6th Guards Mechanized Corps

"On the night of 29.07, the enemy began to retreat to the south
leniya.

The corps commander ordered:

17 MBR with a battery of gliders to organize the pursuit of the retreating enemy, placing the infantry on tanks and vehicles. In the event of enemy resistance at the turn of the river. Nugr

1 TsAMORF, f. 3371, op. 1, d.2.

251

force it in the Rozhkovo area and capture the area (suit.) Bychkovsky, dep. Stud farm, Vetlovka.

49 MBR with 56 TP to advance in the second echelon for 17 MBR and concentrate in the Gradunovka, Krivush, Rozhkovo area.

29 TP in reserve - in ravines in the Shemyakino area.

Parts of the corps, fighting with the rearguard units of the enemy, during the day took possession of Vetrovsky, Moiseevka, Skvortsovo, Shemyakinsky (Komsomol), went to the sowing. bank of the river Nugr, where they were stopped by organized fire from the southern bank of the river and especially from Bol. Black.

On the night of 07/30/16, the MBR managed to cross the south bank of the river with part of the forces. Nugr, but her further attempts to move forward were not successful.

FROM THE JOURNAL OF COMBAT
ACTIONS OF THE 10TH MOTORIZED DIVISION:

"Thursday 07/29/43

Purpose: defense.

The command post of the division is a forest 1 km west of the Chernoye settlement (north).

04.00. Morning report to the Harpe group.

The withdrawal to the new front line of defense is proceeding according to plan. The enemy does not attack. The main part of the regiments before 03.15 retreated to a new line of defense.

The 3rd Artillery Battalion of the 10th Artillery Regiment went on a march to the command post of the "Grossdeutschland" division.

06.00. The regiments report that enemy infantry and tanks occupy areas of their starting positions (lowlands) in front of the division's defense sector. Significant

accumulation of tanks.

The division assesses the coming day as very difficult.

After analyzing the situation by the command of the corps, it is planned to begin a systematic withdrawal on the night of July 30

units and subdivisions in the area of the city of Karachev. The front line of defense on the coming night should be pushed back to the Nugr-Rydan sector.

1 TsAMORF, f. 6 TV mk, op. 1, d.2, l. 8.

252

12.20. The accumulation of the enemy in the lowlands in front of the front line of defense poses an increasing threat. To date, there are 40 tanks near the bridge over the Tskan; in front of the sector of the 20th motorized regiment, the enemy moves to the eastern outskirts of Karateevo.

13.15. The enemy tanks and infantry advance along the road leading to Kuzminka; height 224.9 (section of the 1st battalion of the 20th motorized regiment) is also attacked by tanks and cavalry.

13.50. At Hill 224.9, with the support of three armored vehicles of the 9th Panzer Division, an insignificant enemy breakthrough was eliminated.

14.45. 1a informs the commander of the headquarters about the situation. Particular emphasis is placed on the absence of heavy artillery in the division, no tank support, only an insufficient number of armored personnel carriers (type 5). They are alarmed by the powerful tank onslaught of the enemy.

Military aviation support is not possible due to bad weather conditions. Therefore, the division asks for fire support from the heavy artillery of neighboring units, especially along the bridge over the Tskan.

15.00. From the intercepted Russian radio message, it follows that the enemy has crossed the Tskan area to the north of Kuz Mink and is planning to advance on Lokna.

15.20. The division asks the corps to bring the Zimmermann armored group into Proletarsky.

The Corps is forced to decline the request for the time being. It is clear to the division that during an enemy offensive one cannot count on the support of tanks.

16.30. The 41st motorized regiment reports: a tank breakthrough on the defense line of the 3rd battalion. In the area of the mobile anti-tank battalion, an intensifying enemy tank attack.

18.30. In the defense of the 41st Motorized Regiment, enemy tanks made a wide gap. The division commander informs the corps commander about the situation and once again asks to urgently bring the tanks.

19.20. A day's report to the Garpe group.

From the early morning of 29.07. the enemy brings powerful forces

253

tanks and infantry, and from the area of starting positions began an offensive against the division's defense sector.

Reconnaissance breakthroughs by tanks and partially by cavalry up to a battalion, as well as observations (confirmed by radiograms) make it possible to determine the direction of the main attack by powerful forces - on both sides of the road to Kuzminka.

In the first half of the day, the enemy conducts an offensive by individual groups of infantry with powerful support from tanks. He succeeded in isolated breakthroughs with tanks, some of which were knocked out. The rest have not yet been destroyed.

By evening, the enemy delivered another powerful tank attack, as a result of which he succeeded in a wide breakthrough with tanks in the Kuzminka area.

The absence of heavy artillery makes it impossible for the division to fight effectively against enemy tanks found in their original positions. A difficult situation developed in the sector of the 41st Motorized Regiment. Only the supply of fresh tank forces can alleviate the situation.

On the night of July 30, all units of the division, with the exception of the reinforced 20th motorized regiment, were withdrawn from the front line of defense and concentrated in the area north and northeast of Selikhovo on the Mokhovitsa River.

20.20. The command post of the division moves to the forest 2.5 km east of Valyaevka.

23.30. The 20th motorized regiment reports: the main forces of the regiment have crossed the Nugr.

30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps

From the combat log of the 30th UDTK:

"07/29/43. At 0400, the corps commander issued combat order No. 8.

Ileya order: under the cover of 30 motorized brigade and motorized rifle brigade 197 tank brigades to cross the river. Ors is 6.00 start a decisive offensive in the direction of Odnoshchekino, Sukhochevo, Voskresensky and on the shoulders of the retreating enemy

1 VA-MAVN 26-23/124.

254

force the river Nugr, not allowing him to organize defense in the south. I take r. Ors.

By 0600, the 197th and 243rd brigade in the area of Voskresensky and Dulebinsky crossed the river. Ors along the crossings made by sappers of the 743rd sapper battalion.

In connection with the precipitation of 30 MSBR crossed the river. Ors continued to operate on foot.

Fulfilling the order of the corps commander, despite the fact that it was raining heavily, the 243rd brigade, 30th brigade and 197th brigade decisively attacked and by 8.00 captured the settlements of Odnoshchekino, Sukhochevo, Kolontaevo, approached the north. bank of the river Nugr at the site Voskresensky, Kuliki.

An attempt to force the river. Nugr on the go failed.

The enemy managed to organize a defense in the south. bank of the river Nugr, having at the forefront a large number of anti-tank artillery, mortars and individual self-propelled guns.

16.00. Order of the corps commander: to seize the crossings of the bunk. Nugr and advance in the direction of Vetlovka, Zlyn.

Corps commander's decisions:

243 tbr, 30 msbr and reinforcement units to force the river. Nugr on the Skorodumka, Kuliky section and advance in the direction of Vetlovka, Zlyn.

197 brigade bypass on the left through Borilovo to cross the river. Nugr, from behind the left flank in the direction of Churilovka, Ozerki, to support the offensive of the 243rd Tank Brigade and 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade.

Artillery from 20.05 to 20.45 - artillery treatment of the front line, from 20.45 to 21.00 - a powerful fire attack.

The beginning of the attack on a signal: a volley of 248 guards. mindn on Ozerki.

21.00. After artillery treatment of the front line of the enemy's defense and the districts of his artillery and mortar positions, the 243rd Tank Brigade and 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade launched an offensive from the occupied lines and by 22.00 Voskresensky, Skorodumka and Sev. part of Kulik.

Due to badly broken roads, after the fallout, the mortars and artillery of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade fell behind.

As a result of the counterattack undertaken by the enemy, parts of the brigades retreated again to the north. bank of the river Nugr. 243 tbr with

concentrated in the ravine sowing. Kolontaevo, 30 MSBR retreated to the starting area.

During the night of July 30, 1943, formations and units of the corps did not conduct offensive battles.

From the memoirs of Lieutenant General G.S. Homeland:

"At four o'clock in the morning on July 29, our tanks and wheeled vehicles were on the opposite bank of the river, and by eight in the morning they captured the villages of Kolontaevo, Sukhochevo, Odnoshcheki no, and a number of others and approached the Nugr creek in the Voskresensky, Kuliki section. It was not possible to overcome this water barrier on the move, since the enemy created a strong anti-tank barrier here. A fierce firefight lasted all day. The enemy tried with all his might to stop our movement, to prevent the crossing of the river.

During this fierce duel, we received a message that our 4th Panzer Army had been withdrawn from the Western Front and placed at the disposal of the Bryansk Front. The task was specified: to force the river Nugr and by the end of the day reach the line Zlyn - Skorodumka - Sharapovo. A decision was made: the 243rd Tank and 30th Motorized Rifle Brigades with reinforcements would advance on Vetlovka and Zlyn, while the 197th Tank Brigade would bypass through Borilovo in the direction of Churilovka and Ozerki.

At 20.05, our artillery began processing enemy positions. After forty-five minutes of artillery preparation, the guards mortars - "Katyushas" - made another powerful fire attack, and after that the Urals volunteers moved. At ten o'clock in the evening the villages of Skorodumka and Voskresensky were liberated.

When crossing the river and in the battles to expand the parade ground, the motorized rifle battalion, commanded by Senior Lieutenant Krivobokov, distinguished himself. In the midst of the battle, the commander was wounded out of action. The command of the battalion was taken over by senior lieutenant Konstantin Kostarev, a native of the mountains. Perm.

The infantrymen of this battalion acted boldly and resolutely, not giving in to anything. It came to hand-to-hand

1 TsAMORF, f. 30 UDTK, op. 1, d. 34, l.7--8.

256

Noah. In one of these battles, the battalion commander personally destroyed more than a dozen Nazis and captured two officers with a staff car in which there were valuable documents. A fascist bullet wounded Kostarev. He was bandaged and asked to leave the battlefield.

- They are waiting for us ahead! - answered Kostarev and continued

lead the battalion. After a while he was wounded a second time. And again the battalion commander refused to leave. Only the third wound forced Kostarev to leave the battlefield. He was replaced by the deputy for political affairs Captain Nizovoy. The battalion, step by step, literally bit into the enemy's defenses and broke his resistance.

In the same motorized rifle battalion, the company commander, Lieutenant Tishchenko, was seriously wounded. The command was taken by junior lieutenant Filinykh. He suddenly stopped and then slowly sank to the ground. Yakov Sosnovskikh rushed to his aid, but the commander's heart was no longer beating.

- Listen to my command! Sosnovskikh shouted, dragging the fighters along with him. - Forward! For our Soviet Motherland!

Running up the slope, he saw that a fascist machine gunner was furiously hitting ours, and threw a grenade at him. Once there was an explosion - the machine gun fell silent. However, at the last moment, the enemy's lead burst cut the daredevil's chest. Sosnovskikh woke up in the arms of a medical instructor who was bandaging him.

"Lie down, brother, lie down," the medical instructor said, moving a machine gun and a flask of ox to the wounded man. - You did yours.

No, Yakov Sosnovskikh, the son of a metallurgist worker and the metallurgist himself, who worked as deputy head of the pipe plant department and voluntarily came to the Ural Corps as a private, believed that he had not fully paid off with the Nazi barbarians.

Seriously wounded, he took up arms, climbed out of the trench and fired at the enemy until he again lost consciousness. He came to his senses in the arms of Captain Nizovoi, on whose behalf he conducted talks many times, read newspapers to soldiers, spoke about the successes of the Soviet Army and on various fronts.

257

From the memoirs of the Hero of the Soviet Union Vasily Zaitsev:

"By order of the corps commander, on July 30, at 10.30, the brigade (197th. - E. Shch.) launched an offensive in the direction - height 212.2 - Vishnevsky. The battle for Hill 212.2 was very hard. Our armored assault tanks were met with powerful enemy artillery fire, mortars, enemy air strikes followed one after another. The submachine gunners left the tanks and lay down, the tanks rushed forward, coming out from under the artillery fire. Lieutenant Diky's car was ahead of all the attacking tanks. Watering the enemy's trenches with machine-gun fire, he crushed two machine-gun points with caterpillars, destroyed an anti-tank battery and three mortars. The tank received several direct hits from shells, the commander was wounded, but ordered: "Continue

we want a fight." The turret gunner Tipunov and the machine gunner Dokuchaev were wounded. The weapon is out of order. By order of the commander, the driver Voronin drove the car to the enemy trenches and began to "iron" them. And only when the tank caught fire, having knocked down the flame, brought it out of the battle with the wounded crew members.

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In these battles, the commander of the second tank battalion, Major Chazov, also died a heroic death, the commander of the tank, Lieutenant Tumashevsky and his tower shooter Bolshakov, and several other soldiers were seriously wounded.

The personnel of the battalion of submachine gunners bravely fought. Leaving the tanks under artillery and mortar fire of the enemy in the immediate vicinity of the German trenches, they helped the actions of our tankers, covered the stalled and wrecked tanks, and helped the wounded crews to get out of them.

The enemy tried to counterattack, but was driven back by powerful and friendly fire from the battalion fighters. Komsomol organizer of the artillery battery of the battalion, Sergeant Davydkin, led the gun to an open firing position and hit the counterattacking self-propelled guns of the enemy with direct vodka. Mortally wounded, he continued to control the fire

258

guns and died of his wounds with the word "fire" on his lips. The chief of staff of the battalion, Lieutenant Chertygashev, dying of wounds, sang the song "Farewell, beloved city."

The enemy set fire to the rye, in which machine gunners lay down. The battalion commander Captain Firsov, without losing his composure, commanded "forward", and the soldiers rushed to the attack. It was unexpected for the enemy, who believed that our soldiers would run back and be destroyed by his fire. Meanwhile, machine gunners burst into the enemy trenches, and hand-to-hand combat began in the smoke. Our fighters captured the first trench and captured 18 German soldiers and officers. But the enemy threw up fresh forces and launched a counterattack, going into the flank of the battalion. In order not to be surrounded, the battalion retreated into the burning rye. The situation became critical, but heavy, thunderous rain began, visibility became minimal, the rye was extinguished, and the battalion, picking up the dead and wounded, withdrew to their original positions.

FROM THE DOCUMENTS OF THE FEDERAL MILITARY ARCHIVE
OF GERMANY:

"Secret
Order No. 19
Pub XXSH of the Army Corps

Operational department (1a). No. 2274/43. 07/29/43

I order:

1. Today the enemy attacked again with the forces of the 11th Panzer Corps on the northern flank. The 1st Panzer Corps was redeployed to the southern flank. All attacks were repulsed, local defense breakthroughs were eliminated.

Despite the fact that on July 26, 1943, the enemy lost about 150 tanks, after the introduction of new tank units on July 28, he continued to advance.

2. On the night of July 28-29, the retreat of the 20th Panzer Division, the 10th Motorized Division and the right flank of the 9th Panzer Division to a new line of defense will continue.

259

rony - the southern banks of the river. Tskan and Nugr. Departure starts at 20:30.

3. I charge:

a) The 20th Panzer Division continues its retreat beyond the river. Tskan.

The right border (at the same time the border of the corps): Voi Novo (20) - Suryanino (20) - Krivusha (20) - Bolshaya Chern (20) - Dubrovsky (25 md).

Left border: Bulgakovo (20) - Karateevo (9) - Shara povo (20). (In brackets - numbers of divisions. - E. Shch.)

Close ties must be maintained with the 25th Motorized Division.

The 101st Motorized Regiment should be withdrawn no later than a new front line is determined, and then transferred to the 18th Panzer Division.

6) On the night of July 28-29, withdraw the 10th motorized division from the front and place it at the disposal of the Harpe group.

On the night of July 27-28, 1943, the 20th Motorized Regiment of the 10th Motorized Division transferred from the command of the Army Corps to the combat positions of its division.

c) On the night of July 28-29, the 9th Panzer Division turns its right flank and withdraws units to the Khomyakov-Koptevo line.

Connection with the 20th Panzer Division: eastern border

tsa Karateevo.

Right border: (see paragraph).

d) the 253rd Infantry Division and the motorized division "Grossdeutschland" on the former lines.

4. 28.07, in the afternoon, the 18th Panzer Division will be placed at the disposal of the Harpe group and deployed in the Zlyn area. The artillery of the division remains in command of the 20th motorized division during the retreat on the night of 28/29 July.

5. Artillery.

During 07/28/43, artillery units are located behind the main front line so that they can control

260

make a retreat. At the same time, the defense capability of the main defensive front line must be fully ensured. Particular attention is paid to the conduct of concentrated barrage fire.

6. All divisions to immediately prepare for the advance of convoys and units of rear services to the west.

Until a separate order is received, any redeployment impossible.

7. Regulation of traffic.

All divisions to ensure strict regulation and control of traffic. On difficult sections of the road, use traction vehicles (caterpillar vehicles) for non-stop movement. The safe withdrawal of parts of the hull depends on these measures. To do this, use all the means at your disposal.

8. Communication.

When moving command posts, uninterrupted operation of radio or telephone communications between headquarters should be ensured.

9. Corps command post - where before.

Commander of the XX-Sarmey Corps, General
I. Frissner"1.

Results of the fourth day of the battle

On July 29, under the blows of the troops of the Badanov tank group, the main enemy forces retreated to a new line of defense,

passing along the southern banks of the rivers Nugr and Tskan. Each division of the Harpe group occupied a corresponding stock:

9th Panzer Division: high. 232.6 - high. 214.8 - western outskirts of Kuzminka;

10th motorized division: Kuzminka - northern outskirts of Lokna;

20th Panzer Division: Bol. Niello - (suit.) Ozerki;

25th motorized division: Ozerki - Skorodumka - Churilovo - Borilovo.

1 VA-MA VN 24-23/126.

The 18th Panzer Division was in the second echelon, covering the rear of the above divisions.

"Having reserves: in the areas of Ilinskoye and grove 3 km north of it - up to 40 tanks, Voroshilov - up to 30 tanks, south. Krasnaya Zarya - up to 30 tanks, up to 30 tanks and up to 2 infantry battalions in the Zlyn area, the enemy stopped the further advance of our troops!

Nevertheless, by the end of the day, the troops of General Badanov advanced several kilometers ahead and reached the line:

"11-ytk: zap. outskirts of Karateevo - Kuzminka;

5th shopping center: Kuzminka - sowing. outskirts of Lokna;

6 Guards mk - crossed the river from the move. Nugr and captured Bol. Chern, Rozhkovo;

30th TC: Voskresensky took possession, east. env. Borilovo?

If we consider the results of these four days of the offensive of our troops, they were disappointing. By the end of the fourth day, the troops of Badanov's group finally, in bloody battles, overcame the enemy's first line and, storming his defenses saturated with anti-tank weapons, crossed the Tskanyi Nugr River in some places.

Assault on the second line of defense and forcing the Nugr River Day Five

July 30, Friday. Weather: very cloudy, in some places rainy, in general - a slight improvement in weather conditions.

"07/30/43, 4 TA, breaking the enemy's resistance to

second defensive line, during 30-31.07 and 1.8 continued the offensive "?.

During the day of hostilities, the formations of the tank group of the Badanov army advanced up to 19 km to the south

1 TsAMORF, f. 4th Guards ta, op. 4756, d. 12, l. 11. 2 Ibid., l. 12.3 Ibid.

research institutes and went to the Tsymbulov-Tskan front and further along the Nugr River. Fierce battles unfolded for Bolshaya Chern and Borilovo.

5th Panzer Corps

On July 30, under heavy enemy fire, units of the 24th Tank Brigade crossed to the southern bank of the river. Nugr, continuing to carry out the task. One company of the 265th tank battalion, using a bold detour maneuver, drove the enemy out of Bolshaya Chern, thereby finally stopping the enemy's attempts to gain a foothold on the water line and ensured that other parts of the corps could carry out their tasks.

The 276th tank battalion, leaving one company on the southwestern outskirts of Rudnevo, continued the offensive in the direction of Tsymbulovo - Tskan with another tank company. At this moment, a new task was received: to cross the Nugr in the Rozhkovo region and advance in the direction of Krasny Sadok, Pavlovsky Khutor, Khotynets. The battalion fired from the spot to support the crossing of units of the 41st tank brigade through the Nugr, then crossed itself. Together with the 265th tank battalion, by 1400 hours, the Bolshaya Chern settlement was captured. By the end of the day, they captured the Krasny Sadok settlement and entrenched themselves on the line until the infantry approached!

On the night of July 30, the 70th tank brigade conducted reconnaissance of the crossing of the right and the opposite bank of the river. Sapper units, under the cover of several tanks that were stuck and knocked out at the crossing, equipped the crossing over the Nugr. At 0500, 14 tanks and a motorized rifle unit crossed the Nugr and concentrated in a hollow to the west of Bolshaya Chern.

"At 5.15, the avenue opened artillery fire on the tanks. With a direct hit, the T-34 tank pierced the turret and wounded the turret commander. It was impossible to stay in the hollow any longer. At 5.20 the signal for attack was given. At 0600, the tanks captured Kr. Sadok.

41 brigade, operating to the left in the direction of Ozerka, by this time had only just approached the crossing. crossed

1 TsAMORF, f. 24 brigade, op. 1, d. 8, l. 74.

263

tanks (up to the battalion) did not move forward, but ironed the trenches on the front line, suffering losses from artillery fire. Pr-k, seeing the indecisive actions of neighboring units on the tanks that had broken through, concentrated strong artillery fire from the direction of Kr. Dawn. Tanks suffer losses from artillery fire vr-not Kr. Sa doc. We lost 6 tanks, 4 were hit and burned, 2 were out of order for technical reasons. In Kr. Sadok tanks took up defensive positions.

At 13.00, the pr-k moved to the counterattack with the support of strong artillery fire. Self-propelled artillery guns, from behind cover under the cover of moving tanks, shot at our tanks with direct fire.

The tankers steadfastly repulsed the counterattacks of the pr-ka, 8 defective tanks fought against 30 pr-ka tanks. No matter how hard the tanks of the pr-ka tried, attacking from all sides both in total mass and in separate groups of 5-8 tanks, all the attacks of the pr-ka by our tankers were repulsed.

Losses: T-34 - 2 pieces, M4-A-2 - 6, MK-3 - 3. Killed - 21, wounded - 52, PBV - 10 people.

By the end of the day, the brigade was withdrawn to the 2nd echelon.

For the period from 24 to 30.07.43

M4-A-2: burned down - 17, knocked out - 12,

MK-3: burned down - 4, knocked out - 14,

T-34: burned down - 1, shot down - 2.

Killed - 33, wounded - 115, PBV - 24 people.

11th Panzer Corps

On the evening of July 29, units of the 11th Panzer Corps were in the settlements of Rudnevo and Dolbilovo.

On July 30, units of the 12th motorized rifle brigade of the 11th tank corps fought for crossings on the Nugr River. The enemy from the south bank of the river bombarded our artmin formations with fire and aircraft from the air. At 11.30, separate subdivisions of the units, having penetrated into Bolshaya Chern with a fight, fought street battles and by 16 o'clock captured this village completely.

In view of the heavy casualties suffered by the battalions

1 TsAMORF, f. 70 brigade, op. 1, d. 1, l. 43-44.

264

The 12th motorized rifle brigade, during the four-day battles near Vetrovo, on July 30, the personnel of the battalions was reduced to one consolidated battalion, the commander of which was Captain Romanov. Separate battalions in it were in the position of companies and retained the number of their battalion.

As a result of attacks by enemy bombers, the brigade suffered significant losses both in manpower and in equipment and weapons.

“From the morning of 07/30/1943, 36 brigade and 12 motorized brigade went on the offensive in the direction of Tsymbulovo - Tskan, Kuzminka and by 12.00 captured the crossing across the river. Tskan.

The 20th brigade continued to remain in the reserve of the corps commander, the 65th brigade was engaged in the restoration of materiel.

Subsequently, the 36th Tank Brigade and the 12th Motorized Rifle Brigade attacked in the direction of Kuzminka, Kurchaki, and the reconnaissance company and the auto match company of the 12th Motorized Rifle Brigade attacked in the direction of Lokna. The enemy offered strong fire resistance from high. 137.4, Kuz minka, h. 163.8.

Overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, on July 30, 1943, units of kishod captured Kuzminok with a fight.

During the day, parts of the corps fought fierce battles with the enemy for crossings on the river. Nugr in Lokna and Nar. Ry tribute to Kurchaki»>?.

The 36th tank brigade captured the Proletarsky settlement and crossed the river. Sob. Parts of the corps were continuously exposed to enemy aircraft - 290 sorties were made during the day.

By this time, all attempts by the 30th Panzer Corps to cross the river. Nugr were unsuccessful, therefore, special attention was paid to the capture of the crossing and the village of Lokna, because the passage of the corps through the river. Nugr was possible only in this direction.

“During the night from 30.07. on 07/31/1943, the 36th brigade made a crossing over the river. Rydan and part of the tanks were transported to the southern bank of the river, concentrating them in a ravine south of Proletarsky ”?.

1 NAMO RF, f. 3371, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 141, 143. 2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., f. 3412, op. 1, d.66, l.8.

265

6th Guards Mechanized Corps

On July 30, units of the corps continued to carry out the task assigned to the corps on July 25: "In the morning of July 26, 1943, break through the enemy's defenses at the Krasilnikova-Mal line. Chern, with a breakthrough of the defense, bring in the main forces and by the end of the day go to the Shakhovo, Gorki, Lunino region, cutting the Orel-Bryansk railway in the Shakhovo region.

Our troops had to fight another 40 kilometers to the railway, and overcame (or rather, made their way) in four days of continuous fighting only 15 km.

The attempts of the 16th motorized rifle brigade to continue the offensive, made on the morning of July 30, did not bring success. The infantry was cut off from the tanks by heavy fire, and they were forced to return to their original position.

"At 17.00, 16 mbr, simultaneously with 17 mbr, after artillery preparation, launch an offensive and, breaking the enemy's resistance and blocking Bol. The mob began to move in a southerly direction.

17 MBR brought 3 battalions into battle and, after artillery preparation, crossed the river. Nugr and began to advance in the direction of Krasn. Sadok.

By 22.00, parts of the corps captured Bol. Black, Red. Sadok, Ozerki, Krasn. Dawn and entrenched on the achieved lines.

At 21.00 the enemy launched a counterattack against 16 mbr with a force of up to two infantry battalions, supported by artillery and mortars. The counterattacking enemy was let up at close range and came under strong, pre-prepared fire with a simultaneous attack on his left flank by six T-34 tanks. After an hour-long battle, the enemy withdrew, leaving about 500 corpses on the battlefield.

As a result of the counterattack undertaken by the enemy, parts of the brigades retreated again to the north. bank of the river Nugr. 243 brigade concentrated in the ravine sowing. Kolontaevo, 30 MSBR retreated to the starting area.

1 TsAMORF, f 3434, op. 1, d.2, l.8.

266

FROM THE JOURNAL OF COMBAT
ACTIONS OF THE 10TH MOTORIZED DIVISION:

"Friday 07/30/43 Purpose:
defense. Division
CL - forest 2.5 km west of Valyaevka

04.00. Morning report to the Harpe group.

In the late evening of July 29, the division managed to restore the situation by its own means and, in heavy fighting, in general, regained the front line of defense.

9 armored combat vehicles of the enemy were shot down.

The withdrawal from the enemy proceeded according to plan.

The reinforced 20th Motorized Regiment is subordinate to the 20th Panzer Division. All other parts of the division are located north and northeast of Selikhovo.

The last units of the 41st Motorized Regiment crossed the Nugr sector at 04.15 and were withdrawn from the combat zone.

17.30. The commander of the artillery unit of the XXXU corps reports that in the defense sector of the 25th motorized division between Bolshaya Chernya and Skorodumka, the enemy was committed by tanks and infantry.

18.30. A day's report to the Garpe group.

No special events. Parts of the division marched to the Karachev area.

20.30. Order of the commander of the headquarters of the Harpe group: contrary to the orders given, the division remains in the same area, where it establishes contact with units of the 18th Panzer Division. The headquarters of the 10th Motorized Division received instructions for close cooperation with the 18th Panzer Division.

Task for 07/31/43: to introduce all available units in the division's sector as occupying security forces and to strengthen positions. Anti-tank defense positions are located on both sides of the Krasnaya Zarya-Selikhovo road. On both sides of Hill 215.2, the anti-tank battalion of the 18th Panzer Division is on the defensive.

1 VA-MAEVN 26-23/124.

30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps

On the evening of July 29, as a result of a counterattack undertaken by the enemy, parts of the corps' brigades retreated again to the northern bank of the Nugr River.

The motorized riflemen of the 30th brigade withdrew to the initial area for the offensive along the ravine - 0.5 km southeast of the Kolontaevo settlement.

<197th brigade after crossing the river. Nugrk 23.00 occupied a bridgehead in the center of the Borilovo settlement.

The motorized rifle battalions of the 243rd tank brigade concentrated in a hollow north of the Voskresensky settlement, and the tank

kovye - in a ravine north of Kolontaevo.

244th brigade - the reserve of the commander of the troops of 4 TA - in the district of Odnoshchekin.

During the night on 07/30/43, formations and units of the corps did not conduct offensive battles!

July 30 at 10 o'clock the order of the corps commander: advance in the direction of Vetlovka, Zlyn, Masalskaya, Paramonovo and capture Masalskaya at the end of the day.

"From 0000, the formations and parts of the corps resumed the attack from the occupied lines.

1. 243 tank brigade crossed the river by 11.30. Nugr in the Voskresensky district and captured Skorodumka, advanced in the direction of Kuliki, Churilovka, providing an exit for the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade to the south. without reg. Nugr.

By the end of the day, the brigade captured: Kuliki, Churilovka, sowing. env. Krivchevsky.

Strong artillery fire from the areas: Vetlovka, high. with elev. 192.1, high. with elev. 196.6 - the brigade was stopped and had no further advance, having suffered losses in tanks and personnel.

By the end of the day, the brigade had 9 tanks and 90 men in service. motor rifle b-on.

Due to the fact that the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade had not arrived at this time, the brigade commander withdrew the tanks to a hollow 1.5 km southeast. Lakes.

1 TsAMORF, f. 30 UDTK, op. 1, d. 34, l.7-8.

268

2. 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade from the line of Skorodumka, (claim.) Kuliki from 10.00 attacked behind the 243th brigade of the district of Kuliki, Churilovka.

During the forcing of the river. The Nugr Brigade was repeatedly attacked by enemy aircraft, while suffering losses.

As a result of the fighting, vr-not crossings over the river. Nugr brigade suffered losses:

a) personnel: killed - 70 people; wounded - 300 people;

6) weapons: 8 light machine guns, 3 heavy machine guns and one mortar. The enemy suffered damage: up to 700 soldiers and officers were destroyed, 5 vehicles were burned, one self-propelled gun, 27 mortars, 43 machine guns were captured!

The commander of the PTR company, Senior Lieutenant Ilyinsky, personally destroyed five enemy firing points. In battle he was mortally wounded.

"3. 197 brigade at 9.00 from the turn of the hollow - np Borilovo average attacked the enemy in the direction of high. with elev. 212.4, high. with elev. 221.2, Kalinovka, Zlyn, having the task of capturing Zlyn by 12.00.

With the exit of the brigade to the line of high. with elev. 212.4 the enemy opened heavy artillery and mortar fire. In the ensuing battle, the brigade captured the height. with elev. 212.4, at the same time part of the tanks broke through to high. with elev. 221.2 and south. The infantry was cut off from the tanks by rifle-machine-gun and mortar fire.

Above these heights, the enemy created a strong anti-tank area, in which the brigade fought until 15.00. Having destroyed the main firing points of the project, the brigade continued to carry out the assigned task. 7 tanks broke through to the district of Stud Farm No. 15, where they were met by the fire of a tank ambush, and could not advance further.

As a result of the battle, the brigade lost 14 tanks burned down and exploding, in personnel: 129 people killed, 109 people wounded, 1 missing.

As a result of the battle, the brigade inflicted damage on the enemy: 6 mortar batteries, 24 anti-tank guns, 7 self-propelled guns were destroyed, of which one was of the Ferdi type.

1 TsAMO RF, f. 30 UDTK, op. 1, d. 34, l. 8, 8 (0b.).

269

nand", one T-6 tank, 12 heavy machine guns, a battery of 105-mm guns, destroyed and dispersed to the enemy's infantry battalion.

4. 244 brigade from the Odnoshchekina survey made the transition to Borilovo middle, where they concentrated at 20.45. During the day there was no hostilities.

Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan recalls the events of that day:

"As soon as I appeared at the command post of the corps (36th rifle. - E. Shch.), the phone rang. Corps commander General I.F. Fedyunkin handed me the phone. Member of the Military Council of the Army, General P.N. Kulikov, a little worried, said that in Minino (Mitino), now the Ulyanovsk district of the Kaluga region. - E. Sh.) Marshal G.K. arrived. Zhukov and asks me, if the situation allows, to immediately return to the command post of the army.

In Minino, Georgy Konstantinovich immediately began to question

tell me about the reasons for the not entirely successful actions of the tank army of General V.M. Badanov. I briefly described how the tanks were brought into action. The Marshal grimaced in displeasure.

Yes, the solution could be better.

I reported on our affairs in some detail. When the conversation touched on the role that was assigned to General Kryukov in the operation, Georgy Konstantinovich, who knew him well, remarked:

- Vladimir Viktorovich is a nice person, a fairly experienced and competent commander. But he is too equestrian by nature. You need to keep a close eye on him, otherwise he can break firewood.

Having acquainted me with the course of hostilities of the Central and Voronezh fronts, G.K. Zhukov soon drove out in a car to Badanov's?

One can only guess what kind of conversation Zhukov had with Badanov.

In his memoirs, published during the life of George

1 Ibid., I. 8 (0b.).

2 Bagramyan I.Kh. My memories. - Yerevan: Hayastan, 1980. Pp. 534-535.

270

Konstantinovich, despite his regalia, General G.S. Rodin writes:

"The exit of corps units to the line of the Mokhovitsa River created a serious threat to encircle the enemy, including in the city of Orel. The Hitlerite command did everything possible to delay our offensive. The commander of a group of fascist troops, von Kluge, reported that "the former intention to inflict as many blows on the enemy as possible is now impossible", and referred to the "decreased combat effectiveness and overwork of the troops." Apparently, this circumstance was taken into account, since the Nazis brought up reserves here and went over to a tough defense.

An eyewitness to the fighting of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps on Oryol land, Sergeant of the Red Army Yevgeny Milanevsky passed in the combat ranks of the corps from Orel to Berlin (later - academician and professor of Moscow State University). He recalls: "After powerful artillery preparation and the introduction of tanks into battle, Bolkhov was taken. In the midst of the battle near Bolkhov, Marshal G.K. appeared. Zhukov, who, as the chief coordinator of the entire Oryol-Kursk battle, savagely scolded the officers of our army, apparently for insufficiently decisive

effective actions, and everyone who could, in order to avoid possible troubles, hid from him”?

While the commanders were sorting out relations with representatives of the Stavka and looking for a way out of the situation, ordinary tankers fought, overcoming the incredible difficulties of the most difficult battle in all respects, and at the same time performed legendary feats. We can learn about some of them by reading the front-line notes of a graduate of the Oryol Armored School named after M.V. Frunze, Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Mikhail Georgievich Fomichev?.

1 Rodin G.S. In the footsteps of the past. - Tula: Priokskoye book publishing house, 1968. Pp. 202.

? Milanevsky E.E. Memories of the war years. - M.: Logos, 2005. Pp. 48.

3 Fomichev M.G. - Commander of the 63rd Guards Tank Brigade, received the first "Gold Star" of the Hero in the battles for the city of Lvov. For successful actions during the storming of Berlin and the liberation of Prague, on May 31, 1945, he was awarded the second Gold Star medal.

271

“The Ural volunteers received their baptism of fire in a fierce battle that took place on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge. Our corps received an order to cut the Orel-Bryansk road and reach the flank of the German fascist group hanging over the Oryol salient.

The enemy put up strong resistance. The fulfillment of tasks was further complicated by the fact that the area was heavily mined. The tanks broke through the narrow passages made at night by the sappers. This hampered the maneuver of the machines, did not allow to turn around on the front. And the fire of the enemy kept getting stronger. Dozens of self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns hit the tanks, well-camouflaged bunkers came to life here and there. Shooting from the air with cannons and machine guns and throwing bombs, they attacked enemy planes - they continuously "hung" above us.

Breaking the fierce resistance of the Nazis, the tanks moved forward. Everyone thought of only one thing: to get closer to the enemy faster, to crash into his defenses, to crush and crush him.

The crew of the Chelyabinsk citizen - Lieutenant Akinshin managed to slip far ahead. Firing on the move, hitting targets instantly and without a miss, he destroyed the enemy bivouac at close range, the enemy bunker, several anti-tank guns and reached the first enemy trench. The rest of the tanks remained somewhere behind. In the confusion of the battle in the fire, it was difficult for Akinshin to see them. The lieutenant, without hesitation, boldly led the tank forward, into the depths of the enemy defenses. Akinshin's crew consisted

of the young tankers, the commander himself and all his subordinates were members of the Komsomol. The tankers were connected by a great, real military friendship, one after the other they stood like a mountain and lived like brothers, although they were in many ways different people. The soul of the crew was Lieutenant Akinshin. He possessed great determination, courage and prowess. At the same time, he was a sincere person who knew how to dream and encourage the soldiers with a good, heartfelt word.

Alexander Marchenko, an electrical engineer from Chelyabinsk, served as a gunner-radio operator in the crew. He enjoyed great respect among the tankers, was everyone's favorite. Everything about Marchenko was attractive - both his appearance and some

272

special, strict concentration, and a firm, unshakable will, which allowed him to remain calm in the most difficult situation. Marchenko was handsome with that particular masculine beauty that is inherent in strong and proud people. Tall, slender, with an open strong-willed face, Alexander Marchenko possessed dexterity and dexterity.

The complete opposite of him was the charging Mordvintsev. The soldiers often made fun of his baggy, slowness. But even the sharpest jokes of your comrades - the tankists love a sharp word - you could not make the silent Mordvintsev out of himself. He used to only smile sparingly.

Another member of the crew, the driver-mechanic Surkov, was very thrifty. He was truly a tireless worker, he could always be found in ducklings. Sometimes, after the battle, the soldiers rest - some will settle down to sleep under a bush, some will take the button accordion in hand or write a letter to me, and the housekeeping Surkov is all around the car: cleaning, checking fastenings, repairing something. There was no life for negligent people from Surkov. He could not stand laxity, lack of management.

All these people, different in their characters, acted in battle with the same fearlessness and real, I would say, artistic skill. Even the slow Mordvintsev, being at the cannon, became unrecognizable. Where did his dexterity and speed come from!

The brave crew, ruthlessly crushing the enemy with cannon and machine-gun fire, rushed and rushed forward. The fascists, stunned by the bold blow, faltered and backed away. And after Akinshin's tank, developing the success of the attack, other vehicles rushed. Not allowing the enemy to come to his senses, Akinshin's crew broke through at full speed to the settlement of Borilovo, which we were ordered to take. His tank was the first to reach the village.

The battle for Borilovo was fierce. On the southern outskirts of the Urals, enemy tanks counterattacked. Everywhere went

fierce fights, often one of our tanks fought with two or three fascist vehicles. Soon the whole field was engulfed in flames. Enemy tanks were burning all around.

273

The crew of Lieutenant Akinshin managed to break through behind enemy lines and reach the farm, located a few kilometers from Borilovo. Soon another of our tanks appeared not far from the farm. But here the Soviet tankers were surrounded.

Akinshin, having covered the car in a pit left over from the burnt building, entered into an unequal battle. The crew held out for almost a day. Saving shells and ammunition, the tankers hit only for sure. They destroyed several tanks and over hundreds of enemy soldiers. But the Nazis still managed to get close to our tank. Then Mikhail Akinshin opened the tower, leaned out of it to the waist and began throwing grenades at the Nazis.

Having captured the village of Borilovo, the tankers rushed forward. By morning we had occupied the district center Zlyn, located eighteen kilometers from Borilovo!

FROM THE DOCUMENTS OF THE FEDERAL MILITARY ARCHIVE
OF GERMANY:

"Secret

Headquarters of the 20th Panzer
Division

07/30/43 For the command of the 52nd motorized regiment of the 18th Panzer
Division Notify:
59th motorized regiment of the 20th TD, 112th
motorized regiment, 92nd anti-tank
artillery regiment.

Disposition

1. Large enemy tank forces invaded the Nugryu area of the Rozhkovo settlement, and also reached the junction of the 20th Panzer and 25th Motorized Divisions. The advanced units stand on a common line: the northwestern part of Bolshaya Chern - Krasny Sadok - Ozerki - Skorodumka. The most powerful tank forces against the nick are drawn to this plandarm. The division takes into account the fact that with the onset of dawn

1 Copy of "Front Notes" from the personal archive of the author.

274

the enemy will take advantage of his success and launch further attacks in a southerly direction.

2. The 52nd Motorized Regiment, which has units of the 20th Panzer Division under its command, must first of all reach the area of height 196.6 (1 km south of Krasnaya Zarya). The regiment was to occupy the gap between Krasnaya Zarya and the left flank of the 25th Motorized Division.

3. The 88th anti-tank artillery regiment is transferred to the subordination of the regiment.

4. This regiment, together with the 112th motorized regiment, should close the gap (200 m southeast of elevation 215.2).

5. Radio communication with the division (frequency 1193, call signs 198 and 199).

The original was signed
by Major General von Kessel!

"Secret 20th
Panzer Division Operations
Department (1a). 825/43 07/30/43 KNP division - lowland
south of Gradunovka

Information about the enemy
(Appendix to divisional order No. 7 of 07/28/43)

On July 18, the concentrated forces of the 16th Army of the enemy (since March 1943 - the 1st Guards. - E. Shch.) on a wide front began an attack in a southeast direction with the aim of capturing Bolkhov and in a southerly direction with the aim of intercepting communications on Karachevsky direction. The enemy did not reach the intended target and at the same time lost most of the tanks of three tank corps (1st, 5th and 25th). In the following days, the enemy tried to wear down the German troops with a continuous offensive and attacks by newly brought infantry formations.

On July 26, the enemy completed the formation of the 4th shock tank army, which, with strong artillery support, goes on the offensive. The main blow is directed at the 20th Panzer Division and its immediate neighbors.

1 VA-MAVN 24-35/109.

275

Moreover, the forces of the 11th tank corps, including the 20th, 36th and 6th tank brigades, as well as the 12th motorized rifle brigade, lost 155 tanks on the first day of the offensive. striving

under any circumstances to achieve a decisive breakthrough, the enemy continued powerful attacks on 27 and 28.07 with the remnants of the 11th tank corps, as well as the forces of the 6th guards mechanized corps again brought to the battlefield. At the same time, the enemy again suffered significant losses in men and tanks. Only the 20th Panzer Division from 26 to 28.07 destroyed 139 tanks. It is necessary to take into account the strong resistance of the enemy.

The following enemy formations are operating in front of the front of the 20th Panzer Division.

Before the right flank: 6th Guards. mechanized corps (17th and 49th mechanized brigades), as well as the 126th, 127th and 128th tank regiments subordinate to it, each having 30 T-34 tanks, most of which were destroyed. On July 28, in the morning, the 1st Guards Self-Propelled Artillery Anti-tank Regiment entered the battle with 16 guns of caliber 12.2 cm.

In front of the left flank: the remnants of the 11th tank corps with the defeated 20th tank brigade, presumably the remnants of the 36th and 65th tank brigades, as well as the still combat-ready 12th motorized mechanized brigade. The offensive of this corps was supported by units of the 83rd Guards Rifle Division (248th, 250th and 252nd Guards Regiments), whose combat effectiveness was negligible due to heavy losses.

One gets the impression that the enemy has used up all the reserves prepared for the summer offensive operation and must again be replenished with preparatory reserves from the deep rear.

Most of the motorized and tank formations standing in front of the division enter the battle for the first time. Further destruction of these units will provide the German command with freedom of action in the East. This is the meaning of our counteroffensives, combined with heavy defensive battles!

1 VA-MA VN 24-35/109.

276

The water barrier has been overcome. Forward - to Zlyn!

Day six

31 July, Saturday. Weather: reduction of cloudiness to not large; cessation of rains; lowering of the water level on the rivers; visibility improved to 10 km; north winds, weak; improving the patency of dirt roads.

25th Panzer Corps

As early as July 30, an order was received by the corps headquarters: the 175th tank and 20th motorized rifle brigades should pay special attention to ensuring the left flank of the corps from a surprise attack by the enemy; prepare for counterattacks in the direction of Uzkoye-Vysokoye, Karateevo-Plekhanovo, Bunino-Kashcheyevo. Establish close ties with units operating in these areas.

The brigade took up defensive positions on the western outskirts of the village of Lozinka - Annikovo. During the day, the enemy conducted rare artillery and mortar fire on the position of the brigade's defenses. Reconnaissance was sent as part of two groups from a reconnaissance platoon in the following directions:

1) Narrow, High, Annikovo, Karateevo, Plekhanovo;

2) Rakitinsky, Annikovo, Shestakova, Korobetskaya.

The 175th Tank Brigade, together with the 20th Motorized Rifle Brigade with artillery and mortar units, received an order: to attack the enemy and capture the Brezhnevsky and Efremovsky settlements; be ready to repel counterattacks; organize reconnaissance in the direction of possible counterattacks against the enemy.

The starting position for the attack is Vyazovaya, elev. 223.6.

By order of the headquarters of the corps, the 175th tank brigade on July 31 "at 5.00 concentrated on ref. east positions env. np Korobetskaya. The command post of the brigade moved to the north-west. env. Shestakova. At 13.00, by order of the shtakor, the brigade crossed and concentrated at the right time. positions Elm. During the day and night, the brigade fought and repelled enemy counterattacks. In re

277

As a result of the battle, the brigade had losses: 1 T-34 tank was hit, 1 T-34 tank was burned. 22 people were injured, 4 people were killed.

Enemy losses: infantry squadrons destroyed, 1 artillery battery, 2 tanks knocked out.

5th Panzer Corps

The enemy, under attack from units of the 5th Panzer Corps, withdrew to a line 500 meters south of Lokna and put up strong resistance. By 6 p.m., units of the 5th motorized rifle brigade "reached the mark. 207.5, south. slopes without a name. you are a honeycomb, which is 1200 m north-west. otd. Stud Farm No. 15, and by the end of the day - to the sowing line. env. Martynovsky?

Units of the 24th Tank Brigade "at 15.00 attacked Kr. Mountain. Having overcome the strong fire of the pr-ka, having repelled 2 counter attacks, being under the influence of massive air raids,

aviation comrade pr-ka, the tanks went out and entrenched themselves on the northern slopes of a height of 215.2.

As a result of the battle, 12 T-34s were lost, destroyed and burned down by SHMI.

At this time, the 41st Tank Brigade took an active part in the hostilities, in which it suffered heavy losses.

LOSSES OF PERSONNEL AND TANKS OF THE 41st TANK BRIGADE ON 07/25 AND 07/31/1943

| Personnel | tanks

NS | mns s Total | T-34 | T-70 | T-60 Total 07/25/1943 | 209 | 384 | 335 | 98 | 4% 16 | 8 | 6 | 1.0t.l94ze: | 173 | z17 | 296 | 786 | 4 | 127

1 TsAMORF, f. 3238, op. 1, d. 1, l. 18.

2 NAMORPH, f. 3366, op. 1, d.4, l. 49.

3 Ibid., f. 24 brigade, op. 1, d. 8, l. 73.

4 Ibid., f. 41 brigade, op. 1, d. 12, l. 364.373.

278

11th Panzer Corps

On the morning of July 31, units of the 36th tank and 12th motorized rifle brigades went on the offensive in the direction of Znamenskoye, but, having met enemy resistance from the direction of Krasny Oktyabr, a grove southwest of Kurchaki, Safonovsky, they were forced to retreat to their original position .

At 1900 hours, the enemy counterattacked the corps' battle formations with 33 tanks from the same direction. The counterattack was repulsed, 7 tanks were destroyed, the rest of the tanks retreated to their original position.

At 20:00, the enemy again launched a counterattack - 32 tanks and 6 self-propelled guns with infantry on 18 armored vehicles. The counterattack was also repulsed, the tanks continued to remain on the western bank of the river.

At dawn on July 31, having overcome the resistance of the enemy, the 12th motorized rifle brigade captured the Kuzminka settlement. In this battle, the commander of the combined battalion, Captain Romanov, was wounded and the chief of staff of the combined battalion, Captain Karpukhov, was killed. The command of the combined battalion was taken over by Senior Lieutenant Milykh.

"Having captured Kuzminka, the brigade non-stop pursued the remnants of the razb. parts of the pr-ka and by the end of the day took possession of Sharapovo and sowing. outskirts of Lokno. In Lokna, the brigade captured the fuel and lubricants warehouse of the pr-ka.

On July 31, at 12.30, the 65th tank brigade, consisting of 8 T-34 tanks and 6 T-70 light tanks, concentrating on the southern slopes of height 209.8, attacked the enemy in the direction of Isaevka and by the end of the day reached the area 1 km south of -to the west of Proletarskiy.

All day the enemy bombed the battle formations of the corps, making raids in groups of 25-50 aircraft. Anti-aircraft fire shot down two German aircraft?.

6th Guards Mechanized Corps

On the night and in the morning of July 31, parts of the corps were subjected to repeated attacks by the enemy, each with a force of up to a battalion.

infantry with tanks.

1 TsAMO RF, f. 12 MSBR, op. 1, d. 25, l. 380. 2 Ibid., f. 3412, op. 1, d. 66, l.9.

279

At 0630, the corps' combat formations were bombed by 30 dive aircraft, and at 0700 the enemy counterattacked from the high altitude direction. 206.5 to Krasny Sadok.

"At 9.30, after a new raid by 30 Yu-88 aircraft, the enemy again launched a counterattack in the direction of high. 196.6, Krasnaya Zarya, up to two battalions with 30 tanks. The counterattack was repulsed by forces of 17 and 16 mbr. 100 soldiers and officers were destroyed, 9 tanks and 4 self-propelled guns were knocked out.

The corps commander, continuing to fulfill the assigned task, ordered: 17 mbr to capture the area of el. 233.8, Valya evka, (claim) Malinovka.

16 MBR to seize the development area. roads 1 km south of the mark. 222.6, Malinovka, elev. 218.5.

49 mbr to advance behind 17 mbr in readiness to build on success.

The attack was delayed, because at 10.45 parts of the corps were attacked by Yu-88 aircraft.

At 1100, the units went on the attack, but were attacked again by 16 Ju-88s and lay down again.

3 Yu-88 aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire. Our fighter aircraft

avoided combat with enemy aircraft.

In two hours (from 11.30 to 13.30), 30 Yu-88 sorties and 26 Yu-87 sorties were carried out against the combat formations of the corps.

The corps commander appointed a second attack at 14:00, deciding to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 17th and 16th mechanized brigades, the 29th tank and 1145th self-propelled artillery regiments in the direction of the southeastern slopes of height 206.6, and heights 215.2.

But the enemy outstripped the offensive of the strike group of the mechanized corps. "With forces up to two infantry battalions with 22 tanks, concentrated in the area of high. 215.2, with the support of attack aircraft at 14 o'clock went on a counterattack in the direction of high. 206.6, Cr. Sadok, Ozerki.

Having repelled the enemy's counterattack and overcame stubborn resistance, by 1700 hours our strike group had captured

! TsAMORF, f. 3434, op. 1, d.2, l.9.

280

high 206.6, continuing to advance in the direction of high. 215.2, which the 17th MBR captured by the end of the day, and the 16th MBR captured high. 196.6. The 29th TP went to the Bychkovsky area by 17.00

In total, during the day, more than 450 aircraft sorties against the nickname were made against the battle formations of the corps. At 17:00 our iggurm aviation (IL-2) bombed the command post area and fired at the combat formations of the 49th MBR from the RS (multiple rocket launcher "Katyusha").

During the day, in the offensive zone of the corps, machine-gun and anti-aircraft fire shot down: one Me-109, three Yu-88, one Focke-Wulf.

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On this day, the fighters of the 29th separate tank regiment fought especially successfully.

Combat mission: a regiment consisting of 29 T-34 tanks, a company of auto matchers and a company of anti-tank rifles operating as a tank assault, advance in the direction of Krasny Sadok, Krasnaya Zarya, Bychkovsky, Stud Farm department, break into the area of Valyaevka, Malinovka, take a roundabout ronu and wait for the approach of our units. The regiment in the breakthrough is accompanied by 2 batteries of self-propelled guns.

"From 08.00 on 07.31.43, aircraft from the pr-ka appeared over the location of the unit, which bombarded the Bol district. Niello and

Department of Stud Farm No. 15. Thanks to the arrangement of shelters and good camouflage, there were no losses in tanks and materiel.

At 14.10 31.07 by phone, deputy. Guard Corps Commander Colonel Lesnoy gave the command: "Akimov ordered Maslyayev forward." At 14.20 reconnaissance came out as part of a tank platoon, a platoon of submachine gunners and two anti-tank rifle squads. The regiment with a company of submachine gunners, anti-tank rifles and tank companies left their starting position at 14.20, the line of Kr. The garden passed at 15.10. The tanks moved quickly. In the district of Dubrovsky Prospekt, a strong artillery fire opened. Several tanks caught fire at 500 m. in. Cr. Dawn. Aviation pr-ka carried out massive raids on the battle formations of our tanks in the amount of 35-45 aircraft. Despite the strong artillery fire and

TsAMORF, f. 3434, op. 1, d.2, l. 10.

281

air bombardment from the side of the avenue, the tanks continued to move forward and reached the village of Valyaevka. After that, the military district of Kr departed. Sadok and took up defense under the command of the NSH (Chief of Staff).

As a result of the battle, our losses amounted to:

T-34 tanks burned down - 16; PBV - 1; shot down on the battlefield - 4.

LOSS OF PERSONNEL OF THE REGIMENT

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not | pl | gs | Vu | G Killed about
Al | Wounded 7 |
14 | n | 32 m.Prop. 6/at 9 22 44 | E | in |
8 53. | 17 | oh oh G 86 k -

Conclusion: the regiment broke through the defenses of the avenue at the turn of Kr. Sadok and Kr. Dawn and reached the indicated milestone, thereby completing the task!

From the combat log of the 10th motorized division:

"Saturday 07/31/43.

Purpose: defense

The command post of the division is a forest 2.5 km west of Valyaevka.

05.15. Calling the division commander to the headquarters of the Harpe group.

General Harpe inquires why the military units of the 10th motorized division have not yet been brought to the line of defense indicated in the order. Positions cannot be filled at this time because:

1. Corps orders delivered too late.
2. The poor condition of the roads does not allow you to move quickly.

07.50. The Weber Battle Group (reinforced 41st Motorized Regiment), according to the order of the corps, was transferred to the disposal of the 18th Panzer Division.

1 TsAMORF, f. 29 otp, op. 215314s, d.9, l. 45.

282

09.05. Corps commander at the command post of the division.

On the evening of 31.07. the division in its entirety remains, probably, for a few more days in the same sector and must continue combat operations.

10.20. An order was received: the 10th eastern company and one column of the assembled civilian workers should be sent to strengthen the new line of defense (line E).

16.20. The division commander personally determines the location of the E line.

16.40. The Harpe group demands that the order to withdraw from the site be carried out on the night of 31.07 to 1.8. The withdrawal of the main part of the units will begin at 02.00.

17.40. Colonel Frober, commander of the 92nd Antitank Artillery Regiment (20th TD), was ordered to concentrate an artillery group on the defense sector of the 10th division. Its subordination was transferred to the headquarters of the 10th artillery regiment of the 1st 2nd artillery divisions. In this section of the division, there are 5 anti-tank artillery battalions and one cannon battery.

18.00. In accordance with the decision of the commander-in-chief, the division remains until 04.08 under the command of XXXX [tank corps (Group Harpe)].

24.00. Order for the division: to redeploy units to occupy a new sector of defense - line O.

Tank losses inflicted on the enemy from 11.07 to 31.07.43:

11.7 2 tanks

12.7 1 tank

15.7 46 tanks

16.7 3 tanks

17.7 b tanks

19.7 1 tank

21.7 1 tank

22.7 16 tanks

23.7 b tanks (3 of them without the ability to move) 26.7 46 tanks

27.7 2 tanks and 5 armored vehicles 29.7 b tanks.

1 VA-MA VN 26-23/124.

30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps

The 197th tank brigade, as a result of the fighting all day on July 30, reached the Borilovo area (middle), where it put itself on alert.

On July 31, the rest of the formations and units of the corps continued to advance in the direction of the large settlement of Zlyn.

The 30th motorized rifle brigade was advancing in the direction of Kuliki, Churilovka, the southern outskirts of Borilovo. At 3 o'clock in the morning, the brigade, having destroyed up to a company of enemy infantry, took control of the Kuliks. At 9 o'clock, having beaten off a counterattack (up to an infantry company with four tanks), our motorized riflemen, with the support of four tanks of the 243rd brigade, cleared the southern outskirts of Borilovo from the enemy.

The 243rd tank brigade, with nine tanks in service, together with the motorized riflemen of the 30th brigade went on the offensive
nie.

The 244th tank brigade at 3 o'clock in the morning went to its original position - the northeastern slopes of high. 212.4. At 0520, a brigade consisting of 37 T-34 tanks with an infantry landing and with the support of reinforcement artillery units attacked the enemy in the area of the southern outskirts of Borilovo - high. 212.4 in the direction of high. 221.2, np Vishnevsky, having a task: to master Vishnevsky.

Going on the offensive, the units of the brigade were met with strong artillery fire, which the enemy fired from the dominant heights of 192.1 and 221.2, as well as from the Baevsky settlement

and Bogoslovsky. The infantry landing party dismounted and turned for battle.

Throughout the day, the 244th Tank Brigade waged a fierce firefight in the area of a ravine 1 km south of the height. 218.4 and adjacent slopes.

"As a result of the battle, the brigade lost 15 tanks burnt out and exploded, 12 tanks knocked out, several tanks got stuck in a ravine. By the end of the day, 4 tanks remained combat-ready in the brigade.

During the day of fighting, the brigade inflicted damage on the enemy: 13 anti-tank guns, 17 machine guns, 11 mortars, one self-propelled gun and up to 500 soldiers and officers were destroyed.

284

By the end of the day, the brigade left the battlefield and concentrated in the Borilovo area (middle) "I.

Conclusion.

The enemy, covering the retreat of the Bolkhov group, stubbornly defended the southern bank of the Nugr River.

From July 29 to 31, formations and units of the 30th UDTK, advancing from the northern bank of the Nugr, could only force it and capture crossings and small bridgeheads on the southern coast - in the area of the settlements of Kuliki and Churilovka.

As a result of the fighting all day on July 31, the formations of the corps reached the line by the evening:

243-Yatbr - 1 km east of Churilovka,

30th Motorized Rifle Brigade: 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade - 2 km south of Ozerka, 2nd and 3rd Motorized Rifle Brigade - 800 m north of Churilovka.

"Attempts to develop success in the direction of Ozerka, Vetlovka, Vishnevsky were not successful.

By this period, the brigade had losses in the personnel of combat units and subunits over 50%.

244 brigade, having suffered heavy losses in tanks and manpower, reached the heights. with elev. 221.4, having 4 tanks in service, the brigade commander organized the evacuation of wrecked and stuck tanks in the Borilovo district (upper).

During the night of August 1, 1943, units of the corps did not conduct offensive battles - they remained at their former lines.

"The fighting continued with increasing tension. The 243rd and 30th brigades, overcoming fierce enemy resistance, moved south. The 244th tank brigade, which was in the reserve of the commander of the 4th tank army, entered

at the disposal of the corps and launched an offensive, building on the success of the 197th brigade. After a series of bloody battles, the Chelyabinsk people broke the defense of the elite fascist units, captured the Vishnevsky farm and created a real threat of encirclement of the enemy at the Vetlovka line, "general Rodin?z writes in his memoirs.

1 TsAMO RF, f. 30 UDTK, op. 1, d. 34, sheet 9.9 (0b.). 2 Ibid., l. 9 (vol.).

3 Rodin G.S. In the footsteps of the past. - Tula: Priokskoye book publishing house, 1968. Pp. 195-196.

285

Results of the fifth and sixth days of the battle

Summing up the results of the combat operations of the Badanov tank group during these two days of the Borilov battle, it should be noted that they are very disappointing, if not painful.

she - deplorable.

The tasks set by the Headquarters and the command of the Bryansk Front were not fulfilled. The tankers did not break through the enemy defenses, the second line was not overcome. The brigades of the 11th, 6th Guards Mechanized and 30th Tank Corps, fighting bloody offensive battles, essentially remained in their previous positions. Attempts to develop an offensive in the direction of Ozerki, Vetlovka, Vishnevsky were not successful.

A small success was indicated on the right flank in the sector of combat operations of the 5th Panzer Corps, when by the end of July 31, its units advanced several kilometers ahead and entrenched themselves at the Krasilnikovo-high line. 207.5 - northern outskirts of the Martynovsky settlement - vys. 215.2.

It was during these two days that all formations of Badanov's tank group suffered the most significant losses. In fact, some of them were left without tanks. For example, the 244th tank brigade of the 30th Ural Corps by the end of July 31 had 4 tanks combat-ready. The 243rd Tank Brigade was on the offensive that day, "having 9 tanks in service", the 197th Tank Brigade, after the battles of July 30, put itself in order. The 30th motorized rifle brigade had losses in the personnel of combat units and subunits over 50 percent.

comrade

As a result of these battles, out of sixty tanks, only seven.

From the memoirs of the Hero of the Soviet Union Vasily Zaitsev:

"The capture by the Borilov brigade and the breakthrough of the second line of enemy defense threatened to encircle the entire Oryol group of German troops. Therefore, the enemy threw to hold the line of defense south of Borilov (height 221.2)

286

in addition to the 253rd Infantry Division operating here, tank units armed with the latest Tiger-type tanks, Ferdinand-type self-propelled artillery units, and anti-tank artillery units. The forces became unequal, and the brigade needed immediate support. The brigade commander sent me to the corps commander with instructions: to report on the situation and ask for help. We hoped that the Chelyabinsk tank brigade, which was at that time in Borilovo, would be able to support us. But it turned out that it constituted a reserve for the commander of a tank army, and without his knowledge the corps commander could not dispose of the brigade. The Chelyabinsk brigade received the order to advance in the direction of height 221.2 later, when our brigade, having suffered heavy losses in people and military equipment, was forced to withdraw to its original positions.

The headquarters summed up the results of the first four days of fighting. The exceptional bravery of the warriors, their readiness to carry out a combat mission without sparing their lives, caused legitimate satisfaction. But mixed with it was the pain of the losses he had suffered. It seemed that they were too great in comparison with the achieved results. Many officers of the command and headquarters of the brigade explained this by the fact that the brigade had to fight on wooded and swampy terrain that was difficult for vehicles to access, which, moreover, became impassable as a result of rains. Tankers rammed the enemy defenses, overcoming deep ravines, swampy lowlands, steep river banks, and often the combat vehicles skidded or got stuck in the mud, becoming good targets for enemy anti-tank weapons.

However, shortcomings in the command and control of subunits at individual stages of the battle, the incompleteness of information about the enemy, his strongholds and nodes of resistance, which the Igtgab of the brigade had at the beginning of the offensive, also made themselves felt. We also had to take into account that for many of our soldiers this was the first battle, and here, of course, the lack of

287

effect of experience. From all this, lessons should be learned in order to learn to fight more confidently. It was about this that we had a useful conversation at our headquarters.

During July 31 and August 1 we put in order

units, repaired military equipment, evacuated the wounded to the rear. About two tank companies arrived from the corps reserve. This made it possible to re-form a tank battalion, commanded by Major K.N. Averin, who worked for the war as the secretary of the party committee of the Bryansk Locomotive Plant.

Soldiers of the technical service made their contribution to the staffing of the battalion with military equipment, who, under the leadership of the deputy brigade commander for the technical part, Lieutenant Colonel Galkin, the deputy battalion commander for the technical part, Promogaichenko, restored and commissioned 14 tanks.

zhzh * x

Looking through the lists of the dead Soviet soldiers, whose ashes rest in the mass graves of villages and villages densely located on the banks of the Ors and Nugr rivers, I noticed that the young guys were among the tank crews born in 1923-1925, especially the tank brigades of the 30th Ural corps, were killed mainly on July 30 and 31, 1943. These were the culminating days of the battle, when the German impenetrable wall of fire and metal was literally breaking through.

It is no coincidence that at the end of the battle for Borilovo on July 31, and then on the first day of August, the actions of the tankers of the Badanov group became the subject of analysis, first by the leadership of the Western Front, and then in the Kremlin.

In order to understand the reasons why the tankers did not cope with the task and at the same time suffered unjustified losses, G.K. Zhukov, V.D. Sokolovsky, I.Kh. Baghramyan, V.M. Badanov and commander of the Bryansk Front

288

MM. Popov, although he did not take part in the "case of the tankers" at all - at best he was informed of the introduction of the 4th Panzer Army into battle in the Western Front.

Let's make a reservation right away that the entry of the 4th Panzer Army was not entirely successful: it suffered very heavy losses. To clarify the reasons for this development of events, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin instructed the Stavka representative G.K. Zhukov, who is in charge of the operation "Kutuzov", to understand what happened and report to him personally. Undoubtedly, the issue of introducing the largest tank formation into battle was agreed with Zhukov, and therefore, first of all, he bore the blame for the unsuccessful development of tank operations on the Bolkhovsky direction.

About how Georgy Konstantinovich understood on the spot, we can read in the memoirs of the commander of the 30th Ural Volunteer Corps, Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops Georgy Semenovich Rodin:

"In those days, Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. arrived in the area of the active 4th Tank Army. Zhukov. He was unusually irritable and unbalanced. I don't know whether this was a constant feature of his character or whether it was the result of the fact that living reality was somewhat at odds with the predetermined plan. When he was informed of the intention of the Military Council of the 4th Army to regroup the army in the area of the village of Ilyinsky and provided convincing justifications for this, the marshal categorically reproduced

stumbled.

At this time, they called from the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The commander of the 4th Tank Army of the Guards, Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops V.M. Badanov. With his inherent boldness and objectivity, he reported the situation, pointing out that with a significantly increased enemy resistance, the further offensive of the 4th Panzer Army without the support of infantry and

289

other means will lead to serious and unjustified losses. An hour later it was reported from Moscow that the proposals of the Military Council of the 4th Panzer Army were being accepted. An order was given to regroup the army in the Ilinsky area.

Then Popov, Zhukov and a member of the Military Council of the Western Front N.A. Bulganin flew to Moscow - "on the carpet" to Stalin. On August 1, for an hour (from 18.20 to 19.20), they, in the presence of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff A.I. Antonov explained why another tank disaster had occurred in the area south-west of Bolkhov.

In their opinion, unsuccessful military operations were caused by objective reasons: haste, difficult terrain for military operations, bad weather - it rained continuously, etc. By the way, in his memoirs, Georgy Konstantinovich did not say a word about this trip to Moscow. He only noticed that "with the introduction of the 11th Army of General I.I. Fedyuninsky, as well as the 4th tank army of General V.M. Badanov Headquarters was somewhat late. Only and everything. The representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in this direction was G.K. Zhukov. This means that he overlooked this moment, but, as we see, he laid the blame on the collective body - the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, of which he was a member

myself.

Interesting: how did Zhukov explain to Stalin the reason for the unsuccessful actions of the tankers?

What did N.A. Bulganin, M.M. Pospelov, A.I. Antonov? Maybe we will find out about this later, but until the transcript of the meeting is published, there is silence in the memoirs. Still would! The losses of the 4th Panzer Army during these six days of the offensive amounted to 534 steel vehicles, or 70 percent

In order not to be unfounded, I will give the data on the losses of the 4th Panzer Army in the Battle of Borilov.

! Rodin G.S. In the footsteps of the past. - Tula, Priokskoe book publishing house. 1968. Pg. 202.

290

LOSS OF ARMORED VEHICLES OF THE 4TH TANK ARMY IN THE PERIOD 26 TO 31 JULY 1943!

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Note: the losses of the 11th Panzer Corps exceed the number of vehicles. After receiving some damage, the tanks were repaired and immediately sent to battle. Therefore, for two or three days of fighting, they were repeatedly entered in the reporting register of losses.

249 units of armored vehicles were irretrievably lost, i.e. one third of the cars. that only the first line of This is a very large pot or 34 percent, if we take into account defense of the enemy was overcome. The Germans firmly held the vital corridor along which the evacuation of the main combat forces of the Oryol grouping began on July 31. The Bolkhovskaya grouping of the enemy by this time had left the blow (26th pdi 25th md) and replenished the Harpe group, with whose forces a fierce battle was unfolding.

Regarding Zhukov's remark that with the introduction of reserves

"The headquarters was somewhat late," I note that the 11th and 4th tank armies could not be brought "into action" earlier, because they were in the formation stage and were far from the front. No one, including the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, suggested

1 TsAMORF, f. 323, op. 4756, d.4, l. 76.

291

gal that the Germans are so strong here, that they will be so firmly - "hold on with their teeth" to the Orlovsky bridgehead.

Veteran of the Ural Tank Corps Sergei Bessonov in his memoirs tells "about the dreamer Nikolai Rudensky, who so loved life, its songs and joys and gave it away for the sake of the happiness of current generations.

Twelve of us were volunteers from several hundred workers of one of the shops of the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant, who wanted to go to the front. And the first battle for Nikolai, as well as for many of our comrades, was the last.

Across the river Nugr - fortifications of the enemy. The scouts found that the shore was mined. At night, under enemy fire, sappers made passages in minefields. At the appointed time, parts of the brigade attacked.

The Germans responded to our artillery preparation with a hurricane of fire - you see, they shot almost every meter in advance and forced our machine gunners to lie down, preventing the litankas from climbing the hillock.

A little more fire from the flanks on the discovered positions of the enemy - and a bold rush to the river was made. She's overcome. Tanks rush to the trenches. On the right flank tank, I see my friend Rudensky: together with four other auto matches, he crouched against the armor of the tank. By the way the pieces are tense, it is clear that they have only one desire: to get close to the enemy as soon as possible, to rush, to overcome the enemy trench.

But from where the machine gun hit. Nikolay swayed and without a hundred fell from the tank into high rye.

Our tanks slipped through the defensive line. Auto matchiks jumped off the armor, began hand-to-hand combat with the Nazis. Here, knives specially made by the workers of the city of Zlatoust from special Zlatoust steel were very useful to us, they were handed over only to the soldiers of the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps!

1 The Germans recognized the "invulnerable" Urals by these black knives. Seeing the attacking soldiers with such knives on their belts, the Nazis in a panic began to shout: "Schwarzen Messer!" As soon as the Ural volunteers arrived at a new sector of the front, the Germans harassed their commanders.

nie and neighbors: "A corps of black knives appeared in front of us"

292

By nightfall the battle was over. The surviving officers and soldiers of the enemy retreated. The moon has risen. We searched for a long time in the rye and finally found the body of Nikolai.

In the light of the moon, his face seemed alive and surprised. His body spread out as if he was very tired, as if he were in a factory, and simply lay down on the ground to sleep.

I took his candidate card, military book and machine gun. And then, on the first meters of our land, taken with a fight from the enemy, my friend was buried.

The first meters, but they led to victory!

Shnurm of the second line of defense continues

Day seven

August 1, Sunday. Weather: cloudy in the morning, clear and sunny in the afternoon. Predominance of southeast and south winds, 2-5 m/sec. Air temperature within 15-18 gr. at night, 24-27 gr. afternoon.

As early as July 30, the 4th Panzer Army, having broken the enemy's resistance at the second defensive line, during July 31 and August 1 continued to slowly but stubbornly move forward to the third line of defense - the river. Mokhovitsa.

"Reflecting repeated counterattacks by tanks and infantry of the enemy, by 24.00 on 1.8.43, she reached the line:

and shopping mall: Ugrin - Krasilnikovo,

5 TC: high. 207.5 - (claimed) the Four Graves tract.

6 Guards MK: tract Four Graves - high. 222.6 - Bin DYUKKII.

ZO TK: high. 223.8 - sowing. env. Evil >?.

11th Panzer Corps

Formations of the 11th Panzer Corps were advancing in the direction of Znamenskoye.

By the end of the day, the 36th Tank Brigade, having captured the Egoriev

1 Copy of memoirs from the personal archive of the author.

2 TsAMORF, f. 4 tv. TA, op. 4756, d. 12, l. 12.

293

skaya, fought on the southwestern outskirts of Znamenskoye, where she was stopped by strong enemy artillery fire from the direction of Voroshilovo and Znamenskoye!.

6th Guards Mechanized Corps

On the night of August 1, formations of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps fought in the direction of Bychkovsky, Dubrovsky. Having organized reconnaissance in the direction of Vetlovka, Zlyn, units of the 17th Mechanized Brigade discovered the enemy's retreat from the Bychkovsky-Dubrovsky line in a southerly direction. The 17th and 19th mechanized brigades, having singled out a pursuit detachment, began to move quickly in the direction of Valyaevka, Selikhov, "and by 13.00 the chickens came out. Four Graves, sec. Stud farm. The advanced units, advancing south of this line, were met by art. min. fire from Valyaevka, Savinka, Zlyn and machine-gun fire from high. 233.8, razv. [ilka] dor. [og] np Bindyuki.

<.

By 15.00, the 17th MBR reached the line 500 m north of Krasn. Mountain and fought on the outskirts of this point. By this time, 49 mbr under art. min. fire from the direction of Valyaevka, Malinovka, Savinki crossed the ravine to the west of development. dor. np Bindyuki and fought for the mastery of Malinovka, high. 216.5.

The side detachment of 49 MBR captured Zlyn and, advancing in a southerly direction, provided the left flank of the corps.

On the 29th he put himself in order by sowing. env. Bol. Black.

56 TP - in the reserve of the corps commander - put himself in order and restored materiel in the area of Suryanino 2nd "?.

From July 29 to August 31, being in the reserve of the corps, units of the 49th mechanized brigade put their personnel and materiel in order, pulled up the rear.

On August 1, the headquarters of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps set the task for the brigades and units: in the offensive zone of the 16th Guards Mechanized Brigade, to break through the enemy defenses in the Dubrovsky area, the department of the 15th Stud Farm and advance in the direction of Malinovka, Savinki.

1 TsAMORF, f. 3412, op. 1, d. 55, l.9. 2 Ibid., f. 3434, op. 1, d.2, l. 10.

294

The first motorized rifle battalion with tankers of the 127th tank regiment occupied Bychkovsky on the move. Pursuing the enemy, at 4 p.m. they captured the Dubrovsky settlement. The enemy, located in the settlement of Zlyn, conducted heavy artillery and mortar fire. The second motorized rifle battalion of senior lieutenant Ivashchenko, deviating from the route, went to the cold on Zlyn and in a fleeting battle by 15 o'clock captured this large enemy defense center!

30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps

On the night of August 1, formations and units of the 30th Ural Tank Corps did not conduct offensive battles - they remained at their former lines.

It became known that in the morning the enemy began to withdraw in the direction of Vetlovka, Zlyn, Masalskaya.

At 11.30 the corps commander gave the order to the brigades: to organize a strike group (30th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 299th Mining Regiment, two batteries of the 1513th Iptap and a consolidated battalion of the 244th Tank Brigade - 16 tanks) to pursue the retreating enemy in the direction of Zlyn, Paramonovo, on his shoulders to force the rivers Moho Vitsa, Nepolod and by the end of the first day of August to gain a foothold on the southwestern outskirts of Paramonovo.

By 4 p.m., the pursuit detachment approached the northern outskirts of the village of Zlyn, where the enemy put up stubborn resistance.

The corps commander went to the motorized riflemen of the 30th brigade to lead the fighting to take Zlyn.

As a result of the offensive of the strike group of the corps, reinforced by 5 tanks of the 243rd tank brigade, the enemy's resistance was broken, "and by 2.00 02.08.43 Zlyn captured the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade with reinforcement units.

As a result of the battles for Zlyn, the following trophies were taken:

- a) German cartridges - 130 boxes;
- 6) different mines - 210 boxes;
- c) anti-tank mines - 30 boxes;

1 TsAMORF, f. 3346, op. 1, d. 3, l. 8.

295

D) 4 cars were smashed, an ambulance with medicines was seized! From the memoirs of the commander of the 30th UDTK, Lieutenant General G.S. Homeland: "By four o'clock in the afternoon, the detachment approached the northern outskirts of Zlyn.

The enemy did not want to leave this large settlement without a fight. He concentrated here a large force of infantry, supported by three regiments of self-propelled and field artillery, several tank companies and six mortar batteries. Enemy aircraft continuously carried out heavy bombing strikes on the northeastern outskirts of the village, hoping to cut off our motorized infantry from tanks.

I, with a group of operational workers of the headquarters of the corps, immediately went to this area. In front of me lay scorched earth, dear and immensely loved, familiar with every hollow and every ravine since childhood. Here I once began my working life, being hired as a farm laborer. Here, barefoot as a boy, he walked all the way and across. I saw this land impoverished and forlorn before the revolution, I saw it flourishing and abundant during the years of Soviet power. But I never saw my native land as it was now. She lay before me tormented and wounded, disfigured and defiled by vile creatures who were unworthy to be called people. She called us to her, asked us to help her get rid of the villains with the spider swastika of fascism. What son could look indifferently at the terrible suffering of his motherland?

When the truck drove onto the bridge across the Zlynka River, there was a strong explosion - an enemy mine went off. Some soldiers, including political worker Major Nikolaev, were injured and shell-shocked. They were given first aid, and we continued on foot. The battle went beyond the northwestern outskirts of Zlyn. Here we easily found the command post of the 30th motorized rifle brigade and its commander, Colonel M.S. Smirnova.

- Nut! said the Colonel, peering into the distance. "But let's rip him apart." Sure. People grow up before our eyes.

1 TsAMORF, f. 30 UDTK, op. 1, d. 34, l. 10.

296

During these days of fighting, we received a strong hardening, good combat skills.

Before the brigade commander had time to bring us up to speed on rapidly changing events, enemy bombers appeared over Zlyn. They went in five or six groups of ten aircraft each, it was too late to look for shelter, and there was nowhere to go.

- Lie down! someone shouted, and everyone immediately, where they were standing, plopped down on the ground. Bombs whistled, several of them exploded near the command post, and fragments fell on us, clods of earth. At that moment, I felt an incredible weight on myself. I tried to get up - it was not there! It turned out that a group of good people covered me with their bodies.

signalmen. They didn't think about themselves. They saved the commander.

Meanwhile, some aspects of the situation that had arisen remained unclear, and I invited the commander and chief of staff of the reconnaissance battalion to my place. But at the appointed time, Major N.P. Beklemishev and captain G.N. The elders did not come. Heading towards us, they saw the Zlyn church and approached it. The Nazis turned the church into an ammunition depot. It was filled with boxes of mines, grenades and ammunition. There were even stacks of boxes in the street. The blow of the Urals was so swift and irresistible that the Nazis retreated in a panic, leaving not only a depot of ammunition, but also mortars.

How they ruined the church! Captain Starostin remarked indignantly. - They even shit here. They made a toilet in the church. Here are the barbarians!

"But on the belt buckles they have the inscription "Got mit uns" - "God is with us," Beklemishev replied. "They hide behind God like a screen, you bastards.

- It's great our gave them a light! They draped it so that they forgot about the warehouse, - examining the stacks of boxes, Starostin walked around the church.

- Carefully! Major warned him. "Maybe he's booby-trapped. Went. We are waiting.

>

297

Thus ended the eight-day period of continuous fighting of our corps in the northern sector of the Orel-Bolkhov salient.

By order of the commander of the 4th Panzer Army, on the night of August 4-5, the corps made a 50-kilometer march and concentrated in the Ilyinsky area. In the first echelon of the advancing "ledge on the right" he was supposed to enter the breakthrough in the Ilyinskoye, Gnezdilovo sector, operate in the Volosatovo-Moshchenoe, Glotovo-Ryabinki zone and go to the Shakhovo station.

From the memoirs of Alexandra Petrovna Shalny-Koro left:

"In 1942, I completed medical instructor courses at the Verkh-Isetsy district committee of the Komsomol. After completing our courses, the whole group of us wanted to go to the front in the active army, but we took only the older ones, and I was then seventeen years old. There were many tears and envy for those who went to the front, and they told me and other girls that we still had to grow up. We were sent to work in hospitals. I worked in hospital No. 4005 and almost every day I went to the district

Society of the Red Cross, to Anna Lvovna Sinitsina with a request to send me to the front as soon as possible.

In April 1943, the long-awaited day came. Anna Lvovna informed me that the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps was being formed. I came to the headquarters of the corps. There were already a lot of girls there. How much excitement! Will they take it? After all, I was eighteen at the time. I hoped that they would take it, because I already had practice. And my hopes were justified.

So, I ended up in the medical platoon of the motorcycle battalion. We received uniforms, took the oath. We are real soldiers. The first days were very tired, because the whole day they were engaged in combat, drill and tactical training. Most of all, we "got" from the senior lieutenants Ermakov and Rublevsky. Of course, everything they taught us later came in handy.

"
Rodin G.S. I follow the past. - Tula: Priokskoe book publishing house, 1968. Pg. 196-197, 202-203.

298

In June 1943, we arrived in Kubinka near Moscow, lived in tents, stood at the post at night, two people at a time, since it was still scary for one. During the day there was still the same study, the names dreamed of seeing the real front as soon as possible.

Finally we went to the front. I was at the medical platoon in the surgical department, subordinate to the captain of the medical service, comrade Voronov. There were very few of us: Sima Kazayeva, Larisa Veselova and a few orderlies. The rest of the girls were sent to other units. There was a lot of work to be done. Slept for two hours a day. The wounded were arriving, and they needed to be given the necessary medical assistance. Doctors performed operations, and we, sisters, performed dressings and blood transfusions. We had to work especially hard in Zlyn, we worked under shelling and bombing, as well as in other places, the names of which I don't remember now.

Our girls Shura Rychkova, Lena Yakovleva, Mila Voronova died in the first battles. Soon, a medical battalion was made out of a medical platoon, the people became larger, and I began to ask to be sent to a unit where I could provide medical care to the wounded directly on the battlefield. Larisa Veselova and I were sent to the 61st Tank Brigade, and then to the 131st Separate Engineer Battalion. Our doctor was Dr. Livertovskaya, a very good and sympathetic woman. She was like a mother to us. In addition to her, there were four of us: me, Nina Meshkova (then she was wounded - her arm was torn off), Tanya Bovkun and the orderly Volodya (I don't remember my last name). I was assigned to the third sapper company. The work of sappers is interesting and at the same time dangerous; it is not for nothing that they say that a sapper makes only one mistake in his life. The assignments were different.

It was necessary not only to clear mines, but also to mine fields and crossings.

There were three platoons in our company. They were commanded by very skillful and knowledgeable commanders - comrades Kosarev, Porabkovich and Shevtsov, who later died.

I remember this episode for the rest of my life. Once, out of nowhere, a German "tiger" appeared from behind the mountain, stopped on the road and began to fire. We all lay down

299

in a ditch along the road and returned fire. I also shot, keeping up with the others. There were wounded. I began to drag them into a house near the road and make dressings. Soon a second "tiger" appeared and began to fire more furiously. When I rushed out of the house for the next batch of wounded, I saw that ours were retreating, and someone shouted: "The platoon leader has been killed!" A man wounded in the leg was crawling towards me. Together with a fragment, a piece of an overcoat fell into the wound. Another fighter, wounded in the head, helped me drag him into the shelter, but there was no time to bandage him - the Germans had already cut off our road. I had to retreat through the swamp, through the ditch, where the caterpillar from the tank had been stretched earlier. The Germans did not stop firing for a moment. And suddenly a shell exploded at the ditch crossing, I felt that I was burned, blood flowed down my face, but there was no time to figure it out. We reached the next village, where reinforcements were already approaching. We took all the wounded with us. I was wounded in the head, but I didn't go to the hospital, but did the bandaging myself. Then I couldn't hear with one ear for a long time. Here, for the first time in my life, I wept for the dead and wounded, and I was shaking all day afterwards. The killed platoon commander and several other dead and seriously wounded soldiers were dragged into the house by the Nazis and set on fire!

Day eight

August 2, Monday. Weather: no significant changes. Sunny day, no rain. South wind. Air temperature within 15-18 gr. at night, 24-27 gr. afternoon.

25th Panzer Corps

On August 1 and 2, the 175th tank brigade, having entered the new paradise of the Peshkovo concentration and the forest northwest of 1.5 km of Peshkovo, continued to put in order vehicles and personnel.

It was ordered to disguise all the material part, to open cracks for the personnel. All serviceable tanks up to 6 hours

. A copy of the memoirs of the author's personal archive.

300

transfer the owls under the act to the 162nd tank brigade, leaving the brigade commander's tank in its unit.

"Until 20.08, the brigade stood in Peshkovo, then it was transferred to the area of the village of Spasskoe, where it stood until 11.09, then south-west. Volkovo, and then on 11/16/1943 by rail. present New Darnitsa'.

5th Panzer Corps

«In the night | | on August 2, the 5th motorized rifle brigade fought at the turn of 200 m south of Martynovsky. Then the units slowly, pushing the enemy, began to move forward.

11th Panzer Corps

On the night of August 2, units of the 12th motorized rifle brigade, having captured Lokna, built a crossing over the river. Nugr, which ensured the crossing of the 30th Panzer Corps and its further advance.

On August 2, parts of the corps fought for the Znamenskoye?.

6th Guards Mechanized Corps

"On the night of August 2, tank regiments received replenishment of equipment from the corps reserve: 28, 126, 127 tons - 5 T-34 tanks each, 29 and 56 tons - 12 T-34 tanks each" *.

On the night of August 2, the 49th Guards Mechanized Brigade sent reconnaissance, which reported that at 03:30 the enemy began to withdraw in the direction of the settlements of Selikhov, Valyaevka, Savinki. Our units began to pursue him and at 5 o'clock captured Bindyuki, then Malinovka.

Sergeant Ukharsky from the first motorized rifle battalion captured two prisoners (a soldier and a chief corporal), who testified that in the areas in front of the 49th Guards Mech Brigade there were units of the 18th Infantry Division, battered in the battles near Orel. .

1 TsAMO RF, f. 3238, op. 1, d. 1, l. 19. ? There, f. 3366, op. 1, d. 4, l. 50. 3 Ibid., f. 3412, op. 1, l. 55. sheet 9. 4 Ibid., f. 3434, op. 1. d.2, l. 10.

301

"17 MBR at 8.00 took possession of the Red. Mountain, high 231.8, Sev. env. Valyaevka.

49 mbv 6.15 captured Malinovka, south. env. Valyaevka and continued the attack on Savinki. At 6.30, her combat detachment drove the enemy out of Dolbilovo and captured it.

16 MBRS 6.30 after putting herself in order, she made a march to the area of ur. Four Graves, Bychkovsky, Krasn. Dawn.

By 1200 hours, the 17th and 49th MBRs met strong resistance at the Krasn line. Banner, Savinki.

17 mbr on mastering Valyaevka, blocking Red. Znamya, from 17.00 began the battle for Ivanovsky, being under strong flank fire from Krasn. Banner and groves to the west of it.

49 MBR at 14.00 captured Savinki and continued to advance on Prilepy.

By the end of the day, the brigades continued to fight for the heights south of Savinka and for the Ivanovsky settlement.

49 MBR during the night on 03.08 by the advanced units of the Free Labor case, Martynovsky!

30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps

On the night of August 2, the corps commander set the task for his units to capture the Masalskaya settlement and further advance on Paramonov.

On the approaches to the village of Masalskaya, a warehouse with ammunition was seized: 4 light machine guns, 3 heavy machine guns, 11 rifles, 300 grenades, domestic cartridges up to 1 million.

"The position of the joints and parts of the hull at 13.30:

a) reconnaissance of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade, bypassing Masalskaya, went southeast. outskirts of Masalskaya. 30 MSBR 0.5 km north. Masalskaya is ready to launch an attack;

6) 243 brigade concentrated on the southeast. env. Zlyn is ready to support the attack of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade, having 18 tanks in service;

c) 244 brigade concentrated in forest 1! km east Vishnevsky (Cheremyshniki), with 30 tanks in service;

d) 197 brigade concentrated in the ravines of the west. Baevsky, with 28 tanks in service. Corps commander's decision:

1 TsAMORF, f. 3434, op. 1, d.2, l. 10.

a) 243 brigade and 30 motorized brigade bypass Masalskaya from the west. and advance in the direction of Muratovo, Paramonovo;

6) 244 brigade and 197 brigade destroy the enemy in Masalskaya!

Fulfilling the order of the corps commander, units of the 30th and 243rd brigades at 1600 captured Masalskaya, Dolbilovo and forcing. Mokhovitsa, went to its southern shore.

At 18.00, after a 15-minute artillery attack, formations and parts of the corps went on the offensive from the southern bank of the river. Mokhovitsa, but, having met strong fire resistance from the enemy from the area of Filonovo, Kruglitsa, Shemyakino (Orlovsky district. - E. Shch.), they were not successful, and by order of the corps commander, the tanks returned to their original positions:

197th brigade - hollowsev.-zap. Sinister;

243rd brigade - hollow west. Sinister;

244th brigade - hollow east. Sinister;

30th Motorized Rifle Brigade - entrenched 400-500 meters south. Masal
Skye.

At 10 p.m., the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade sent reconnaissance in the direction of the Kruglitsa and Shemyakino settlements in order to capture prisoners.

The tank brigades remained in the occupied areas, engaged in the evacuation and restoration of materiel.

From the memoirs of Yakov Sosnovsky?³:

"The training of our 197th (Sverdlovsk) tank brigade was carried out in the city of Degtyarsk, Sverdlovsk region.

On the night of July 27, 1943, they immediately went into battle as part of the Fourth Tank Army.

The first fight in which I participated lasted two days. In this battle, one of my friends - Tishchenko - was killed, Cherdantsev, Sharov, Kazakov were wounded.

On the morning of July 29, enemy resistance was broken

! TsAMORF, f. 30 UDTK, op. 1, d. 34, l. 10, 10 (vol.).

2 Ibid., l. 10 (vol.).

3 After treatment in the hospital, the Sosnovskis were sent to a military school. He became an officer and returned to the front again. After the end of the war, Yakov Anatolyevich returned to his native plant and headed the research laboratory. Together with the team, he developed and implemented advanced methods for the production of pipes. In addition to front-line awards, he added a medal of the laureate of the State Prize.

But. Having huge losses, our corps won the first victory. Our unit continued to pursue the retreating enemy. When the halt was organized, we were in the head part. Before they had time to catch their breath, as they say, the commander of the brigade, Colonel Smirnov, drove up, from whom they received a verbal order: to provide themselves with ammunition and immediately follow the route indicated on the map through the ravine in order to get behind enemy lines and prevent the Nazis from blowing up the river crossing, along which they retreated, and hold it until the arrival of our units. The brigade commander noted the importance of this operation, which was of exceptional importance for the successful advance of the tank corps. 60 people under the command of Comrade Filins went to carry out the task. They were armed with machine guns, machine guns and grenades.

It was impossible to approach the crossing - the Germans fired from all types of weapons. Our sappers cleared minefields under heavy enemy fire. The company of Lieutenant Tishchenko had to shoot down the enemy from here. In the first minutes of the battle, Tishchenko was seriously wounded, he was replaced by Lieutenant Filinykh. And we continued to make our way to the crossings under a hail of enemy bombs, shells and mines. They plowed almost every meter of land. I saw Filinykh fall, I thought he was wounded, I rushed to him, but he was dead, and I took command.

It wasn't long before the crossing. I run, fall, wait for the submachine gunners and machine gunners to catch up, show them the most important targets, and again forward under the fire of German artillery.

The ravine went to the left to the river and exited just in the area of the crossing. Finally the river appeared. At another time, it must have been calm, but now it seethed, hissed from exploding shells and mines.

After the command "Prepare", when everyone should be ready for a swift throw and take up their firing position, I, in order to drag the fighters behind me, jumped out of the ravine first. "Urals, forward!" I shouted. And suddenly, almost point blank - the fire of an enemy machine gun. My grenade

304

made him choke. Another throw - we are at the crossing. Notut an enemy bullet seared my chest. In a fever, he took a few more steps and fell. Biting my lips, drowning out the pain, I got up on my hands and saw how our submachine gunners began hand to hand combat with the Germans. Thinking that they could hear me in the rumble of explosions and frequent automatic and machine-gun shots, I gave orders. But, apparently, the blood flooded the respiratory tract - I did not hear myself. I remember: I got up again, ran a little, scribbling from a machine gun, until the cartridges in the disk ran out. At the very descent to the river fell and lost

consciousness. And when I woke up, I saw that I was bandaged and in a trench, I felt that I was lying in a pool of my own blood. Nearby was a machine with a charged disk and a flask of water. Gathered all his strength to get out of this grave alive. I took the machine gun and crawled along the ravine. At this time, a battalion approached us for reinforcements, led by his deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Captain Nizovoy. He was well known to me on the party line. I knew him as an energetic person. He immediately lifted me from the ground, kissed me - alive: urgently to the medical battalion! From there I was taken by plane to the evacuation hospital in the city of Kaluga (field mail 40380), where I stayed until August 15, 1943. I had a chest operation, and the doctors said that I was born into this world for the second time. As a member of the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps, I was soon evacuated to hospital No. 414 in the city of Sverdlovsk, where I stayed until my recovery.

There I learned that our corps had been awarded the title of Guards. This news helped me to cope with the wound, to return to the ranks as soon as possible!

Day nine

August 3, Tuesday. Weather: cloudy in the morning, clear and sunny in the afternoon. The predominance of southeast and south winds, 2-5 m/sec. Air temperature within 15-18 gr. at night, 24-27 gr. afternoon.

1 Memoirs from the personal archive of the author.

305

2 and Zavgusta formations of the 4th Panzer Army, "overcoming the stubborn resistance of the Germans, captured a number of settlements, throwing the enemy back to the line: Znamensky Koe - Lebedyansky - Ivanovsky - Prilepy and further to the southern coast. Mokhovitsa "!

25th Panzer Corps

"In the period from July 23 to August 3, the 162nd tank brigade, in cooperation with the 51, 356 joint venture of the 36th guards. sk fought at the turn of Veselaia Zhizn, Slobodka, Uspensky, Znamenskoye ?.

5th Panzer Corps

On August 3, units of the 5th motorized rifle brigade, after intense combat operations in the Orlovsky bridgehead sector, were withdrawn from the battles and were operationally subordinate to the Bryansk Front with the task of creating an anti-tank line along the river. Nogr in the areas of Lokna, Rozhkovo and

be ready to repel enemy counterattacks.

Even earlier, on August 2, at 9 o'clock, the 24th tank brigade set out along the route Krasnaya Gora, Pavlovsky Khutor, but was fired upon by enemy artillery fire. The brigade went on the attack on Pavlovsky Khutor bypassing on the right through Lebedyansky and entrenched itself at the turn before the infantry approached.

On the last day of the battle, after a thorough reconnaissance, having gathered small disparate groups of motorized riflemen under a single leadership and linking interaction with artillerymen and mortarmen, the brigade knocked the enemy out of the Lebedyansky settlement without losses, destroying 4 anti-tank guns, 2 mortar batteries and 75 soldiers and officers.

On August 4, the brigade was withdrawn from the battle in the Shemyakino area.

Parts of the 41st tank brigade at that time occupied an anti-tank area on the heights north of Rozhkov.

The 70th tank brigade, according to the combat order of the headquarters of the corps, by the end of August 4, "was withdrawn to the area of \u200b\u200bits

1 TsAMO RF, f. 4th Guards ta, op. 4756, l. 12, l. 12. 2 Ibid., f. 3228, op. 1, l. 1, l. 6.

306

positions: Sukhochevo, Borilovo (northern), Borilovo (southern) and occupies the line of defense along the Nugr River, the brigade headquarters - ov ragyugo-west. Sukhochevo.

4.08. by 17.00 the brigade occupied the anti-tank line:

1. 261 tb - location elev. high 159.8, (lawsuit) crossing the river. Nugr (300 m southwest of the Church), elev. high 188.7.

2. 262 tb - the location of the ravine, which is west of Grachevsky.

3. SSB-no PTR - location south-east. slopes elev. high 201.9 with the release of outposts in the Borilovo region (northern).

4. Headquarters - at the OP vr-not bezym. high 500 m southwest Church of Borilovo.

5. Brigade command post - southwest ravine. Sukhochevo. They stood until 12.08, then moved to Tula!

11th Panzer Corps

"On August 2 and August 3, 1943, parts of the corps fought for Znamenskoye.

Tanks of the 36th and 65th brigade repeatedly broke into Znamenskoye, but, having no support from the 26th Guards. sd, would be forced to retreat to their original position, while incurring losses.

The Znamenskoye garrison consisted of an infantry battalion reinforced with tanks and a large number of field and anti-tank artillery. In addition, Znamenskoye was defended by the enemy with the help of a large number of long-range artillery and mortars, which were located on high. 220.0, 229.0, 232.7 and in Voroshilovo.

VZ.00 4.08.1943 The 12th Motorized Rifle Brigade captured the district center Znamenskoye "?.

6th Guards Mechanized Corps

On August 3, throughout the day, units of the 6th Guards Mech Corps fought on the lines reached by morning. At 19 o'clock the right flank of the 17th mechanized brigade was counterattacked by the battalion

1 TsAMO RF, f. 70 brigade, op. 1, d. 1, l. 43-44. 2 Ibid., f. 3412 (And shopping mall), op. 1, l. 55, l. 9.

307

nom infantry from the direction of the grove west of the Red Banner. The counterattack was repulsed with heavy losses for the enemy.

In the sector of the 49th Mechanized Brigade, the enemy continued to retreat. Pursuing him, the first motorized rifle battalion cleared Svobodnaya Trud from the enemy, the second - Savinki.

"In these battles, the personnel of the brigade, despite the difficulties of the battles, having not slept for two nights in a row, showed their burning hatred for the fascist enslavers.

Yes, Art. Lieutenant Konkov, under heavy artillery fire, correcting the fire of his battery, destroyed an anti-tank battery and up to two infantry platoons.

Art. the cook of the second motorized rifle battalion Kopalov P.F., delivering food to the soldiers on the front line, was fired upon by a German shooter. He entered into a duel with him and killed him. Artillery reconnaissance sergeant Romanov made his way behind enemy lines in the village of Zlyn, reconnoitered the location of mine and artillery batteries. Returning from reconnaissance, he helped five wounded soldiers on his way. Based on his data, the fire of two enemy minbatars was suppressed!

30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps

"30 shopping malls with the forces of 30 MSBR crossed the river. Mochowitz, mastered

Masalskaya?

On that day, subunits of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade were fortifying themselves at a line 0.5 km south of Masalskaya, and in small groups conducted active combat operations to improve their positions. The fighters boldly and resolutely went over to the attack, battles began in the enemy's trenches and turned into hand-to-hand combat. Up to 200 soldiers and officers were destroyed per day.

The rest of the formations and units did not conduct hostilities.

From [5 hours] formations and parts of the corps were bombarded by enemy aircraft. During this period, 120 sorties were recorded. There were casualties as a result of the bombing.

1 TsAMORF, f. 3434 (bgv. MK), op. 1, d.2, l. 10. 2 Ibid., f. 4th Guards ta, op. 4756, d. 12, l. 12.

308

Until 10 p.m., formations and parts of the corps remained in the occupied areas, where they pulled up the materiel and put themselves on alert.

With this, the active hostilities of the corps of General Rodin in the Battle of Borilov ended. His formations as part of the 4th Panzer Army were redeployed to a new - Khotynets - direction and continued military operations to break into the enemy defenses, which, under the pressure of our tankers, in an organized manner, from line to line, withdrew its troops across the Desna River.

"The very first day of fighting (July 27, 1943) turned out to be unfortunate for our crew: both me and my native Thirty-Four were unlucky," tankman Ivan Ramensky, holder of five orders, writes in his memoirs. - Approaching the village, which was ordered to take our company, we came under massive artillery fire from the Germans. One car caught fire, then another ... Maneuvering, I began to bypass the enemy positions from the flank, meanwhile the tower gunner fired at the German cannons. And suddenly, as if an unknown force lifted and threw our tank to the ground. Motor stalled. I was alone in the car. He went to the cannon and fired back until the evening, until he revived the engine, then he took the car out of the battlefield. My hands were wounded by shrapnel. They wanted to send me to the hospital, but I objected: "Drag the fragments here and quickly." They pulled me out, bandaged my hands, and I hurried to the car. Our faithful friends, tank repairmen, made me happy: while they were patching up my hands, they managed to repair a side hole from a direct hit by an artillery shell.

The tanks of the Sverdlovsk brigade with armored troops were met with heavy fire. The guns fired in the forehead, mortars from the right flank cut off our submachine gunners from the tanks.

Lieutenant Dikiy's car, rushing forward, turned two bunkers with its caterpillars, destroyed an anti-tank battery and three mortars. But the "thirty-four" received several holes, the lieutenant was wounded, another shell wounded Tipunov's turret, put the gun out of action.

309

"Fire both machine guns," ordered the lieutenant. - Go ahead and crush the bastards, crush!

Mechanic Voronin rushed the car to the enemy trenches. Started to iron. The radio operator-machine gunner Dokuchaev was wounded. The car caught fire. Voronin crawled out under the bullets and shells, knocked out the flames from the car with a fire extinguisher and took it to a safe place.

The experienced driver of another tank, Shamshin, constantly maneuvered, and the tower shooter Alexei Litvyak managed to suppress the enemy from short stops and on the move. But instead of the destroyed tanks, the Germans threw up novys.

The battle with counterattacking enemy tanks continued for almost six hours. The tank of the battalion commander Ivanov was put out of action, the car of Lieutenant Tumashevsky caught fire, and the tank of the company commander, Lieutenant Dudnichenko, was also knocked out. Shamshin could no longer drag him in tow. Unfortunately, we ran out of ammunition. And at this time, the tank hit the second German sleep in a row, the car caught fire. Machine-gun discs began to burst in it. Lieutenant Dudnichenko ordered to leave the tank. The crew took with them a frontal machine gun, four surviving disks for it, PGISH, automatic disks and - to a field of tall rye. Moans were heard near the aircraft funnel. They crawled there and dragged the seriously wounded Tumashevsky and his tower shooter Bolshakov into the funnel. Thirty meters were left before the rye, when they saw the wrecked tank of the battalion commander Ivanov and the Germans crawling towards him.

- Litvyak, Kozub! - Dudnichenko ordered the turret and the machine-gunner. To the rescue of the captain! Probably wounded - find it!

Found! For two days, Shamshin kept the Germans away from the air crater, where the battalion commander and our wounded submachine gunners were located. How Litvyak and Kozub discovered the wounded battalion commander, how they fought together with him in an unequal, last battle with the enemies, no one could tell: the remains of the volunteer heroes Litvyak and Kozub, the battalion commander Ivanov, were found on the third day in a funnel in a rye field ".

Here are some more examples of the heroism of the Ural warriors.

310

In the same battle, a platoon of machine gunners of senior sergeant Efimtsev, under heavy enemy fire, was the first to swim over the Negr River. Fearless warriors burst into the enemy's trench and began hand-to-hand combat. Volunteers from Nizhny Tagil and Serov, Dyachkov, Gorelik, Smekhov, Gazhi, destroyed about two dozen fascists, while others were put to flight. When forcing the river, the commander of a company of anti-tank rifles, Senior Lieutenant Ilyinsky, destroyed five firing points, many enemy soldiers and officers. He died a heroic death, shooting at the enemy until his last breath.

"The machine gunner of the motorcycle rifle battalion, Komsomol member Mikhail Orlov, showed exceptional stamina. Fulfilling the assigned task, he moved forward with a machine gun and opened well-aimed fire at the enemy. The Nazis covered Orlov with mines. The machine gun of the brave warrior fell silent. His comrade rushed to Mikhail and suggested that Orlov leave behind.

- Can you go?

"I can, of course," answered the machine gunner, "but I won't go!" My place is here, I have nothing to do there.

Orlov again took up the machine gun and nailed to the ground a dozen more fascists. From the depths of the defense, the enemy intensified shelling. Mikhail Orlov was wounded a second time. Fragments of enemy shells hit him in the chest, his Komsomol ticket was covered with blood. Comrades crawled up to the machine gunner again, helped him and offered to go to the medical battalion. Orlov categorically refused.

- Here are the bastards! he threw in angrily. - The Komsomol ticket was ruined. But you, you bastards, scratch even more! Mikhail wiped the bloodied ticket on his tunic, put it away, and took up the machine gun again. But he could no longer shoot: his strength left the brave machine gunner. At the last moment Menton nevertheless raised his head and said softly:

- In Leningrad, on Lazurinskaya, five, in the fifth apartment ... sister ... Write to her ... And write in the Urals that I have fulfilled my oath ...

The machine-gunner hero died with a sense of accomplishment. Mikhail Orlov was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner. The whole Urals learned about his feat.

zi

Overcoming the stubborn resistance of the Nazi troops, the 243rd Tank Brigade captured the villages of Churilovka and Kuliki by the end of the day, and then was stopped by strong enemy artillery fire and massive air raids. The same thing happened with the 30th motorized rifle brigade. 50-60 aircraft continuously "hung" over our battle formations, holding back the movement of tanks and infantry.

But nothing could stop the Ural heroes. In the battle for the village of Borilovo, the crew of Lieutenant Eremenko skillfully acted, which included Anton Ogarok, a former foreman of Uralsmashzavod, Gennady Nesterov, a former mechanic and Komsomol organizer of the workshop of the same plant, Petr Trepachev, who also worked at the same plant. Even during the battles for the crossing on the Ors River, this crew destroyed several dozen Nazi soldiers and officers, three anti-tank guns and a heavy machine gun. The tank had over fifty dents from shells, bullets and shrapnel. But the Ural armor turned out to be as strong as the people who cooked it. Driven by a great feeling of love for their homeland and hatred for the sworn enemy, the crew of Lieutenant Eremenko was among the first to break into Borilovo and dispersed the Nazis, who were trying to counterattack. At this time, an enemy shell hit the car and wounded the commander. The communist turret gunner Anton Ogarok, forgetting about his own wound, bandaged Yeremenko, and the driver Pyotr Trepachev took the tank to cover. Machine gunner Gennady Nesterov immediately contacted the company commander by radio and reported the situation. He ordered to send the wounded tank commander to the mesanbat. Friends carried out this order, but having handed over Eremenko to the doctors, they again hurried to the front line.

"It's impossible without a commander," said the head of the political affairs of the brigade,

- Nothing. Let's not let us down, - said Pyotr Trepachev, a driver, a participant in the battles with Japanese samurai,

"Ilyane is new to this business," Gennady Nesterov remarked, correcting with his hand the Order of the Red Banner of War received in the battles at Khalkhin Gol.

312

"I'm taking command," Anton Ogarok said firmly.

The tank again crushed the Nazis with fire and caterpillars. Anton Ogarok sent row after shell, Gennady Nesterov's machine gun worked insanely silently. Suddenly, a shell hit the car and tore off the caterpillar. From the second hit, the fuel tank caught fire, the Nazis surrounded the tank, but it continued to fight back. The Uralsmashevites did not flinch even when there were three "tigers" against one burning Soviet car. The Germans surrounded the car, offered to surrender. The guys were grief-stricken, but they returned fire at the enemy. Shell after shell flew into the burning car. They fought until the tank exploded. The Nazis became so brutalized that they continued to shoot even at the place where the thirty-four exploded together with the heroes.

Looking through the lists of fighters awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, I did not find the names of the Eremenko crew in them. Why didn't these guys get the highest award of the Motherland? Apparently, in the war the same feats

gi, but committed by different people, were evaluated differently. The communist Ogarok did not come to the attention of the political department of the corps. Or maybe the award sheet was lost in one of the intermediate instances. After all, how many there were! Until now, award reports are being found. Most recently, our fellow countryman I.A. was awarded for exploits in the Great Patriotic War. Leonov "Gold Star" Hero of Russia. And the performance was for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Relocation to a new combat area

Day ten

August 4, Wednesday. Weather: cloudy in the morning, clear in the afternoon, sunny. The predominance of southeast and south winds, 2 - 5 m / s. The air temperature is within 15 - 18 gr. at night, 24 - 27 tr. afternoon.

"

Rodin G.S. In the footsteps of the past. - Tula: Priokskoye book publishing house, 1968. Pp. 194-195.

313

It is known that in accordance with the order of the Military Council of the Bryansk Front dated August 3, 1943, the further offensive of the formations of the 4th Panzer Army in the previously indicated direction was suspended.

Fulfilling the directive of the command of the Bryansk Front, the troops of the army on the night of 4 to 5.08, having regrouped, made a fifty-kilometer march and "by 12.00 on 5.08.43, they concentrated in the areas:

ITK - Korytinka, Sizenki, Kamenka, (suit.) Clearance;

30 UDTK - Dernovo (claim.), Brezhnevsky, Volobeeva, Kareeva, Shestakovo;

bgv. MK - (claim.) Peshkovo, (claim.). Nizina, Kashcheyevo;

5 TK - 4.08.43, left the operational subordination of the ar
missions."

11th Panzer Corps

"On the night of August 3-4, 1943, the 11th TC made a march along the route: Znamenskoye, Kurchaki, Burgova, Kamenka, by 14.00 on 08/04/1943 it was completely concentrated in the Kamenka, Sizenki area and received materiel from 25 TC and 212 sd.

During August 4-5, 1943, parts of the corps received and restored the materiel. formation commanders and

units, headquarters commanders carried out reconnaissance of directions, linked issues of interaction with 8 SC, 25, 30 TK Ibgv. MK">?.

6th Guards Mechanized Corps

"At 12.00 3.08. an order was received from the commander of 4 TA to withdraw 6 guards. MK as part of 4 TA to a new direction. The brigade commanders at 15.00 heard the order of the corps commander - with the onset of darkness to hand over their sectors to units of the 61st Army, withdraw the brigades from the combat area and concentrate in the new area by the morning of 04.08.

On the night of 4 to 5.08, the 40th mechanized brigade made a march: Bol. Chern, Dolbilovo, Shamyakino (Krasnikovsky village council), Krasnikovo, Kamenka, Peshkovo, Ivanovsky"?3.

1 TsAMORF, f. 4th Guards ta, op. 4765, d. 12, l. 13.

? There, f. 3412 (11 shopping mall), op. 1, d.55, l.9. 3 Ibid., f. 3346 (49 Guards MBR), op. 1, d.3, l. 8.

314

30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps

At 6 p.m., formations and units of the corps received an order: on the night of August 4, make a march and by 4 a.m. concentrate in the areas: Vetrovsky, Krasnaya Gora, Rudnevo, Shemyakino.

The corps went to marig and made it along two routes.

Right route: Zlyn, Vishnevsky, Borilovo, Odnosche cinema, Kalinovsky, Shemyakino (Suryaninsky village council).

Left route: Zlyn, Vishnevsky, Krivchevsky, Voskresensky, Kolontaevo, Selemenevo, Suryanino.

"The 197th and 244th brigade marched along the right route, all other formations and units along the left. The 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade remained to hand over the combat sector until 21.00 on 4.8.43.

By 0600, formations and parts of the corps were concentrated in the area: Vetrovsky, Kr. Gora, Shemyakino and during the day evacuated and restored the material part.

During the march, enemy aircraft conducted reconnaissance flights at night, but there were no attacks on the corps columns from the air.

The combat composition of the formations and parts of the body:

a) 197 brigade of tanks - 34;

- 6) 243 brigade of tanks - 23;
- c) 244 brigade of tanks - 31;
- d) 30 motorized brigade infantry brigade of tank brigades had losses of up to 70%;
- e) Artillery units had insignificant losses!

CONCLUSIONS

25th Panzer Corps

From the final combat report of the 25th Panzer Corps:

"25 TC commanders of BT and KV? Western Front, Lieutenant General Mostovenko brigade was attached to the 84th and 217th Guards. sd, 36 guards. Ski in the period from 22.07 to 3.08 fought joint battles with them with the task of reaching the Znamenskoye, Lokna line, and then capturing Khotynets.

During joint operations with the 36th Guards. sk brigades of the corps were transferred from one division to another. These joint military operations of the 25th TC and 36th Guards. ck did not give success, because:

b TsAMORF, f. 30 UDTK, op. 1, d. 34, l. 18 (0b.), 19. s Armored and cavalry troops.

315

a) 36 Guards. the sk had in its units and subdivisions a meager amount of infantry, which was not able to consolidate the success of the tanks and accompany their attack;

6) artillery of the 36th Guards. During the entire period of joint actions, the SC had a very small number of shells (0.1-0.5 BKU).

In general, joint actions did not give results, but on the contrary, they tied 25 TK hand and foot and led to the loss of tanks "?.

11th Panzer Corps

"1. Despite the fact that the corps in the first days of the fighting carried out the unusual task of breaking through the enemy's main line of defense, as a result of which it suffered heavy losses, it completed the task, breaking through the enemy's defenses, ensured the introduction of 5 TK into the breakthrough, pursued the enemy, who did not used intermediate tactically advantageous lines, and continued to resist until Znamenskoye.

2. During this period, 36 brigade operated better than others.

On August 3, 1943, Shtarm's combat order was received - the 4th tank corps was ordered to transfer the site to a neighbor and concentrate in the Kamenka, Sizenki area and receive combat materiel from 5th and 212th rifle divisions "3.

6th Guards Mechanized Corps

"1. The enemy defense in the corps offensive zone was prepared in anti-tank terms. The area abounded with anti-tank obstacles: r. Ors, r. Nugr, r. Mokhovitsa, numerous ravines, which hampered the operation of large tank formations.

2. Parts of the 5th Rifle Division, operating in the corps' offensive zone, due to the small number of personnel, did not have an impact on the battle and avoided active actions.

3. Corps, having received the task of independently breaking through

1 Ammunition. ?

TsAMORF, f. 3419 (25tk). op. 1, d. 23, l.3. 3 Ibid., f. 3412 (11 shopping mall), op. 1, d. 55, l. 9-10.

316

a well-prepared enemy defensive line and having no attached or supporting artillery, he was forced to consistently commit brigades into battle and concentrate all efforts on chewing through the defenses.

4. The lack of distribution of tasks between the mechanized corps and rifle divisions freed the SD from responsibility for the implementation of the combat mission, created a mixing of battle formations and led to temporary dual power.

5. Overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the corps traveled 32 km in 8 days of fighting, liberating 44 settlements. During this period, the following trophies were taken: tanks - 7, vehicles - 7, machine guns - 18, guns of various calibers - 11, self-propelled guns - 1, shells - 8,100, cartridges - 28 thousand, 48 soldiers were taken prisoner.

Destroyed: guns of various calibers - 45, tanks - 21, vehicles - 39, machine guns - 150, mortars - 8, motorcycle cycles - 6, horses - 34, rifles - 293, armored vehicles - 2, ammunition depots - 3, aircraft shot down - 5, hit that - 6.

4,221 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed.

30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps

As a result of offensive battles in the period from 27.07 to

On August 3, 1943, formations and units of the corps advanced 20-25 km, while freeing 20 settlements from the Nazi invaders: Kazansky, Luchansky, Bessonovsky, Dulebinsky, Dulebino, Strukovo, Strukovsky, 2nd Shchigrovsky, Klyaginsky, Odnoshchekino, Sukhochevo, Borilovo, Kolontaevo, Voskresensky, Skorodumka, Kuliki, Churilovka, Krivchevsky, Bogoslovsky, Vetlovka, Dolsky, Zlyn, Masalskaya, Dolbilovo.

During the same period, as a result of the fighting, formations and parts of the corps "suffered the following losses:

a) tanks: burned down and blown up - 45, missing - 2, knocked out - 65;

1 TsAMO RF, f. 3434 (btv. mk), op. 1, d.2, l. 10-11.

317

6) weapons - knocked out: self-propelled guns - 4, 76 mm guns - 8, 45 mm guns - 2, 37 mm guns - 1; destroyed and knocked out: mortars - 14, heavy machine guns - 9, DShK machine guns - 5, light machine guns - 37;

c) materiel: 49 cars destroyed, 50 cars destroyed, 1 armored vehicles destroyed, 6 armored vehicles destroyed, 4 motorcycles destroyed, 2 motorcycles destroyed,

d) personnel: killed - 479 people, wounded - 591 people, did not return from the battlefield - 34 people.

In addition, 30 MSBR lost 1835 people killed, wounded and missing.

Due to the fact that the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade was continuously in battle, the losses in personnel require clarification and division of the total number into killed, wounded and missing - it is difficult!

Thus, the 30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps lost 2,939 out of 10,849 people, or 27 percent, in killed, missing and wounded in the Battle of Borilov.

As already mentioned, in the battles for the Orlovsky strategic bridgehead, the German troops suffered the most significant losses of all they suffered in the Second World War. And this is confirmed by another archival document.

From the documents of the German Federal Military Archives:

"Secret

Supplement to the Documents of the 20th Panzer Division

Operational department (1a). No. 843/43 dated 5.08.43

Report of the commander of the 20th Panzer Division

59th Motorized Regiment

Due to significant losses, the combat effectiveness of the regiment has significantly decreased. In connection with the death of a large number of officers, for the further functioning of the regiment, it is necessary

1 TsAMORF, f. 30 UDTK, op. 1, d. 34, l. 10.

318

it is possible that sergeants (senior sergeants) take over the functions of the dead officers.

The remaining anti-tank guns and soldiers are unable to provide the defense of the regiment.

The level of combat training and combat readiness of the personnel of the company is completely different. Young soldiers make up for their lack of experience with impeccable conduct and readiness to fight. And the most experienced soldiers of the regiment lack the necessary former combat capability.

Heavy fighting (at first the regiment advanced, then went on the defensive) had no effect on the morale of the personnel, even taking into account the fact that many battles were lost.

112th Motorized Regiment

Basically, the position of this regiment is the same as that of the 59th Motorized Regiment.

21st Tank Regiment

The fighting lasted more than a month, and at the same time there was no way to carry out maintenance, there was no time to repair wrecked tanks. In this regard, with the amount of equipment that survived the battles, the unit is on the verge of its combat capability. In order for it to become combat-ready again, it needs to urgently make up for the lack of armored vehicles.

The morale of the unit, despite the large losses in personnel and deprivation, is good.

92nd Tank Artillery Regiment

During the month of large-scale hostilities, combat capability decreased compared to the previous month due to large losses in personnel and the withdrawal from

building guns. During the fighting, most observers and radio operators died (35 observers and 60 radio operators). Because of these losses, the regiment was forced to send only one observer per battery. It is urgently necessary to replenish the composition of the dead officers (11) and radio operators.

The experience of recent large-scale battles has shown that during hostilities, it is the subunits armed with mortars of various types that need to make the most of their combat capabilities.

319

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Motorized anti-tank artillery battalion

In view of the significant losses of weapons, especially self-propelled artillery mounts (SPGs), it is urgently necessary to provide 16 SPGs to equip at least one assault unit.

20th Reconnaissance Battalion

The reconnaissance unit could not be fully staffed due to large numerical losses.

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among officers, non-commissioned officers and privates, as well as due to the
failure of a large number of combat

technology. Two rifle platoons merged into one. Sapper Battalion

As a result of the fighting, the battalion suffered heavy losses, while some
of the good specialists and experienced fighters died. With a few exceptions,
it was possible to make up for the lack of sapper-engineering equipment.

321

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The technical condition of vehicles is poor. Within 4 weeks, almost no vehicle met the requirements for it.

CONCLUSION

The participation of the division in large-scale military operations, which lasted 4 weeks (from July 5 to August 3), led to heavy losses in personnel, weapons and material losses.

As a result of prolonged military operations in a defensive battle, the number of personnel of the division was significantly reduced.

In the division, 149 officers, 3231 non-commissioned officers and soldiers were killed, injured or missing.

Without a doubt, these numerous casualties changed the overall picture of the state of the division, but, despite this, it can be said that this state of affairs did not affect the general morale and the way the soldiers of this military unit carry out orders. In general, the situation is stable.

The poor condition of the roads due to prolonged rains created problems for the movement of troops. This led to the failure of a large number of vehicles, so that now it is hardly possible to call this division motorized.

In general, we can say that this division needs a break in the fighting to replenish people, weapons and new military equipment. The uniforms of the fighters during the battles were badly worn out, so a change of uniforms is urgently required.

At the moment, the division has two motorized battalions (average in terms of the number of fighters). Their basis is a significantly reduced contingent of experienced officers who participated in the battles, non-commissioned officers from the personnel of two motorized rifle regiments. A small number of newly arrived to replace the dead - for the most part weak and lack of initiative soldiers, they lack combat

333

spirit, so they do not meet the requirements that are necessary to participate in heavy defensive battles. Due to the heavy fighting that has been going on continuously since 07/05/43 and continues at the present time, the soldiers are very often very exhausted, to the point that they are not able to fight. Morale, as before,

encouraging, although there are reasons that hinder the rise in morale: a large number of deaths, a rather long retreat, and - not least - reports of air raids on German cities and the associated decadence at home. Military units urgently need rest to fully restore their fighting ability and physical strength, to raise their spirits internally, to prepare soldiers for battle and to introduce new reserves to replace the dead. Division commander, general of tank troops
Signature.

The battle on the Oryol Bulge
(report on the battles of the 9th and 2nd tank armies from July 5 to August 18, 1943)?

On a beautiful summer day on July 5, the 9th Army launched a carefully prepared offensive according to the plan of Operation Citadel in the direction of Kursk with the aim of encircling (together with the shock army group YuGg) in this area of the enemy strategic forces. The tank battle formation "wedge" XXXXX of the tank corps, which was covered on the right flank by XXXXXY], and on the left flank by XXXX / tank corps, with first-class air support, punched a 14-kilometer gap during the first attack? in well-fortified enemy positions. But already on the second day, enemy resistance intensified, especially intense

1 VA-MA VN 27-20/164.

? Ibid VN 20-91755.R.1-47.

at Author's note. On the first day of the offensive, the German strike group made its way to the south only 5-6 km. Only on July 10, on the last day of the offensive, did it reach Teploye, which is located at 12-14 kmotnp Tagi, from where the offensive of the XXXX [tank corps] began on July 5. Read more about this in my book The Battle on the Cathedral Field.

334

nim was artillery fire. Hastily bringing in all the local operational reserves, the enemy, using the most severe measures in relation to his army, tried to prevent a breakthrough and the entry of few tanks into the operational space. On the second day of the offensive, the reserves urgently brought in from the depths—one tank corps and three guards rifle divisions—were thrown towards the German tank wedge. More than 100 additional tanks were brought up from our rear to the place of the main attack. A tank battle began, lasting several days. This battle showed the superiority of the German tankers. Our troops, fighting with enthusiasm and enthusiasm, slowly moved forward in the sector Nikolskoye - Olkhovatka - Ponyri. On July 7, 1943, the enemy moved from defense to counteroffensive, which at first

did not bring him success, and the enemy suffered significant losses. After the regrouping of troops and the strengthening of the German tank forces, the offensive on the front Teploye - Olkhovatka - Ponyri (10 km wide) gained positive momentum. However, in this sector, the attackers ran into especially fortified enemy positions: minefields, tanks dug into the ground and anti-tank artillery. All this powerfully fortified line of the enemy held back our offensive for several days. At this dramatic and culminating moment of the offensive, at the urgent request of the Supreme Commander, Army Group Center detached the 12th Panzer and 36th Infantry Divisions from its reserve to support the offensive. After the regrouping and inclusion of new formations in the strike group, it was necessary to complete the breakthrough in the south-west direction in sector XXXXY! tank corps. However, on July 11, events occurred outside the 9th Army's offensive zone that forced us to stop Operation Citadel in its northern sector. The enemy, with large forces in three sectors of the front of the Oryol Bulge, went over to the offensive against the forces of the 2nd Tank Army, which were on the defensive. In response to military operations under the Zita del plan, the Soviet leadership launched a long-planned

336

general attack on Orel. Presumably, this offensive began much earlier than originally planned. The enemy attacked with his significantly superior forces the troops of the 2nd Panzer Army in the area west of Novosil, east of Bolkhov and northwest of Ul'yanovo and broke through the defenses of 14 infantry and one tank divisions and advanced 10 km deep into the front line. In this situation, the joint command of the Oryol grouping was forced to resort to help. In order to avoid the danger of the enemy breaking through deep into the rear and in order to remove the threat of encirclement of most of the troops of the two armies located in the area of the Oryol Bulge, it was forced to stop the offensive from the north to Kursk and transfer part of the forces of the 9th Army to the areas of the breakthrough, since the loss of Orel, the blocking of all railway lines and roads that depart from this transport center, would make it impossible to supply the advancing 9th Army, would stop its offensive. Thus, already on July 12, an order was received from the command of the army group to withdraw the 12th, 18th, 20th tank divisions and the 36th infantry division, the anti-tank units of the Ferdinand self-propelled guns and heavy artillery units and send them by forced march to the areas where there was a threat of a deep breakthrough in the defense of the 2nd Panzer Army. The initially glimmering hope of overcoming the crisis in the army of Colonel-General Rudolf Schmidt by quickly bringing in the above-mentioned forces and then continuing the advance of the 9th Army had to be finally buried on 13.07. When the huge scale of the enemy offensive against the 2nd Panzer Army was revealed, the operational goals of this offensive became clear: to encircle and destroy our entire grouping inside the Oryol Bulge. Pre-

the supposed operational intentions of the enemy are shown on the map.

On July 15, the enemy launched a counteroffensive on a broad front against the 9th Army - in the fourth, southern sector of the Oryol Bulge, where he used significant forces of artillery, tanks and air fleet. To do this, from the western part of the Kursk Bulge to strengthen the already superior

337

He brought into action two rifle divisions and one tank corps, reinforced by four separate tank and one guards mortar regiments. The main blow was directed at the sector of defense of the XXXXX] tank corps and at the junction of the XXXXXP tank and XXIT front of the army corps. The first attack of the enemy was repelled in the course of fierce battles, and already on the first day 230 tanks were knocked out against the nickname. But here the 2nd Panzer Army faced even more difficult battles. In this situation, the Supreme Commander of both armies (Colonel-General Walter Model. - E. Shch.), with the support of the top leadership of the Wehrmacht, decided to return the 9th Army to its original positions in order to shorten the front line and free up Th four divisions and use the old defensive positions. The enemy did not notice our systematic retreat, which lasted 3 nights, then he continued the offensive in order to prevent the creation of a new German line of defense. Enemy attempts were unsuccessful, despite the use of all tank formations and units with air support. All enemy efforts to break through with significant forces on July 16 and 17, especially east of the railway

338

Orel - Kursk, failed as a result of our reliable defense, while only from 15 to 17.07.43, 530 enemy tanks were hit. On July 18, the 9th Army was still in its original positions (from which it launched its attack on Kursk on 07/05/43), completely ready for defense. In the 2nd Panzer Army, the development of the situation on the main axes on July 19 led to a climax in operational combat operations. The newly arrived 3rd Panzer Army of the Russians attacked the XXXI Army Corps with all its might, whose divisions had up to now courageously resisted the pressure of the enemy.

After the introduction of new forces, the enemy is trying to expand the place of the breakthrough on both sides of the Ulyanovo region.

This operational crisis was dealt with by using all possible reserves. Thus, on 23.07 the dangerous situation was resolved.

In addition to the already engaged 36th Infantry Division, to

The 8th and 2nd Panzer divisions are urgently transferred to the defense sector of the XXXU army corps. In the Ulyanovo area, thanks to the quickly brought units of the 9th Panzer Division, it was possible to stop the enemy tank forces, rushing to the southeast, and from the southwest, the 183rd, 253rd and 707th Infantry Divisions were already hurrying to the breakthrough site. The immediate threat to the Orel-Karachev railroad and highway, where one Russian tank brigade was already located (162nd, colonel Volynets. - HER. Shch.), was eliminated by a powerful attack by air tank destroyers, and the 253rd infantry division, after changing the direction of its march came from the south to Ilyinsky and from 21.07 firmly holds this village. The breakthrough to the east of Orel is assuming ever more menacing proportions. However, thanks to the rapid movement of the 12th Panzer Division from the area southeast of Bolkhov to the place of the breakthrough and the reduction of the front line with the release of troops, even here, at the last minute, the immediate danger of capturing Orel was averted. At the same time, crisis situations have to be dealt with, especially southeast of Orel. Thanks to the timely arrival of the 78th Assault Division, which in a hurry

339

was transferred from the 9th Army in the normal order, our position in the Orel region seems to be strengthened. The situation is controlled thanks to the rapid supply of troops and the covert redeployment of formations, as well as as a result of individual tactical actions, especially anti-tank troops (mobile assault guns, etc.).

Deep enemy breakthroughs and forced reductions in the front line to strengthen the position east and northeast of Orel led to the fact that in the area northwest of Bolkhov a strongly protruding arc was formed, which, although not subject to enemy attacks from the north, nevertheless arose danger of isolation. Before the enemy can do this, it is also necessary here, along with the strengthening of the positions of the XXXV Army Corps, to shorten the front line, which now runs just north of Bolkhov. It is precisely here that the newly formed 10th Motorized Division arrives in time to thwart the plans of the enemy: to encircle Bolkhov from the south thanks to a massive offensive of tanks from the Krasnikovo area. With great effort and as a result of a flexible and tactically competent leadership, it was possible to avert the danger and paralyze the enemy offensive by strong defense and counteroffensives. Thanks to the interaction of the troops, as well as the above-described movements of the formations to the shortened front line, the line of the Oryol Bulge was strengthened, the position of the troops in the defense improved.

Beginning on July 18, the behavior of the enemy in relation to the 9th Army confirmed the interconnection of these actions with the attacks directed against the 2nd Panzer Army. Along the entire front, 400 km long, there were fierce battles that took on the character of a huge battle.

The enemy, who has not yet been able to carry out the planned breakthrough of the front by a frontal attack, hastily regrouped his forces in front of the defense front of the 9th Army in the section of the Oryol Bulge along the Troena-Fatezh highway and in the area of the Chern settlement to strike at the southern flank of this army. The movements of the Russians were noticed in time

340

us vigilant German intelligence, and immediately, i.e. On July 18, retaliatory actions followed: the movement of two liberated divisions and several units of the army to this dangerous sector of the front. Therefore, the Russian offensive on July 19, with the forces of three rifle divisions and 60 tanks, ran into a strong German defense, and as a result of the offensive, the enemy managed to penetrate only in separate sectors.

As a result of a tank breakthrough to the Karachev-Bryansk railroad (July 19), the already wide "dent" in the northwestern section of the Oryol Bulge widened in the area of the 2nd Panzer Army. As a result of the withdrawal, the 2nd Tank Army took up appropriate positions in its sector of defense. On July 23, with a blow from his tanks, the enemy broke through the defense front at the junction of the 2nd and 9th armies in the Zmievka area. The consequences of this breakthrough were eliminated only on July 24, using the last reserves.

On July 26, in connection with the tense situation on the Oryol sector of the Eastern Front, the joint command of the armies issued an order on measures to prepare for a retreat from the entire area of the Oryol Bulge and the withdrawal of troops to the position of the Hagen line. The accelerated equipment of the new line of defense has been going on since mid-July. On July 28, a decision was made and an order was issued for a planned withdrawal to the Hagen line. The retreat was carried out from July 31 to August 17, 1943 with the change of four defensive positions, which, in turn, were divided into intermediate defensive lines. Thanks to this maneuver, more than 20 divisions were released for other fronts.

The situation that had developed on the Oryol Bulge dictated the need for an early maneuver associated with a retreat to the Hagen line. Despite the fact that it was possible to stop the enemy offensive and inflict significant losses on him, it was impossible to resist the massive offensive of enemy troops for a long time without counting on reserves. Especially since the enemy has moved on to new attacks: from 22.07 he is changing the direction of the main attack to the east of Orel. Since the offensive in this direction did not give

341

desired results, the enemy will redeploy the 3rd Panzer Army from the east to the south in order to

strike with the aim of breaking through the front at the junction of the German armies. The remaining tank formations are concentrated to the north of Orel in order to cut off our Oryol grouping by coordinated actions of a simultaneous offensive (meaning the offensive of the 2nd and 3rd Russian tank armies from the south in the direction of Karachev).

So far, the enemy has not succeeded in liquidating the salient around Bolkhov. Then he, contrary to his original plan, puts forward his strategic reserve here - the 4th Panzer Army, which in the next few days will engage in battle with the German troops occupying a position on the arc of the front around Bolkhov.

The crisis situation in the area of the breakthrough south of Uliano stabilized after the approach of the 95th Infantry Division to the right flank of the Main Army Corps, the 26th Infantry Division and the motorized division "Grossdeutschland" to the area east of Karachev. The dangerous development of this situation was stopped thanks to the timely actions of the Grossdeutschland Motorized Division and the 26th Infantry Division from Army Group South and the 293rd and 129th Infantry Divisions from Army Group Center, which were hastily brought into action. The counteroffensive of these formations made it possible to stop the advance of the Russian forces in the direction of the Khotynets-Karachev railway and to the highway, which is a "blood-carrying artery" supplying troops throughout the entire Oryol Bulge.

An attempt by the enemy to break through along the railway. The village of Tereben - Bryansk in the direction of Bryansk was disrupted by the army groups of Bezelager and Buzikha, who approached from 15 to 17.07.

The main place of battles at the end of the month was the arc of the front around Bolkhov. Attacks to break through the front line, undertaken in various sectors of the front northeast and southwest of Bolkhov, run into a solid anti-tank defense (GI army corps and the Harpe group: s9, 18, 20th tank, 10th and 25 th motorized

342

divisions). The enemy loses here on some days more than 200 tanks.

After blocking the enemy main attack east of Orel, on July 31, the enemy went on the offensive with the forces of the 3rd Soviet Tank Army against the 9th Army in the Nikolskoye-Filosofovo sector.

In the midst of these battles, in conditions of the most severe time trouble, both armies, according to the order, were forced to prepare a retreat to the Hagen line. At the same time, complex tasks of a tactical and organizational nature were additionally assigned to their troops. Within three weeks, it was necessary to retreat 100 km into the depths of the front line with battles. This required significant tactical movements in

combat area as soon as possible. It was necessary to prepare the troops for an organized withdrawal, ensuring their mobility and morale. In addition, the reconnaissance of defense lines in new places was carried out in a hurry and their preparation for normal functioning, using labor forces (sappers, construction troops, carts, prisoners and civilians).

It was necessary in the shortest possible time to move to the new line of defense all the stocks prepared for the offensive of the 9th Army and stored in warehouses near the front line. Similar difficulties arose with respect to the intelligence service.

Even more effort was required to evacuate crops and destroy fields in fertile areas where the harvest had just begun. The main tasks here were the preparation of roads for driving livestock and transporting crops, the evacuation of the entire civilian population, the destruction of all the most important structures, roads and bridges, everything that was not subject to evacuation: cars, agricultural machinery, products, and, finally, all settlements .

The evacuation from Orel and its destruction became a particularly difficult task for the 2nd Panzer Army. Under the conditions of an acute shortage of time, retreat measures began in all the above-mentioned sectors. Very difficult

343

large stocks of weapons were evacuated from warehouses east of Krom. With the involvement of all possible forces and transport, it was still possible to complete it, despite poor road conditions.

The Commander-in-Chief of both armies succeeded in incorporating these most complicated organizational measures into a well-organized general plan of action.

On July 31 in the evening, on the orders of the Fuhrer, a retreat to the Hagen line began in bad weather and on impassable roads. The rain, which lasted all day, washed out all the roads in the area of the Oryol Bulge. However, the situation described above required immediate action.

The first step in the retreat plan brought temporary relief in all sectors of the front of the Oryol salient. Separate phases of the movement to the "Hagen" line were hampered by the powerful offensive of the enemy from the east, especially by the incessant attempts of the enemy to break the flanks of the retreating German armies. Only after the defensive line had been shortened as a result of the maneuver on the flanks did this danger pass.

In relation to the 9th Army, the enemy from the very beginning increased the pressure on the southern flank of the army in order to make a breakthrough here and cut off significant German

forces before they manage to gain a foothold in the next line of defense.

On August 1, powerful enemy attacks continued by four rifle divisions, 120 tanks with strong air support in the Shepelevo-Gostoml sector. These attacks were halted heroically by the troops (7th, 258th, and 31st Infantry Divisions) who fought continuously for three weeks and managed to knock out 77 enemy tanks. Due to the constant pressure of the enemy in the following days, especially from the area of the salient near the village of Chern, it was necessary to redirect the direction of the main attack of our own air forces from the combat area of the 2nd Panzer Army here - to the dangerous sector of defense of the 9th Army.

5.08 200 enemy tanks supported by infantry and

344

aviation launched a powerful offensive southwest of Krom in order to break the line of the retreating German troops and quickly capture the transport hub of Krom. On this day, the 258th Infantry Division XXXXY! The tank corps had to repulse the attacks of the Soviet troops 15 times with the participation of a large number of tanks. The constant disruption of communications due to enemy bombers, the increased number of guerrilla sabotage on the railway and the resulting shortage of ammunition and fuel especially aggravated the situation. The epicenter of the battle on the Oryol Bulge, which until now had been in the sector of the 2nd Panzer Army, had shifted to the south, to the defensive line of the 9th Army. The Supreme Commander ordered that a significant number of air defense troops and anti-tank weapons be concentrated on the axes of the main attacks and that the number of mines laid be increased. And also to move the 12th tank division, which was subordinate to the 2nd tank army, to the area east of Shablykino for the subsequent change of the 292nd and 383rd infantry divisions. Aviation successfully operated in the sectors of the 9th Army.

This is how the crisis was overcome. The section of the front at Krom was held for two days. Thus, it was possible to frustrate the enemy's plans to break through in one direction to Kromy, and in the other, where the tank army was advancing, to Khotynets and encircle significant German forces.

Meanwhile, Orel was abandoned on August 5, after the destruction in accordance with the plan of all bridges and important in the military from carrying structures and buildings, as well as after sending 53,000 tons of cargo and 20,000 wounded.

At this time, it became obvious that the enemy was gradually regrouping his troops, especially the forces of the 4th Panzer Army, in the west. Therefore, in the interval from 6 to 8.08 a tactical crisis ensued in the sectors of the 2nd Panzer Army. This happened when the enemy tried to break through the northern sector of defense with strong tank formations (group

Harpe) in the Uzkoye area. 7.08 this situation has been corrected.

To prevent further dangerous development of

345

beings had to build a new line of defense along the river. Moschenka and Nugr (on the Moschenoe - Gavrilova section). Before that, the enemy, having regrouped his forces, launched a new attack on Khotynets here. The attacks continued until 10.08, but without success.

After stubborn fighting in the southern sector of the Oryol Bulge in the Kroma region, thanks to the continued retreat of the 9th Army, it was possible to gain greater freedom of action. The new outline of the line of the German front, which went sharply to the north in a straight line, deprived the enemy of his former possibilities. This situation forced him to attack the southern flank of the army. Therefore, the enemy concentrated his forces south of Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky and launched a large offensive from the area of the village of Bryantsevo to Dmitrovsk (72nd Infantry Division). Under bad weather conditions, the enemy managed to make a deep breakthrough, but on August 9 and 10 the enemy was unable to expand it, despite the forces of three rifle divisions and tanks. The 72nd Infantry Division withstood the onslaught of the enemy.

By this time, the Hagen line and the routes passing behind it were urgently repaired and supplemented with newly created anti-tank nodes on the intermediate buffer lines of defense. Unfortunately, at the same time the 9th Army was weakened due to the transfer of the 4th, 8th, 9th, 12th Panzer, 31st, 102nd, 183rd, 293rd, 258th Infantry Divisions and numerous units to other fronts. The transfer of these units to the tank and military corps, worn out in battles by the GUJ tank and KhP army, meant additional difficulties in the defense for the 9th Army.

On August 19, with the advancing of the enemy on the positions of the XX Army Corps, and then on August 26, on the positions of the XXXI Panzer Corps, and on August 28, on the positions of the Harpe group, a new chapter in the military history of the 9th Army began - the battle abroad "Hagen". After the completion of the battle on the Oryol Bulge, the 9th Army joined in a new defensive battle, which unfolded along the entire Eastern Front - from the Kuban to Lake Ladoga.

346

It will be possible later to appreciate the merits of the 9th and 2nd tank armies in solving combat and organizational tasks during the battle on the Oryol Bulge and to determine the effectiveness of the decisions taken. But it is already clear that in the operation "Citadel" the advancing troops of the 9th Army dealt a significant blow to the enemy troops,

who were going to go on the offensive from the Kursk region to the north, and significantly weakened the enemy formations. The enemy was no longer able to strike with the same force in the direction of Khotynets - Karachev, surrounding our troops in the Orel region from the south. It is also clear that the retreat carried out by both miarmies to the Hagen line diverted part of the advancing Russian formations, and the reduction of the front line made it possible to release a significant number of formations and units for other fronts. They were given 19 divisions, namely: five armored, three motorized and eleven infantry, with numerous army formations of NIAM. :

Success in battle is the result of the dedication of individuals. Combat units were again in the lead, and infantry was in the first place. For almost seven weeks without a break, the German armies fought battles, for almost seven weeks they opposed the superior forces of the enemy. In total, the following fought against the 9th and 2nd tank armies:

85 rifle divisions;

3 rifle brigades;

13 tank corps (39 tank brigades and 13 motor rifle brigades);

2 mechanized corps (4 tank and 2 motorized rifle brigades);

1 cavalry corps (3 cavalry divisions);

33 separate tank regiments.

Our infantry was supported by: strong and mobile artillery

!' Author's note. This list is not entirely complete. In the Battle of Orel (offensive operation "Kutuzov"), on our part, 95 rifle (including 3 cavalry) divisions, 13 tank and 2 mechanized corps, 46 tank brigades and 30 separate tank regiments, 9 artillery divisions, etc. .connections and parts.

347

leriya, combat-ready aviation, battle-tested tankers, anti-tank troops, sappers, construction troops, reconnaissance, supply units and units, railway troops and rear services Koryuk, all other troops and services not involved in battles that carried out road construction, regulation traffic, as well as blasting in the abandoned territory.

The significant successes of the combat troops, led by extremely determined, courageous and able to cope with critical situations, military leaders confirm the data on the damage inflicted on the enemy: 11,772 prisoners

nyh; 2007 defectors; 4728 tanks; 203 guns; 362 anti-tank guns; 32 anti-aircraft guns; 206 mortars; 827 machines; 799 pistols; 32 multi-barrel rocket launchers; 34 aircraft.

At the same time, the great successes of the 1st Aviation Division should be noted, which supported the 9th and 2nd Tank Armies from the air, hitting ground targets, and in some situations determined the outcome of the battle in the Battle of the Oryol Bulge. Its pilots made 5-6 sorties a day, making a total of 37,421 sorties. They won 1,733 air battles, while fighters accounted for 1,671 victories and only 64 defeats (referring to the losses of German and Soviet aircraft, respectively. - Yo. Shch.). In addition, aviation disabled more than 1,100 tanks, 1,300 trucks and tracked vehicles, as well as numerous batteries. Dropping 20,000 tons of bombs, she inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment.

On the ground, aviation operations were supplemented by the battle-tested anti-aircraft troops of the 12th anti-aircraft division, which knocked out 383 aircraft and 2 tethered balloons, and in ground battles - 229 tanks. They also destroyed a large number of combat positions, guns, vehicles; in addition, in the course of defensive battles, great damage was inflicted on the personnel of the enemy.

The most difficult tasks were solved by the leadership of subunits and supply units of both armies. At the same time, the main difficulties for the 9th Army were the need for a quick

348

restructuring from offensive to defensive and retreat, and for the 2nd Panzer Army, the difficulties were associated with the growing needs for the expenditure of material resources, the latter was due to the dynamics of the battles in which the army participated and the rapid growth of the contingent of troops. Both armies, to get out of a difficult situation (due to lack of ammunition and fuel), more than once had to resort to temporary support from each other, which was associated with interruptions in work or overloading of the railway. In general, 120,000 tons of ammunition (including almost 2,000,000 shells for light field howitzers), 40,000 cu. m of fuel, which often had to be delivered to the places of the main battles in the shortest possible time. At the same time, the support troops showed the highest skill. No less difficult were the tasks associated with cleaning up the territory during the evacuation of industrial facilities and people. All actions related to these events were carried out in the shortest possible time and in the most organized manner. It was possible to evacuate abroad "Hagen" 180,000 civilians and 30,000 head of cattle.

During the battles, sappers laid about 250,000 mines of all kinds and destroyed about 1,000 bridges and tunnels. At the same time, they, together with the construction troops

they laid about 1,500 km of new roads and tracks in the army sectors.

An indicator of the excellent work of the signalmen, who at the beginning of the offensive of the 9th Army laid a dense cable network, then reconstructed it for defense needs, and then dismantled this network and moved the Hagen abroad, are the following figures: only one 511th regiment signalmen laid 1480 km of cable, 622 km of uninsulated wires; dismantled 1480 km of cable and 1130 km of bare wires. During the battle, telegraph communication services processed 10,500 telegraph messages and transmitted 26,500 telegrams. The intensity of radio communication was four times higher than during Operation Buffalo (the winter retreat of the Germans from the Rzhev region. - E. Pr). Similar indicators are also characteristic of the 2nd Panzer Army. Besides,

349

It should be noted the work of signalmen, who repaired damage to communication lines as a result of their rupture by shells, mines and bombs.

The performance of the railway during the withdrawal to the new line of defense is illustrated by the following figures: about 200 evacuation echelons, 400 transport trains were carried out, and this is in addition to trains with supplies and transportation of vacationers. At the same time, the scope of work of the railway troops almost doubled due to damage carried by partisans and air bombardments. During the retreat, the sappers of the railway units destroyed 420 km of the railway, 40 railway stations, 7 large bridges from 25 to 130 m long, many small bridges and tunnels. More than once the outcome of the battle depended on the urgent delivery of ammunition or the timely transfer of military formations to the right place.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

So, by the beginning of the tenth day of the offensive, the troops of the tank group of General Badanov, "overcoming the stubborn resistance of the Germans, captured a number of settlements, throwing the enemy back to the line: Znamenskoye - Lebedyansky - Ivanovsky - Prilepy and further to the southern bank of the river. Mokhovitsa "".

The movement of formations of the 25th Panzer Corps stalled, and they fought on the line of Veselaia Zhizn - Slobidka - Uspensky - Znamenskoye.

Connections of the 5th Panzer Corps - at the turn of Lokna - Rozhkovo - Pavlovsky Khutor - Lebedyansky.

Formations of the 11th Panzer Corps conducted barefoot operations behind the district center Znamenskoye and entrenched themselves in the NCM

after his release.

Formations of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps, having liberated the Prilepy, Svobodny Trud, and Martynovsky settlements, continued to fight for the heights south of the Savinka settlement and for the Ivanovsky settlement, without advancing further to the south.

Formations of the 39th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps stopped at the enemy's third line of defense, which passed along the southern bank of the Mokhovitsa River, having reached its maximum advance in a southerly direction - the Dolbilovo and Masalskaya settlements.

So, in ten days, the tank and mechanized formations of the Badanov strike group with heavy battles about

1 TsAMORF, f. 4th Guards TA, op. 4756, d. 12, l. 12.

351

moved southward to a depth of 20-25 km. The daily rate of advance of the group was 2-2.5 km.

In continuous combat operations, which took place both day and night (see extracts from the logs of military operations of formations), only by the end of the ninth day was the second defense in depth was completely overcome, and our tankers approached the third line of defense of the enemy.

According to the original plan of operation, the Badanova formations were supposed to cut the enemy's communications (railway and highway Orel-Bryansk) in the Shakhovo-Khotynets sector by the end of the first day, i.e. about tearing up the enemy's defenses and overcoming about 50 km in a day. There was still 25 km from the Mokhovitsa River to the railway.

In order to overcome the third line of defense and reach the main communications of the enemy (railway and highway Orel - Bryansk), Badanov's tankers did not have enough forces and means.

Let me remind you that on July 25, the Military Council of the Western Front, in its directive, set the task for the 4th Panzer Army: "to enter the gap in sector 8 of the SC of the 11th Guards. And, with a strike in the south-western direction, cut off the main communications of the enemy in the area: Khotynets and by the end of 26.7.43, reach the area: Krasnaya Polyana, Khotynets, Mayaki, Sbolyashevo, Bogdanovka, Naryshkino, Bykovo, Bunino, creating conditions for encirclement of the enemy's Oryol-Bolkhov grouping".

In accordance with the directive of the front commander and the operation plan, the commander of the 4th tank army, General Balanov, set the following task for his formations: to break through the enemy's defenses, enter the gap, overcome

let three anti-tank lines (the rivers Ors, Nugr and Mokhovitsa) and by the end of July 26, 1943, reach the area: Krasnaya Polyana, Khotynets, Gremyachiy, Dubrovo?

On the tenth day of the battle, Badanov's formations, following the order of the Military Council of the Bryansk Front, stopped

¹ TsAMORF, f.4 guards TA, op. 4756, d. 12, l.5.
² Ibid., l. 8. 3 From
July 29, 4 TA became part of the Bryansk Front.

352

attack in a southerly direction. On the night of August 4-5, 1943, the 4th Tank Army (the 25th and 5th Tank Corps had left the army by this time), having regrouped, made a 50-kilometer march northwest to the area np Korytino, Myvrino (now Mymrino), Vyazovaya, Dernova, Peshkova in order to break through the enemy defenses in a new direction. From here, after two days, which were required to replenish with people, tanks and ammunition, Badanov's army continued to fulfill its previously set task: to cut the enemy's communications in the section of st. Shakhovo - Khotynets.

Thus, the task that the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command assigned to the troops of Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops V.M. Badanov, was not completed not only on the first day, but in general. On the tenth day of the Naiga offensive, the troops stopped at the enemy's third line of defense (the Mokhovitsa River) and had no further advance. On this, the Borilovsky armored battle was assured.

THE PRICE OF VICTORY

The documents of the corps, brigades, regiments, kept in the military archive of Podolsk, give us a complete picture of the number of troops and weapons that make up the Badanov armored group (in particular, a report on the combat and numerical strength).

These archival documents contain standard reporting forms - "Information on Losses", which accurately indicate how much one or another formation (unit, subdivision) lost officers, sergeants and privates (killed, wounded, missing). .Information about the losses of personnel and weapons is also contained in the combat logs.

The documentation of the 5th, 11th and 30th tank corps is especially well represented in the archive. Now the reader has opportunity to get to know them.

353

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The fighting of the 11th tank corps in the Borilovsky battle

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Rod V proryV mechanized brigades at the
turn of TsvanoVoyuii - Lesnoy Zuevekikh

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Scale 1:50 900

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Combat operations of the 49th mechanized brigade

Pursuit of the retreating enemy nickname 6 district
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Combat operations of the 49th mechanized brigade

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Scheme of combat operations of the 49th brigade in the Bychkovsky, Dubrovsky area

357

Cielea
fighting strength" TO
PBR 8 battles from
270743. to 108.435

Combat operations of the 70th tank brigade

358

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Fighting 11th Panzer Corps

359

INFORMATION ON THE LOSSES OF PERSONNEL
OF THE 5TH MOTOR RIFLE BRIGADE FROM 12.07 POS.68.1943 G.1

Lost unloaded

back

Wounded

Losses of weapons: rifles - 70, PPSH - 241, RP - 23, StP - 12, PTR - 14, 76 mm
guns - 2, 45 mm guns - 8.

As of July 11, the brigade in its combat strength had: National Assembly - 238, MNSiRS - 1106 people; rifles and carbines - 740, PPSH - 606, RP - 44, StP - 25, PTR - 36, 76-mm guns - 12.45-mm guns - 122.

Thus, the 5th motorized rifle brigade suffered losses during the period of fighting: in personnel - 75 percent, in armament - up to 50 percent.

FROM THE JOURNAL OF BATTLE
ACTIONS OF THE 24TH TANK BRIGADE:

"The total losses of the brigade for this period (12.07 - 03.08.43) are in personnel: 178 people were killed, 12 people were missing, 314 people were injured"?

"31.07. At 15.00 attacked Kr. Gora, having overcome the strong fire of the pr-ka, having repelled 2 counterattacks, being under the influence of massive air raids of the pr-ka aircraft, the tanks went out and entrenched themselves on the northern slopes of height 215.2.

As a result of the battle, 12 T-34 tanks were lost knocked out and burned down.

From 27.07 to 04.08 irretrievable losses in tanks amounted to: T-34 - 7, T-70 - one "".

' TsAMORF, f. 5 MSBR (3366), op. 1, d. 4, l. 43.

2 Ibid., l. 50.

3 Ibid., f. 3404, op. 1, d. 68. l. 47 (Ob.); d. 68, l. 42. 4 Ibid., f. 24 brigade, op. 1, d. 8, l. 73-80.

360

FROM REPORTS ABOUT THE BATTLE AND STRENGTH
OF THE 41st TANK BRIGADE!

On 25.07.43 | On 3.08.43 Losses People

yh Ze
Command staff 216/219 216/173 -46

ML. command staff 455/387 455/317 - 70
Enlisted personnel 476/335 476/296 - 39 1147/928
1147/786 - 142 Cars Lightweight.
auto 3 to -

Cargo. ed. 68 74 +6

292/450

201/238

292/466

287/138

82 mm min.

The first digit is staff, the second is available. | 1 TsAMO RF, f. 41 brigade,
op. 1, d. 12, l. 364, 373.

361

INFORMATION ON THE LOSSES OF THE 41st TANK BRIGADE
C28.07 POS.68. 43 D.1

| MNS RS | Total 40 4

66 40 | 16

81 7 1 1 10

||

|

FROM THE REPORT TO THE PERSONNEL AND BATTLE
STRUCTURE OF THE 41st TANK BRIGADE NAZ.68.43

Medium tanks:

T-34 4

MK-3 1

Thus, irretrievable losses for the indicated period amounted to: T-34 - 39,
MK-3 - 9, T-70 - 6, T-60 - 8. In total - 65 vehicles.

REPORTS ON THE BATTLE AND STRENGTH OF THE
70TH TANK BRIGADIER

b RE

|| On 10.07.43 not on 10.08.43. Losses | 214/214 214/174 -
40 -

G

456/387 456/330 - 57 476/332
476/250 8 146/933
146/754 - 179

Antimobiles

|
Out >
G.
s auth. 4 4 —
Cargo. ed. 79 46 - 33 Spec. 19
19 —

'
TsAMO RF, I. 397.
? There, f. 70 tr, op. 1, d. 12, I. 243, 247.

362

On 07/10/43] on 08/10/43 And Losses

76 mm guns

82 mm min.

^|s
And

Tanks
32 16 [in

Lungs 14 8 -6

Weapon
Rifles 483/485 483/435 - 50 PPSH 287/267
287/138 - 129 Stank. pool. 4 4 —
Man. pool. 20 0 | = -
Zenith. pool. 2 2 - PTR 24 18
G 6 |

guns

—=!

From the combat log of the 70th tank brigade:

"The combat strength of the 70 brigade on 07/26/43:

M4-A-2 29 pcs.

MK-3 19 pcs.

T-34 5 pcs.

Losses.

27.07. People: killed - 3, missing - 8, injured - 5; tanks: M4-A-2 - 7 pcs., MK-3 - 4 pcs.

28.07. People; killed - 14, missing - 8, injured - 58; tanks: M4-A-2 - 5 burned down and 5 damaged, 1 out of order;

MK-3 - 1 was burned down and 6 were destroyed.

29-30.07. People: killed - 21, missing - 10

lovek, wounded - 52;

tanks: M4-A-2 - 6, MK-3 - 3, T-34 - 2 pcs. For the period from 24 to 31.07.43, human losses amounted to 172

people, of which: killed - 33, missing - 24 (irretrievably - 57 people), wounded - 115 people;

tank losses amounted to: M4-A-2 burned down - 17, knocked out

then - 12, MK-3 burned down - 4, knocked out - 14; T-34 burned down - 1,

363

hit - 2; of these, irretrievable losses amounted to 22 machines "".

Summarize. According to archival documents reflecting the combat operations of tank brigades, all the losses of the 5th tank corps amounted to 124 tanks, of which 92 were irretrievably: 47 T-34 units, 15 T-70 light tanks and 30 British and American MK-Zi M4 tanks -A-2.

Losses of personnel of the 5th Panzer Corps at the Orlovsky bridgehead

From July 12 to July 23, 1943, formations and parts of the corps lost 2135 (303) in battle? people, of which 644 (99) were killed, 116 (6) were missing, and 1375 (198) were wounded. It is known that rifle units bear the greatest damage in battles. In this case, this is confirmed by the losses of the 5th motorized rifle brigade. During the same time, they amounted to 877 (84) people, of which 234 (25) were killed, 83 (5) were missing, 560 (54) were wounded, or 40 percent of the total number of the entire corps (daily losses - 178 people)?.

INFORMATION ON THE LOSS OF PERSONNEL OF THE 5TH TANK CORPS FROM 26.07 TO 31.07.1943

Parts

Upr. korp. 24tbr

41 brigade
| 70t6r |

1 TsAMORF, f. 70 brigade, op. 1, d. 1, l. 39-44.

2 Losses among the officers are given in a glance. I note that in the battles, the Soviet units had losses - for one dead officer, 5 - 7 people from the privates and non-commissioned officers, while the non-German units accounted for 25 people from the number of privates and non-commissioned officers per one killed officer.

3 TsAMORF, f. 3404, op. 1, d. 164, l. 13.

4 Ibid., l. 2.

364

1708 zenap

277 mortar regiment

704 div. b-n connection
zi

25 sec. recon b-n

188 sec. sapper-

b-n

731 oiptd

1435 sap RGK

As you can see, over 6 days of hostilities in the Battle of Borilov, the corps lost 512 people (daily losses amounted to 85 people), i.e. half as much as in the first stage of the fighting (12.07 - 23.07.43). I. The 24th Tank and 5th Motorized Rifles, due to the heavy losses suffered in the first period, took a limited part in the battles at the second stage - in separate episodes. For 6 days of fighting in the second stage, two brigades (41st and 70th) lost almost as much as in the first stage. The daily losses of these brigades at the first stage were 31 men, while at the second stage they were 48 men (mainly losses in tank crews).

In the final period of the battle (August 1-August 4, 1943), formations and units of the 5th Panzer Corps did not take part due to heavy losses.

1 TsAMORF, f. 3404, op. 1, d. 164, l. 13.

365

Losses of the 25th Panzer Corps

The exact losses of personnel and weapons of the 25th Panzer Corps in the battles from July 26 to August 4 are not indicated in archival documents, but there are general data on losses from July 14 to August 10.

"During the period of the 27-day operation (14.07 - 10.08.), the corps advanced 210 km, of which, in conditions of heavy combat, up to 70 km, suffered the following losses:

a) loss of personnel!

| Bezvoz

Category Killed b / in gatekeepers | Wounded | Total loss

Officers UD 12 183 222 405

NCOs 380 136 WT: 526 1042

Enlisted personnel 502 352 | 854 1123 1977 |

Total 1053 | 500 | 1553 | 1871 | 3424

6) irretrievable losses in tanks? | 5 |

[Stamps | November 111

Tanks T-34 42

Tanks T-70 12

| Total 54

Due to the fact that the documents of the brigades of the 25th Tank Corps in the Central Military Archive of Podolsk are not presented in full, especially in terms of reports on combat strength and information on losses, the calculation of losses in the Borilovsky battle of this formation can be established by daily average losses, which, based on the general data of the table, is not difficult to establish. It should be noted that in the fighting of the brigade of the 25th tan

1 TsAMORF, f. 3419, op. 1, d. 23, l. 8.2 Ibid.

366

kovoy corps did not participate all 27 days. According to the reporting documents, the battles with their participation took place in three stages: the first stage - from July 14 to 22, or 9 days; the second stage - from July 27 to August 1, or 6 days. At the third stage (August 6 - 10, 5 days), only the 162nd tank brigade took part with the tanks of the 175th and 111th tank brigades transferred to it.

So, the formations of the 25th tank corps participated in the hostilities for 20 days.

DAILY DATA OF HUMAN LOSSES OF THE
25TH TANK CORPS AND DATA OF LOSSES FROM
JULY 27 TO AUGUST 1, 1943

human human

Losses from 1505 : 468 564 1032 27.07
to 1.08 people | human

DAILY LOSSES OF TANKS OF THE 25TH TANK CORPS AND DATA
OF LOSSES IN THE PERIOD FROM JULY 27 TO AUGUST 1, 1943

Their Stamps 11th brigade | 162nd ue - tb Total | Re T-34,
average daily | 42:20 48-20 t 55 | losses 2.1 2.4 1.75 Ra 25
Losses from 27.07 to 1.08.43 12.6
14.4 10.5 1 37 tanks T-70 E tanks 12:20 15 ry

| Average daily losses g 0.6 —

| Losses from 27.07 to 1.08.43 g 3.6

Total (average daily | 54:20

losses) 2.7

Losses from 27.07 to 1.08.43 16.2

367

Thus, applying the calculation method developed by the mathematician V.V. Gmurman!, it was established that the formations of the 25th tank corps could irretrievably lose 48 tanks during the six days of participation in the Borilovsky battle, of which 37 tanks accounted for medium tanks T-34. These losses are equal to the strength of one tank brigade, or 33 percent of the entire composition of the tank corps.

This calculation is confirmed by the documents of the 175th tank brigade. Thus, in the journal of combat operations of this brigade for 07/28/43, it is noted: "losses of the brigade for a day of fighting: wounded - 60, killed - 15 people; T-34 tanks - 8 pcs."2.

The most complete information about the combat and numerical strength and losses is contained in the archival documents of the formations of the 4th Panzer Army, which were assigned the main role in the operation to break through the enemy's defense lines. The 11th Tank Corps and the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps took part in the offensive from the first day, and the 30th Ural Corps from the second.

An idea about the number of personnel, weapons, about our losses and the damage inflicted on the enemy, is given by excerpts from documents that are of undoubted interest to us.

BATTLE COMPOSITION OF THE 11TH TANK CORPS ON JULY 25, 1943

-- T

Total by
Car brand Including: list

T with
| corrected. urgent | cap. nyh | rem. |
rem. | rem.

|

|

G 1 | TankiT-34 135 | 129 2 | 4

2 | TanksT-70 63 63 _ = er

| | = --

| 3 ISAU-122 16 16 — _ —

| 4 | Armored personnel carriers 38 and 38 | ==

| 5 | Armored vehicles | 47_47

Gmurman VV Theory of Probability and Mathematical Statistics. — M, 1997. Pp. 189.

2? TsAMORF, f. 3238, op. 1,d. 1, l. 17. 3 Ibid., f. 3412,
op. 1,d. 55, L. 5.

368

INFORMATION ON THE LOSS OF
WEAPONS OF THE 11TH TANK CORPS
IN THE PERIOD OF JULY 26 AFTER AUGUST 1943

T
Car brand | Including No. t Total T
t
p/p | losses | free- | rebound | fun- | | E return to our ranks | 1 | Tanks
T-34 | 202 | 97! 105 - 2 T-70
tanks | 99 32 | 66 Gz [ACS | 12 | d | | = | | 3 4 |
Armored personnel carriers And | 12 _
| 5 and - 7 | - 5 | Armored

vehicles | 18 | 3 G 15 | A

LOSSES OF THE 6TH GUARDS MECHANIZED CORPS

Losses of personnel from 26.07 to 10.08.1943:

"Killed - 1334 people, including 166 officers.

Wounded - 3984 people, including 293 officers.

Missing - 33 people, including 2 officers.

As a result of heavy losses of officers in the corps, all battalion commanders were replaced twice and all company commanders three times.

Unit commanders died:

July 29 - deputy. commander of the 16th brigade lieutenant colonel Budin,

July 29 - Commander of the 29th Tank Guards. lieutenant colonel Maslyaev,

August 8 - Commander of the 49th MBR Guards. lieutenant colonel Jabot,

10.08 - commander of the 51 paws of the guards. lieutenant colonel Lakhtin,

July 27 - deputy. commander of 51 paws for p / h - guards. Major Dorokhov"?

Losses of weapons from July 26 to August 10, 1943: "140 tanks were knocked out, of which 83 were irretrievably damaged. 4 SAU-122s were disabled.

Disabled guns - 12.

The armored vehicle was disabled. - 9.

Disabled armored vehicles - 12

and other property"?3.

1 TsAMORF, f. 3412, op. 1, d. 55, l.9.

? There, f. 3434, op. 1, d.2, l. 25. 3 Ibid., l. 26.

369

Damage inflicted on the enemy from July 27 to August 20, 1943: Tanks destroyed - 21.

Armored vehicles destroyed - 2.

Guns of various calibers destroyed - 69. Soldiers and officers destroyed - 5541.

Trophies taken:

"Tanks - 7.

Self-propelled guns - 2.

Guns of different calibers - 17. Machine guns - 23.

Captured - 48 soldiers.

LOSSES OF THE 30TH URAL VOLUNTEER TANK CORPS

During the period from July 27 to August 3, 1943, as a result of the fighting, formations and units of the corps suffered the following losses:

197th tank brigade.

Losses in tanks: burned down and exploded - 15; hit - 17.

Losses in armament: 76-mm guns knocked out - 3; mortars - 4; easel machine guns - 3; light machine guns knocked out - 4; 3 vehicles destroyed, 2 damaged.

Losses in personnel: killed - 129 people, wounded - 109 people, did not return from the battlefield - one.

243rd tank brigade.

Losses in tanks: burned down and exploded - 15, lined up - 26.

Losses in armament: 76-mm guns shot down - 1; mortars - 2; easel machine guns - 2; DShK machine guns - 2 were knocked out; light machine guns shot down - 17; cars destroyed - 2, hit - 7.

Losses in personnel: killed - 152 people, wounded but - 208 people.

1 TsAMORF, f. 3434, op. 1, d.2, l.26-27.

370

244th tank brigade.

Losses in tanks: burned down and exploded - 15; hit - 23.

Losses in armament: destroyed mortars - 1; easel machine guns - 3; light machine guns shot down - 15; 2 cars destroyed, 7 damaged.

Losses in personnel: killed - 152 people, wounded - 113 people, did not return from the battlefield - 30 people.

30th motorized rifle brigade.

Losses in armament: 76-mm guns shot down - 4; mortars destroyed - 2; easel machine guns - 3; light machine guns shot down - 15; 21 cars were destroyed, 30 were destroyed.

Losses in personnel: killed, wounded and missing - 1835 people.

1621st self-propelled artillery regiment.

Losses in tanks and self-propelled guns: a tank was hit - 1; self-propelled guns shot down - 4. Personnel losses: killed - 8; wounded - 23.

299th mortar regiment.

Losses in armament: destroyed mortars - 5; wheeled vehicles - 13. Personnel losses: killed - 29, wounded - 75.

1513th anti-tank regiment.

Losses in armament: 45-mm guns shot down - 2; cars: destroyed - 3; knocked out - 2.

Personnel losses: killed - 5, wounded - 13.

219th anti-aircraft artillery regiment.

Loss of weapons: 37-mm guns knocked out - 1; destroyed machine guns DShK - 3; cars destroyed - 2, hit - 2.

Personnel losses: 10 killed, 13 wounded.

The rest of the combat units were insignificant

371

nye losses. The rear units and subdivisions of the corps had no losses in materiel and personnel during the period of hostilities.

INFORMATION ON THE LOSS OF PERSONNEL OF THE
CREW OF THE TANK UNITS OF THE 30TH UDTK FROM JULY 27 TO AUGUST 1, 1943

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n connection

Total

1 TsAMORF, f. 30 UDTK, op. 1, d. 34, l. 13-15.

372

INFORMATION ON THE LOSS OF PERSONNEL OF THE 30TH UDTK IN THE PERIOD FROM JULY 27 TO AUGUST 2, 1943

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LOSS OF PERSONNEL OF THE 4TH TANK ARMY

The documentation of the 4th Panzer Army is presented to the archive in full, especially in the part reflecting the combat and numerical strength, as well as losses at all three stages of hostilities at the Orlovsky bridgehead. And what is especially important for us - at the first, most bloody stage - in the battle of Borilovsky.

As we already know, the initial numerical strength of the 4th Panzer Army was 38,581 people.

Now let's cite the sad statistics of losses in the grandiose armored battle that raged for 10 days in the area of the ancient Russian village of Bori.

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373

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SUMMARY TABLE OF PERSONNEL LOSSES OF THE BADANOV STRIKING GROUP IN THE PERIOD FROM JULY 26 TO 31, 1943.1

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Losses 4 TA 2574 | 342 NOT
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| 9110 | 5tk G 128 61 189 323 | 512 | 25 tk | sound | 150 | 468
564 | 1032 | Total E 553 | 3513 781 |
10654 | Daily | 54 | 9 = 5% 1180 | 1776 | | losses | 1
and |

Note. Human losses for the next 5 days of fighting (from 1 to 5 August) are not reflected in
archival documents due to the fact that reporting data were submitted on the 1st, 10th and 20th of
each month.

As we can see from the above table, the average daily losses of
formations and units of Badanov's strike group in the battles at the end of July
amounted to 1776 people. It follows from the documents that units of the 5th and
25th tank corps practically did not participate in the battles from 1 to 4 August. This
means that the losses for four days (from August 1 to August 4 inclusive) are three

the corps of the 4th tank army should be about 7 thousand people. But they were much lower than in the battles at the end of July, since the intensity of hostilities sharply subsided from August 31 - the Germans began to retreat in an organized manner to the new Hagen defensive line.

I dare to suggest that the damage during these four days amounted to about 1.5 thousand people (on August 5, hostilities were no longer conducted, formations and units were redeployed to another sector of the front).

Thus, all the casualties of Badanov's shock pear

1 TsAMO RF, f. 323, op. 4756, d. 117, l. 54; f. 3404, op. 1, d. 164, l. 2; f. 3419, op. 1, d. 23, l. 8.

375

in the Borilovsky armored battle from July 26 to August 4 - about 12,000 people, of which irretrievable losses (killed and missing) amounted to about 4,000 people.

The fact that the formations of the 11th Panzer Corps lost 2,863 men in the last six days of July (irrecoverably 1,180 men) is a confirmation of the fact that the intensity of hostilities decreased sharply in August; in 10 days of August, they lost 378 people, of which 61 were irretrievable losses.

The daily losses of the 11th Panzer Corps in July (6 days) amounted to 477 people, and in August (10 days) - 37 people. Thus, the daily losses of connections of this corps in August decreased by almost 13 times.

INFORMATION ON THE LOSS OF PERSONNEL OF THE 11TH TANK CORPS IN THE PERIOD FROM 26.07 TO 10.08.1943

Killed Missing Injured

1129 | 2000 | 3241

|

LOSS OF ARMORED VEHICLES

Let me remind you that in the shock tank group of General Badanov, taking into account the tanks and self-propelled guns of the 5th and 25th tank corps, on July 26 there were 978 armored vehicles. In fact, more than 1000 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts took part in the Battle of Borilov from our side. Should

keep in mind that after significant losses in the battles of July 26-28, the 11th Panzer Corps received 35 T-34 tanks and 16 British MK-22 tanks. In addition, on July 27, the 70th tank brigade of the 5th tank corps "... having received overstaffing: T-34 tanks - 5, M4-A-2 - 29, MK-3 - 19, continued fighting"³.

1! TsAMO RF, f. 3412, op. 1, d. 66, l. 27. 2 Ibid., d. 80, l. 27; f. 24 16p, op. 1, d. 8, l. 5-3 Ibid., f. 70tbr, he. 1, d. 1, l. 39.

376

The fighting in the Borilovsky battle was extremely fierce, with the use of a large number of tanks and self-propelled assault artillery.

So, from July 26 to August 5, the steel vehicles of the Badanov joint group, due to damage received in battles (mainly from anti-tank fire - artillery, tanks and self-propelled guns - and the repulsion of anti-tank fighter aircraft), in the Borilovsky battle 678 times left building. Irrevocable losses during the same time amounted to: 299 T-34 tanks, 30 British tanks, 60 T-70 light tanks, 6 self-propelled guns SAU-122 and one SAU-152. Thus, all irretrievable losses amounted to 396 units of armored vehicles, or 40 percent of the initial composition (978 combat units of armored vehicles accurately accounted for).

Undoubtedly, the irretrievable losses of the 4th Panzer Army in the battle of Borilov on July 28 and 29 would have been greater than in the battle of Prokhorovka if the Germans had launched a counterattack with tanks and "flashed through" the battle formations of the Soviet tankers. And then all the slightly damaged tanks would have been blown up by a special sapper team, as was the case near Prokhorovka. The attitude of the German Colonel-General V. Model, commander of the enemy's united Oryol grouping, was different in this battle: retreating - "snarl". After the battles near Borilovo and Zly Nyu, the Nazis withdrew to the border of the Orel-Bryansk railway line, and then part of the German tank forces were thrown to Khotynets, as well as the formations of Badanov's 4th Panzer Army, which was not deployed to the Khotynets direction.

1 This milestone, in terms of losses, was surpassed only by the 5th Guards Tank Army in the tank battle near Prokhorovka, setting a kind of "record" on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. According to the data "On the irretrievable losses of tanks during the defensive battle of the Battle of Kursk", on July 12-16, Rotmistrov's army out of 860 combat-ready vehicles irrevocably lost 334 tanks and self-propelled guns (222 - T-34.89 - T-70.12 - type "Churchill", 8 - SAU-122, 3 - SAU - 76); 222 steel vehicles received significant damage requiring repair (147 - T-34, 56 - T-70, 7 - Churchill type, 3 - SAU-122, 3 - SAU-76). Thus, the losses amounted to 65%. See: TsAMO RF, f. 203,

op. 2851, d.24, l.451 - 455.

377

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378

Now it remains to give data on the losses of German units and formations
that participated in the Borilovsky armored battle.

LOSS OF THE ENEMY IN BORILOVSKY ARMORED BATTLE

The enemy grouping before the offensive consisted of a shaft of 60,510
people.

In the Federal Military Archives of Germany, I was not able to find ten-day
reports of the losses of the German formations that participated in the Battle of
Borilov. Losses are presented only in the monthly reports of the panzer and
motorized divisions. Documents of the loss of people in part (from

efficient battalions of assault guns) are not presented at all in the archive inventories. But, judging by the losses of combat vehicles, it can be assumed that the damage was insignificant and practically did not affect the overall picture of personnel losses (irretrievable losses of self-propelled guns - 11 units, and 54 units - in repair to eliminate damage from our anti-tank weapons) . Even if we take into account the total number of all crews killed, then the total casualties of individual divisions of assault guns will be only 260 people (65 vehicles x 4 people - the composition of the crew of the self-propelled guns).

So, the average daily combat losses of the formations presented in the above table were:

in July - 537 (21) people, of which irretrievable losses (killed and missing) - 157 (12) and wounded - 380 (15) people;

in August - 195 (8) people, of which 53 (2) were irretrievably lost and 142 (6) were wounded;

Now it is not difficult to calculate the losses of the German formations in the Battle of Borilov.

For 6 days of July (from July 26 to July 31) they amounted to 3222 (126) people; losses by categories amounted to 942 (36) and 2280 (90) people, respectively.

379

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For four days of August, the enemy's losses amounted to approximately 780
(32) people; losses by category, respectively, 212 (8) and 568 (24) people.

Thus, in 10 days of the Borilov armored battle, the German tank and motorized
divisions of the Harpe group lost 4002 (158) people, of which 1154 (44) were
killed and missing and 2848 (114) were wounded.

In the German accounting documents, reflecting all the statistics of
Operation Citadel, the losses of the three panzer divisions (9th, 18th and 20th) in
the period from 5 to 10 July amounted to 3438 people, of which 677 were irretrievable
losses, the rest are casualties. These figures indicate that the intensity of the fighting
in the Borilovsky battle was almost adequate to the fighting on the Soborovsky field
(the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, or the southern front of the Oryol Bulge),
where the fate of the entire operation "Citadel" was decided and decided.

WEAPONS LOSS

It is impossible to establish the exact losses of enemy armored vehicles directly in the Battle of Borilov (July 26-August 4, 1943) according to the records of Soviet units and formations, since they are given for different periods of time.

For example, a certificate of the combat path of the 162nd tank brigade (06/05/1942 - 08/10/1943) records that "for the period from 07/14/07 to 08/10/43 for mastering st. Khotynets 162 brigade inflicted the following defeats on the enemy: soldiers and officers - 3650 people were killed, destroyed: tanks - 42 (T-6 - 7 pcs.) "".

It is not possible to determine exactly how much enemy armored vehicles this brigade destroyed in the Battle of Borilov. Earlier in this document it was stated that in the period from July 14 to July 21, "by fighting behind enemy lines, the brigade inflicted damage on this [enemy] the following losses: 750 soldiers and officers were killed; taken prisoner, then shot

1 TsAMORF, f. 3228, op. 1, d. 1, l.6

382

lyano 194 people; headquarters destroyed - 4, tanks - 11 destroyed (including T-6 - 4), armored vehicles - 6, vehicles - 95, guns - 21, minbatteries - 5, M-110 aircraft - 1, 7 km blown up railroad ways""!.

Thus, the 162nd tank brigade in the Borilovsky battle could destroy 31 tanks, of which 3 were T-M "tiger" tanks.

"In the battles from July 26 to August 3, units of the 11th tank corps were knocked out and destroyed: tanks and self-propelled guns - 140, armored vehicles of tires and armored personnel carriers - 27, guns and mortars of various calibers - 94, light and heavy machine guns - 66, vehicles different brands - 85, 2000 soldiers and officers of the enemy "?.

But it is impossible to establish what the irretrievable losses of enemy armored vehicles are from these data - "hit and destroyed". Judging by the information of the 11th Panzer Corps' own losses in the same battles, for one of our destroyed tanks, one was irretrievably lost - it burned down or exploded and was not subject to repair. This means that parts of this corps completely disabled about 70 enemy steel vehicles.

More specific data, very close to the actual damage, are given in the reporting documents of the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps.

So, in the period from July 27 to August 20, 1943, his units "... destroyed

also no tanks - 21<...>, 5541 soldiers and officers. Trophies were taken: tanks - 7, self-propelled guns - 2 <...>, 48 soldiers were taken prisoner"?3. I note, again, from July 27 to August 20, and the battle of Borilov ended on August 4. In the battles for the liberation of the Khotynets center of resistance, which began on August 6 and ended on August 14, this formation suffered significant losses both in weapons and men, but much less than in the previous battle of Borilovsky.

1 TsAMORF, f. 3228, op. 1, d. 1, l.7-8.

? There, f. 675, op. 382894, d.8, l. 23. 3 TsAMO RF, f. 3434, op. 1, d.2, l. 26-27.

383

Close to the real damage inflicted on the enemy by units of the 30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps, the data of the reporting documents of this formation for the period of battles from July 27 to August 3.

During this time, "DESTROYED: soldiers and officers - 3970; tanks - 11, self-propelled guns - 9; guns of various calibers - 77, mortars - up to 30 batteries; machine guns - 42, six-barreled mortars - 6; aircraft of different brands - 9; cars - 10; armored vehicles - 3, bunkers - 13, enemy LV - 4.

CAPTURED: vehicles - 5, fuel depots - 2, ammunition depots - 4.

132 soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, of which 10 were delivered alive.

As you can see, this unit for 9 days of fighting (it entered the battle a day later) destroyed 20 enemy armored vehicles. Own losses in tanks during this period are as follows: "burnt down and exploded - 45; missing - 2, half a bit - 65. Thus, the ratio of losses, according to our documents, is 1: 2.3 in favor of the enemy

The "Lelyushenko Report" recorded that during the entire period of hostilities from July 26 to August 20, 1943, the troops of the 4th Tank Army (reinforced by the 5th 25th Tank Corps) "knocked out and destroyed 211 tanks, 84 self-propelled guns ; 7 tanks and 8 self-propelled guns were captured; <...> 28,767 enemy soldiers and officers were killed. 486 soldiers and officers were captured.

Own losses: officers killed and wounded --- 1186 people, sergeants - 4109, privates - 6911; all of them — 12206 people"?

The Lelyushenko Report does not say what losses

suffered the 4th Panzer Army in armored vehicles. But they are given in the reporting documentation of this army - in the information about the losses.

So, judging by the reporting documents of the connections and the hour

1 TsAMORF, f. 30 UDTK, op. 1, d. 34, l. 12 (vol.). 2 Ibid., f. 4th Guards ta, op. 4756, d. 12, l. 20-21.

384

of those who are part of the Badanov group, the losses of enemy armored vehicles in the Borilovsky battle are close to the figures given in the enemy's reporting documents, judging by which German formations and units in this battle irretrievably lost about 100 armored vehicles

nicknames.

The data on the human losses of the German side in our sources are significantly overestimated. The "Lelyushenko Report" states that the formations of the 4th Panzer Army in the battles from July 26 to August 20, 1943 destroyed (killed) 28,767 enemy soldiers and officers.

According to the monthly reports of the German divisions that participated in the battle of Borilov, all losses in two months (July and August) amounted to 20,540 people, of which 14,644 people were wounded; the remaining 3896 soldiers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and enemy officers are listed as killed and missing. Thus, in a document signed by the Guards, Colonel-General D.D. Lelyushenko, the enemy's losses are ten times overstated - German losses in killed and missing in two months (and carried July 26 to August 20) amounted to 3896

Human.

LJ*

Now let's turn to the enemy's reporting documents on the losses of the armored forces of the Wehrmacht.

On July 25, the German Harpe group had 384 tanks and self-propelled guns in service by the start of hostilities.

Prior to this, German formations and units of this group took part in Operation Citadel, advancing from the southern sector of the Orlovsky bridgehead to Kursk. In fierce battles with the troops of the Central Front (13th, 70th and 2nd tank armies), which were on the defensive, they suffered significant losses in armored vehicles.

385

LOSSES OF GERMAN TANKS AND SELF-PROPELLED INSTALLATIONS
IN THE BATTLE OF THE SOUTHERN SECTION OF THE ORLOV
BRIDGE HEAD C5 TO JULY 14, 1943 G.1

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656th regiment
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Note: in the numerator - armored vehicles lost forever, in the denominator - in
need of repair.

As you can see, from July 5 to 14, separate formations and units (later united
into the Harpe group) in offensive battles in the southern sector of the Orlovsky
bridgehead lost 48 steel vehicles, of which 21 tanks (3 units T-Sh, 14 units T-
TU , 4 units of T-M "Tiger") and 27 self-propelled assault mounts (19 units of the "Ferdinand"
type and 8 units of Zi S-Sh).

It is not possible to establish exact figures for the losses of German units
and formations during the period of intense hostilities from July 26 to August 5,
due to the fact that reporting documents are transferred to higher authorities
every ten days. Separate folder of documents of military operations of the
Harpe group in the Federal Military Archive of Germany

`TVA-MA VN 10/246; VA-MA VN 10/48; VA-MA VN 10/62; VA-MAVN 21-4/450.

386

No'. Therefore, it was necessary to study the documents in the main XXIII and
XXXX Corps, as well as the funds of individual formations (tank and
motorized divisions) and units (individual regiments and divisions of self-propelled
assault mounts). The most important of them were copied and later translated
and studied so that these data were presented on the pages of the book. As a
rule, they are compactly presented in tables. The following table can serve as an
example of such work with archival documents.

LOSSES OF GERMAN TANKS AND SELF-PROPELLED INSTALLATIONS IN THE BATTLE OF BORILOVSK FROM 26 TO JULY 31, 1943`.

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and | | 3/7 | 3/7 904th lptd.
| 0/10 | _ | 0/10 Total 2 | 6 [1/54] 20 | 2 |
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*

Note: in the numerator - armored vehicles lost forever, in the denominator - in need
of repair. The reports of tank divisions do not reflect tank losses associated with current and long-
term repairs.

1 For example: all the losses of the German armies that took part in the operation "Citadel" are
collected together and presented by documents stored in the archive fund: BA-MA VN 6 / ". 564.

? VA-MAVN 10/246; VA-MA KN 10/48; VA-MA VN 10/62; VA-MA EN 21-4/450

387

At the first stage of the Borilov battle (26-31.07.1943), the enemy tank divisions lost
58 tanks: the 9th TD - 23 tanks (7 T-Sh units and 16 T-GU units); 18th TD - 15 tanks
(12 units of T-Shi Zed. T-[U]); 20-yatd - 19 tanks (2 units of T-Sh and 17 units of T-GU); The
505th separate division of heavy tanks "tiger" lost one vehicle in these battles.

The 656th separate regiment of Ferdinand heavy assault guns lost 20
Ferdinand self-propelled guns in the battles in the northern sector of the Orlovsky
bridgehead. It is not possible to determine the exact number of losses of these
68-ton steel vehicles in the Borilovsky battle, because the archival documents
of this regiment reflect the total losses of military operations in two stages of
the battles on the Orlovsky bridgehead - from July 5 to July 14 and

from 15 to 31 July.

In addition, five separate assault divisions in more

11 assault mounts were irretrievably lost in the northern sector of the Orlovsky bridgehead, 54 self-propelled assault guns were temporarily out of order, depending on the damage in the battles, and required short-term or long-term repairs. So, at the end of July, the German armored forces irrevocably lost 90 pieces of armored vehicles.

As noted above, the intensity of hostilities from August 1 to August 4 inclusive, due to the systematic withdrawal of German units and formations from the Orlovsky bridgehead, including this northern sector, sharply decreased. The number of German units on this sector of the front was not so significant (especially in tanks and self-propelled guns) compared with the beginning of the offensive of our armored shock wedge. For example, the 2nd tank army of the enemy, which included the Harpe group, in the last decade of July 1943 lost 34,749 people killed, missing and wounded (the maximum losses of the Wehrmacht armies for the entire period of World War II). And in the first ten days of August, this army had already lost 8162 people (half the personnel of the motorized division). Thus, the losses in people decreased by 4.2 times. Similar losses for this

388

period in tanks and self-propelled guns, and they probably amounted to about 10-12 units (from 1 to 4 August).

Thus, the irretrievable losses of German tank units and formations amounted to about 100 pieces of armored vehicles, or about 25 percent of the original composition - 384 tank and self-propelled guns.

LOSS RATIO

In living force

It is known that all the casualties of the Badanov strike group during the ten days of the Borilov armored battle (July 26-August 4, 1943) amounted to about 12,0090 people, of which about 4,000 were irretrievable and about 8,000 were wounded.

Taking into account the damage of individual assault divisions, the losses of the German Harpe group in the Battle of Borilov amounted to about 4200 people, of which about 1200 people were killed and missing and about 3000 people were wounded. I emphasize once again that these figures are approximate, with an error of plus or minus 0.2 percent.

Thus, the ratio of casualties in the 10-day Borilov battle - 1:3 is not in our favor.

In principle, this is a normal ratio, if we take into account all the nuances of the battle: when our armored group was advancing (the standard ratio of losses in the offensive is 1: 3 in favor of the defending enemy) and any maneuver was excluded in the prevailing situation (offensive in the forehead); when the Germans, being in deep defense, occupied advantageous lines along the southern banks of the Ors, Nugr and Mokhovitsa rivers, with many nodes of resistance, including at command heights.

' Data without taking into account the losses of rifle divisions from the 8th Rifle Corps of the 11th Guards. army, on the site and with the participation of which hostilities took place to break through the enemy defenses.

389

In armored vehicles

The losses of the Soviet armored forces in the Battle of Borilov amounted to 396 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The irretrievable losses of German tank units and formations amounted to about 190 armored vehicles.

Thus, the ratio of losses in armored weapons is 1:4 in favor of the enemy.

Again, these are justified losses due to the above reasons.

So, why did our tank and mechanized formations suffer such huge losses? How did it happen that the orders of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the General Staff, the command of the Western, and then the Bryansk fronts were not carried out: the front line of the enemy's defense did not break through, the tank armada, numbering almost a thousand steel vehicles, could not enter the operational space and break through to the main communication line Orel-Bryansk, in order to cut off the enemy's Oryol grouping?

Taking the data of archival documents as a basis, we will try to answer these questions and understand why this happened.

BATTLE ANALYSIS

So, as a result of the hostilities, the troops of the Badanov group did not fulfill their main task assigned to them by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command: having entered the breakthrough, by the end of the first day of the offensive, go to the Orel-Bryansk railway in the Naryshkino Hotynets section in order to interrupt the main enemy communications and cut off the enemy's Oryol grouping from the main rear supply bases. This can be explained by objective and subjective reasons, which, in general, are reflected in the above

documents.

Nevertheless, the final result was achieved: the Military Council of the 4th Panzer Army "considers that the army coped with the tasks set", although with a two-week delay, it achieved the intended goal: "by 0700 hours on 9.08.43 came out vr-n. d. 1.5 km north-west. Art. Shakhovo", thereby cutting the Orel-Bryansk railway. But by this time the enemy had already managed to withdraw the entire Oryol group from under attack. Tankers of the 197th and motorized riflemen of the 30th brigade discovered that "the railway. canvas Eagle - Bryansk blown up "".

The slow but continuous movement of the armored shock wedge of General Badanov to the main communications of the enemy, in turn, contributed to the advance of the troops of the Bryansk Front, advancing from the eastern direction from Novosil to Orel, and the almost bloodless liberation of the city of Orel by the troops of the 3rd and 63rd and armies.

1 TsAMORF, f. 323, op. 4756, d. 4, l. eleven.

391

Grupna Badanova, with her massive and methodical offensive, broke the resistance of the 9.18, 20th tank, 10th and 25th motorized divisions of the enemy, as well as individual divisions of self-propelled assault artillery, which approached the previously prepared defense lines, inflicting significant damage on them.

During the conduct of protracted, exhausting battles in conditions of continuous heavy rains, which contributed more to the defending German troops than to the advancing Soviet ones, the 5th, 25th, 11th, 30th Tank and 6th Guards Mechanized Corps suffered significant losses in people and armament.

On August 1, at a meeting with Stalin in the Kremlin, the generally unsuccessful entry of Badanov's army was noted, which led to the fact that the strategic task was not completed: intercepting communications and cutting off the enemy's Oryol grouping, despite the fact that the Soviet tank group suffered significant losses.

Then no one was punished for this strategic miscalculation, because it was necessary to punish ourselves first of all, at least by demotion in rank.

Didn't Stalin sign the directive on bringing troops of the 4th tank army into the breakthrough, reinforced by two - 5th 25th tank corps, didn't he consult with the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters Zhukov? Were not present at the meeting during the discussion of this issue near the map Antonov (deputy of the absent chief of the General Staff Vasilevsky), as well as the chief of the Operational

Directorate of the General Staff Shtemenko?

While working out the beginning of the operation to bring into battle a huge army with a colossal number of tanks and self-propelled guns, many of which had a weight of 35 or more, didn't they take into account the nature of the area where a person's foot, even a month after rain, gets stuck in the soil that holds water, like sponge? Couldn't you see on the maps how many swampy rivers and rivulets there are - and all this without bridges and crossings?

392

Even without enemy opposition, it is simply impossible for such an armada to overcome a distance of 40-60 km in a day. Didn't take into account the almost complete absence of roads in the direction chosen for the snowcock?

The situation with the terrain and the road network of the enemy was exactly the opposite, and therefore he was ahead of our troops in the transfer of his mobile troops to the right place and at the right time. So here were selected tank and motorized divisions that had not yet taken part in battles. The enemy, defending hard, managed to hold back the onslaught of the formations of the 4th Panzer Army and inflict very significant, incommensurable with their own, losses on the advancing Soviet troops. It was on this occasion that the top military leadership of the country and the front gathered in the Kremlin office. It would be interesting to read the transcript of this meeting. But even without reading it, one can guess what the conversation was about: about tactical miscalculations at all levels of our command - from the corps to the front. The miscalculations of the Headquarters and the General Staff, of course, were not considered.

But hardly anyone dared to speak at this meeting about the main reason for the death of our tanks and self-propelled guns in the summer of 1943, about the significant design flaws of our tanks, and above all the T-34.

A little lower we will read documents that reveal the reason why our light and medium tanks T-60, T-70, T-34 and self-propelled guns SU-76, starting from the summer of 1943, were burning on the battlefields by tens and hundreds. But the main thing: people were burning there, wonderful Russian people - kinder, more reckless and bolder than they were in the world. Come to Rudnevo, Bollypuya Chern, Borilovo, Zlyn, carry those graves and get a grasp of the endless lists of burned out Ural (and not only) guys and girls. What good people they were, what excellent tanks they made. But steel machines were like that until a certain time, and by the summer of 1943 it turned out that they had serious designs.

393

tive disadvantages. I have been looking for an answer for a long time, but why on the or-

2586 tanks and self-propelled guns burned down and exploded in 37 days of fighting on the fields and heights, irretrievably sinking, mostly with crews, into the abyss of the final battle of the Oryol battle, which was no less cruel and bloody than Moscow and Stalingrad.

At first, I found documentary confirmation of my conjecture by carefully studying the archives of the 20th Panzer Corps, which lost all the tanks in one week of the assault on the Krivtsov Heights. Why this happened is answered in a document (written rather boldly for those times) by the commander of this corps, Lieutenant General I.G. Lazarev. It is called "Recommendations for the actions of a tank corps when breaking through a heavily fortified enemy defense zone (according to the experience of fighting in the Bolkhov direction on July 11-31, 1943)". General Lazarev, informing the army command about the reasons for the not entirely successful actions of his corps in the area of the Krivtsov Heights, at the same time gives recommendations on how to fight the enemy's armored vehicles.

"The capture of Krivtsovo, Khmelevaya on 07/12/1943 and height 231.2 was reported in Shtarm-61 three times and turned out to be not true. The enemy defense was not broken. It was possible to shoot down only military outposts. The enemy repelled all the attacks of our advancing troops on the centers of resistance Khvatnevo (correctly - Fatnevo. - E. Shch.), Krivtsovo.

On 07/13/1943, the enemy managed to pull up the 12th Panzer Division from the Orel region to the battlefield, in which there were 190 tanks (the data is greatly exaggerated, at that time there were 13,959 people, 9 T-Shi tanks, 93 T-GU, 33 assault guns. See VA-MA KN 10/156. Om yupa! Kerop 1.07.1943. - E. Shch.).

Minefields have not been cleared.

Commander of the 20th Tank Corps, Lieutenant General I.G. Lazarev ordered: "Take control of Krivtsovo by July 13, 1943."

On this day, in the battle for Krivtsovo, the 80th tank brigade lost 28 T-34 tanks, 11 T-70 tanks.

394

The 1419th self-propelled artillery regiment lost 6 SAU-122 vehicles.

In the battle for the settlement of Selikhovo, Milyatino, the 20th Tank Corps lost 18 T-34 tanks, 8 T-70 tanks.

<...>

07/16/1943, in just a day of fighting, the corps lost 9 T-34 tanks, Ztanka T-70, motorized infantry - 120 people.

By the end of 07/16/43, the corps had in service: T-34 - 29 ma-

tires, T-70 - 22 cars.

In the enemy grouping, in addition to the T-Sh and T-PU tanks, there were up to 15 T-M "tiger" tanks, which from a range of 1.5-2 km, firing from a place, put our tanks out of action.

20 TC instead of the task of developing an offensive behind enemy lines after breaking through the defense, it carried out the task of breaking through the front line of defense in the most tank-dangerous directions, thereby making a great contribution to the defeat of the enemy in the Orel-Bolkhov direction.

The corps must be put out of action in reserve and further used where a weaker point is revealed in the enemy.

Drawbacks:

Intelligence worked poorly, giving incorrect information about the enemy's move.

The tank corps was brought in without adequate fire support, and there were no places where success was indicated.

Brigade commanders, upon receiving a combat mission, hesitated with execution.

The artillery of the corps was unable to suppress the artillery of the enemy in a fleeting battle.

The self-propelled artillery regiment did not provide fire for the attack of the tanks, while losing half of its self-propelled guns.

Weak interaction between motorized infantrymen and tankers to overcome beams, ravines, small groves.

Inadmissible attitude to tank troops: in battle, all reserves are spent cleanly.

In the first battles, tankers die due to inexperience, according to

395

Therefore, there is an urgent need to reconsider the principle of the approach to crewing.

Recommendations:

It is necessary to skillfully use the terrain in battle, at dusk - in the evening or early in the morning. A mass attack of tanks with support and cover at direct fire with 85-mm anti-tank guns could achieve a certain superiority over the enemy. Our self-propelled guns and tanks must not show themselves at a distance of 1.5-2 km to enemy tanks and self-propelled guns, but, when maneuvering, approach them for combat at a distance of 1000-5600 meters in order to have equal conditions for firing.

The best thing to do urgently is to give the tanks an equivalent long-range gun (85 mm) with high penetration and good optics.

5."

07/17/1943, i.e. after five days of fighting, the corps was withdrawn to the reserve of the Bryansk Front. Total losses from July 12 to July 30, 1943: T-34 - 95, T-70 - 43, SAU-122 - 10. Enemy losses: T-M - 12, medium tanks - 21. The ratio of losses is almost 5 to 1 in favor of enemy.

Commander of the 20th Tank Corps, Lieutenant General I.G. Lazarev".

Our formations suffered significant losses in the Bolkhov operation. The archives contain the "Information on the losses of personnel, material and technical part of the 61st Army for the period from 11.07 to 08.08.43". This document is very important in the sense that it enables us to establish the exact losses of the 61st Army in both rifle and tank units.

The losses of the 61st Army amounted to 40,120 people, or 52 percent of the original number (77,067 people). This is a colossal loss, considering that the main losses were suffered by rifle and tank battalions.

1 TsAMORF, f. 3417, op. 1, d.2, l.11-16.

396

IRREVOCABLE LOSS OF TANKS OF THE 61st ARMY

IN THE BOLKHOV OPERATION

G E] -

Brands of
machines Parts t

Total KV | T-34 | T-70 | T-60 SAU-122 | SAU-152 99 43 - 10

18 7 1 152
— 27

2 - — | — | — 21

— — — — | — | 6 6 138 |
501 10 6 | 0

And if we take into account that by the beginning of the Bolkhov operation, the tank units of the army had in their composition: KV - 7, T-34 - 208, T-70 - 80 and T-60 - 2 vehicles, i.e. only 297 combat units of armored vehicles, the losses amounted to 69 percent.

A more complete answer, why our tanks burned so often and in large quantities, I found in the archives of the Institute of Military History MORF. Here is the document.

"Top Secret

Memorandum on tank
battles in battles from 12 to 20 August 1943

First Deputy NPO Marshal of the
USSR Comrade. Zhukov G.K.

In tank battles from 12 to 20 August 1943, the 5th Guards. TA met with exclusively the latest types of enemy tanks.

Most of all on the battlefield was the T-U "Panther"; in significant numbers - tanks T-U "Tiger", as well as modernized tanks T-Sh and T-{U.

Thus, in a collision with German tank units that had gone over to the defensive, we, as a general rule, suffered huge losses in tanks and were not successful. They no longer experience tank fear.

397

Our tank industry (except for the SU-122 and SU-152) did not produce anything new during the war years, and the existing shortcomings on the tanks of the first production, such as: the imperfection of the transmission group, the extremely slow and uneven rotation of the turret, extremely poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation have not been completely eliminated even today. On the basis of our T-34 tank - the best tank in the world at the beginning of the war - the Germans in 1943 managed to create an even more advanced tank T-U "Panthera", which, in fact, is a copy of our T-34 tank, but its qualities are much higher than our T-34 tank, and especially in terms of the quality of weapons.

CHARACTERISTICS OF ARMORED VEHICLES

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- | — — — + + and

T-34 45 | 9515 45 |205 916 | 00| 55 a 3 { 6

you 90-75 | 90—45 4 | 15 17% | — g T : | 7
KV-1 59
| 9 in p u | 4 tm 00 | 10 8210
282 88 86 | 44 SU-152 | 70 | 700 || 60 | 30
—30 | 152 20 | 43 1 | "Ferdy- | 200 160 88 = 20 nands" | |

| |

* The barrel of a 75 mm gun is 1.5 times longer than our 76 mm gun, and the projectile has an exceptionally high initial speed.

I, as an ardent patriot of the tank troops, ask you, Comrade Marshal of the USSR, to break the conservatism and arrogance of tank designers and production workers and, with all acuteness, raise the issue of issuing but by the winter of 1943

398

new tanks, surpassing in their combat qualities and design the existing types of German tanks.

In addition, I ask you to sharply increase the equipment of tank units with evacuation means.

The enemy, as a rule, evacuates all his wrecked tanks, while our tanks do not have this possibility, as a result of which we lose a lot in terms of recovery.

tanks.

At the same time, in those cases when the field of tank battles remains with the enemy for a certain period, our repairmen, instead of their wrecked tanks, find shapeless piles of scrap metal, since this year the enemy, leaving the battlefields, blows up all our wrecked tanks.

Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops Rotmistrov

August 20, 1943 Army
in the field".

The not entirely successful experience of bringing Badanov's shock group into combat operations served as a lesson in carrying out such operations in the future. The main conclusion was made, which was that a breakthrough for tank armies should be made by combined arms armies, atam, where general army armies are not able to provide a breakthrough, it is necessary to reinforce the tank army with rifle formations, artillery, give it an independent breakthrough sector, assigning providing flanks for combined arms

you armies.

Summing up, it should be noted that the Borilovsky armored battle was not planned in advance, just like Prokhorovka. It happened as a result of

b Archive IVI, FO. 161, op. 202, d. 2, room 733 (TsAMO RF, f. 1, op. 28372ss, d. 11, l. 88-92).

399

the Soviet 4th Panzer Army, which has tank and mechanized formations in a certain direction, and counteraction in the opposite direction of German tank and motorized forces. The authors of this battle are, in my opinion, the commander of the 4th Panzer Army, Lieutenant General V.M. Badanov and the commander of the enemy's group of troops located to the west of Bolkhov, Lieutenant General Josef Harpe.

Until now, this battle has not been covered by us due to the fact that the Soviet tank troops suffered quite tangible losses in the Borilovsky battle. In European historiography, it was generally a "blank spot", as well as the entire Battle of Oryol as a whole. Domestic historians also did not study the armored battle that unfolded on the banks of the Ors, Nugr and Mokhovitsa rivers. We must always and everywhere win. We won here too. But what is the price of this victory?! High, very high! But the ratio of losses of the opposing sides in the Battle of Borilovsk looks more worthy than in Prokhorovsky. In both battles, in the end result, our troops were victorious. At Prokhorovka, the troops of the 5th Panzer Army stopped the movement of German troops to Kursk, and as a result of the Borilov battle, the Nazi troops, under the pressure of Soviet armored forces, were forced to leave the Orlovsky bridgehead and the city of Orel - the strategically important success of the Red Army.

missions.

Every Soviet soldier who took part in this battle should be awarded, and in the first place, General Badanov. He made a worthy contribution to the liberation of the Oryol land. And what about losses?.. But here it could not be otherwise. But did our troops lose in other large-scale battles?

1 General Harpe is directly related to the tank forces - from January 10, 1941 he was the commander of the 12th tank division, then XXXI of the tank corps, and later - the commander of the 5th tank army.

400

less? The "Orlovsky bastion" really was such, the storming of the bastions requires huge sacrifices.

It is known that the preparation of any operation includes activities carried out by commandants, itabs of all levels and by troops. The most important were the following: making a decision and setting tasks for the troops; operation planning; organization of all types of reconnaissance, command and control and interaction between the branches of the armed forces; regrouping of troops and starting positions for the offensive; transportation of materiel and organization of logistic support; combat, operational and political training of command, staffs and troops; operational support of the operation, etc.

The experience of carrying out the Stalingrad offensive operation showed that the first most important condition for its successful conduct was that the enemy was dealt a powerful and sudden blow. In two sections of the breakthrough, the tactical defense zone of the enemy was breached, and thus conditions were created for the rapid development of the operation in depth, towards the flanks, with the final result being the encirclement and destruction of the enemy's Stalingrad grouping.

The plan of the Oryol offensive operation, codenamed "Kutuzov", in its scheme resembled the Stalingrad operation, codenamed "Uranus". The troops of the left wing of the Western Front of Sokolovsky's troops (Bagramyan's strike group) were to break through the front in the Kirov region and move south, towards the troops of Rokossovsky (Pukhov's strike group), who, in turn, were to break through the front in the Nikolskoye - Dive and make your way to the north - towards the troops of Sokolovsky.

The plan conceived by the General Staff of the Red Army to encircle the Oryol grouping of the enemy did not receive due development: Bagramyan's strike group (the left wing of the Western Front) was stopped on the southern borders of the Oryol woodland - on the Vytebet River; Pukhov's troops (Central

401

front) practically did not budge and for a long time remained on the banks of the upper reaches of the Oka and Svapa.

Nevertheless, the plan for the encirclement of German troops near Orel was not removed from the agenda by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the spacecraft. After the operation "Kutuzov" came to a standstill at the beginning of the third decade of July 1943, the movement of our troops to the west along the entire perimeter of the Oryol Bulge stopped - the Soviet command decided to repeat the attempt to encircle the German troops. For this purpose, fast regrouping of compounds is carried out. The last reserves were thrown into the battle. We already know that to the northwest of Bolkhov in the areas of Krutitsy and Seredich for a strike in a southerly direction

Badanov's tank group was concentrated in order to cut the enemy's communications in the Shakhovo-Khotynets sector and further, moving south, meet with the Rokossovsky strike group of troops (2nd and 3rd tank armies of generals Rodin and Rybalko), which after breakthrough of the German troops in the southern sector of the Oryol Bulge was supposed to break through to the north - towards the troops of Badanov's tank group.

These plans are documented.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in its directive No. 30153 of July 26, orders: "From 24 hours on July 26, 1943, transfer Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army from the Bryansk Front to the troops of the Central Front!"

Commander of the troops of the Central Front, General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky in agreement with the General Staff on July 26, 1943. 00:30 gives the order to bring the 2nd Panzer Army into the gap:

"1. Strike group 70 A since the morning of July 27, 1943 continues the offensive and develops success in the general direction of Chuwardino. Her strengthened 29 sk attacks the enemy in the area (claim) Zhiryatino, Nov[aya] Zhizn, Svetly Luch and develops success in the general direction to Brusovets.

1 TsAMORF, f. 3, op. 11596, d. 13, l. 195.

402

2. 2TA - with the release of infantry and tanks 70 A to the line of Gran Cinema, Yablonovets, Maslovsky, enter a breakthrough in the area (claim.) Zhiryatino, Kamenny Kolodez with the task of reaching the Krasnaya Grove area by the end of the day on July 27, 1943, Gnezdilovo, Chuwardino; in the future, keep in mind the actions on Star[oe] Gnezdilovo, Verkh[nyaya] Boevka.

Entering the breakthrough 2 TA provide:

a) all artillery of the 55th rifle division, 29th rifle division and most of the artillery of the 4th artillery corps,

6) Most of the power is 16 VA.

3. The commander of the 2nd TA - the day of July 26, 1943, to use the 2nd TA for the thorough preparation of the offensive and for the organization of its interaction with the troops of 70 A (especially with the 4th artillery corps) and 16 VA.

The next day at 13:40. Rokossovsky gives the order to break through the enemy defenses with the forces of the 3rd Panzer Army.

"<...>

3) 3 Guards. TA - Sutra 7/28/1943, go on the offensive with the immediate task of breaking through in the Kozminskoye, Cheryak-Znamensky sector, developing a strike on the Nikolskoye s / s, Mal[oe] Ryzhkovo, Aleksandrovsky, Ploty, Ploskoye. In the future, ford the river. Oka on the section Mala[aya] Bystraya, the mouth of the river. Kroma, go to the area Khmelevaya, Sebyaki but, Korovye Boloto, Samokhvalovo, Gorki and send reconnaissance in the directions of Orel, Naryshkino, Shablykino and Kholodovo, Soskovo.

<...>

5) To the commander of the 16th VA - with the transition to the offensive of the 3rd Guards. TA, part of the army forces to ensure its offensive and actions behind enemy lines, and especially its crossing over the river. Oka.

Receipt confirm. On the readiness of the 3rd Guards. TA to the offensive to report to 2.00 28.7.1943 "2.

1 TsAMO RF, f. 62, op. 329, d. 23, l. 178-179. 2 Ibid., l. 189-190.

403

It should immediately be said that both the first (July 12-15, 1943) and the second attempts (July 26-28, 1943) to encircle the German troops near Orel did not take place. Our troops were unable to break through the enemy's defense line, which initially ran along the banks of the Oka, Zusha, Neruch rivers, to its entire depth in order to enter the operational space and surround the enemy's grouping, as was the case in November 1942 on both sides from Stalingrad.

LESSONS OF THE BORILOVO BATTLE

As you can see, the preparation of the troops of the Badanov tank group for the introduction into the breakthrough, which resulted in the largest in the history of the Great Patriotic War (consider the Second World War) Borilovsky armored battle, was carried out in accordance with the plans of the General Staff of the spacecraft and the decision of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.

It was the second try! breaking through the enemy defenses, which began almost simultaneously on the northern and southern sectors of the front of the Oryol Bulge with the aim of encircling the German troops near Orel (see the above documents of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the front command).

The combat logs of the 4th Panzer Army and the corps of the owls that make up its composition recorded that on the first day of the offensive, combat operations to break through the enemy's defenses in the Ivlevo-Shemyakino-Luchki section were involved

we have only two corps out of five: the 11th tank and the 6th guards. mechanized (first echelon). The 5th and 30th Panzer, being in the second echelon, followed the first. The 25th Panzer was in reserve, stationed in the Peshkovo area. What is this? Was it a mistake by the commander of the Western Front, General Sokolovsky, who in such an initial version approved General Badanov's plan to send a tank group into the breakthrough, or was their sober real account of the current situation on this sector of the front?

! The first attempt to break through the enemy's defenses in the northern and southern sections of the Oryol Bulge was made at the beginning of Operation Kutuzov by the troops of the left wing of the Western and Central Fronts, respectively, on July 12 and 15, 1943.

405

Why didn't they throw all five corps into the offensive on the first day of the offensive - July 26, and this is more than 900 tank self-propelled guns.

Firstly, all commanders think about reserves, so the 25th tank corps, replenished with tanks, was left by Lieutenant General Badanov of tank troops in reserve.

Secondly, they hoped that the forces of the 11th Tank Corps of General Radkevich and the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps of General Akimov is enough to break through the enemy defenses at the turn of the Ors River in order to immediately bring into the operational space the tank formations of the 5th corps of General Sakhno and the 30th - General Rodin, following in the second echelon.

In addition, any commander thinks about the flanks.

If the left flank of Badanov's group was out of danger—the enemy's Bolkhov grouping was pinned down by the combat operations of General Belov's 61st Army—then the right flank posed a real threat. Two fresh divisions appeared here: the motorized "Grossdeutschland" with "tigers" and "panthers" and the 253rd Infantry. In addition, at that time the Germans held in their hands the rocky road from Khotynets through Znamenskoye to Bolkhov. At any moment, they could move along it a quickly created local armored group and cut off the formations of tank corps from the Badanov group that had broken through behind enemy lines.

As you can see, not everything is as simple as it seems.

After an unsuccessful first day, when our troops were unable to break through the first line of defense of the enemy to the full depth, but only wedged into it in places, at the suggestion of Sokolovsky, Badanov threw all the corps of his shock group into the offensive. One brigade in each corps remains in reserve: in the 30th Ural tank corps - the 244th Chelyabinsk tank brigade.

Despite some miscalculations by the command, especially in the preparation of the operation and during it (completely without the participation of aviation), in the end, the efforts of the strike tank group of Lieutenant General Badanov achieved a general strategic success: the largest combined grouping of enemy forces, Colonel General Walter Mo

406

The division was forced to leave the Oryol strategic bridgehead, which was of paramount importance for the Germans on the entire Eastern Front.

It should be borne in mind here that the fate of the entire enemy grouping on the Orlovsky bridgehead was decided in its northwestern sector. It was here, in parallel courses, having begun to tear and dissect the enemy's defenses, that two of our shock groups rushed from north to south: one - the right one - Bagramyan's group (the base was the 11th Guards Army) from the Kirov region in the direction of Khotynets; the other, the left, is Belov's shock group (the base is the 61st Army) in the direction of Bolkhov. At the first stage of the battle for Orel, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command set the task before Bagramyan and Belov: to take Bolkhov, the northern citadel of the Oryol bridgehead. In order to block Bolkhov from the southwest, Bagramyan was forced to "pin off" a significant piece from his grouping, directed with his tip at Khotynets: the 5th, 25th tank and 8th rifle corps. Belov's shock group: 9th Guards rifle, 20th tank corps and the 36th separate tank regiment "enveloped" Bolkhov from the north and southeast. The Germans fiercely resisted and did not want to concede Bolkhov. At a critical moment for them, they transferred here the 12th tank division and then urgently from the city of Sumy the 26th infantry division.

At the end of the second decade of July, as already noted, a crisis arose in the operation to liberate Bolkhov: the Germans significantly strengthened the defense of Bolkhov with fresh forces; the forces of our formations, in order to take Bolkhov by storm, were not enough - all the reserves were exhausted.

The entry into combat operations of the tank group of Badanov, Headquarters of the High Command. pursued two goals: the first was to cut the railroad with a blow in a southerly direction. and the Orel-Bryansk highway and cut off the enemy's Oryol grouping, the second - together with the troops of the 61st Army, block the enemy's Bolkhov grouping and contribute to the liberation of Bolkhov.

Thus, by their actions of the troops, the Bada group
nova:

a) created a threat of blocking Orel from the north and hung

407

over the communications of the enemy, and most importantly - over the rock

forest road Orel - Bryansk;

6) contributed to the release of first Bolkhov, and then Orel;

c) took a direct part in the liquidation of the northwestern section of the enemy's Orlovsky bridgehead.

c) diverted significant enemy forces to the breakthrough area, forcing the Germans to deploy not only operational army reserves to eliminate it, but also to withdraw a number of divisions from the Kromsky, Sumy and Smolensk directions;

Of undoubted interest are the operational-tactical methods of combat operations of the Badanov group:

a) during the relative stabilization of the front in the zone of enemy defense for 18 months, our troops went over to combat operations with a pronounced offensive character;

6) the presence of a strongly fortified, deeply echeloned enemy defense, it would seem, excluded the possibility of conducting decisive offensive operations on our part, nevertheless they were carried out and, on the whole, ended successfully;

c) since that time, the positional warfare on the front of the Oryol Bulge ended - the assigned tasks in offensive operations were solved only by a maneuver: bold, daring, which was carried out by well-trained military personnel of all levels (divisional, corps and army), possessing mature military skills.

So, the brutal and intense combat operations of the armor of the Badanov tank group during the overcoming of the first front line of the enemy's defense, further battles in depth are not characterized (like most of the battles of the Battle of Oryol in July-August 1943) by a consistent struggle at intermediate lines, echeloned by the enemy to a large depth, were in the nature of digging into the depth of defense, on the one hand, and wide maneuverability of actions aimed at destroying a dense network of resistance centers located in settlements on

408

tactically advantageous heights and along the lines of water barriers
- on the other hand.

In these battles, the enemy, pulling up reserves and trying to stop the advance of our units with counterattacks, launched counterattacks under the base of the offensive wedge.

Thus, the overall positive result in the Borilovsky battle was not achieved as a result of a small

due to the improvement of the combat training of troops and tactical skill in maneuvering formations, which is the result of the increased military leadership art of military leadership at all levels.

Despite the fact that the operation of Badanov's troops to break through the enemy's defenses and rapidly advance towards communications did not develop as planned, but took on a protracted and bloody character, the advance of the tank wedge in a southerly direction towards Khotynets led to the achievement of major operational results.

1. Our troops liquidated the "Bolkhovsky bastion", located in the depths of the enemy's defense.

2. The armored group of General Badanov, continuing to slowly but stubbornly advance to the south-southwest, created a direct threat to bypass Orel from the north-west and encircle the entire Oryol group. This, in turn, forced the German troops defending against the troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies advancing on Oryol from the east, hastily, starting on July 31, to begin a retreat to the west, where our line was not prepared for a solid defense. Hagen", which in the middle of September 1943 was overcome by our troops relatively easily.

3. The advance of Badanov's troops in a southerly direction forced the retreat, I would say, the flight of the entire Oryol grouping of the enemy to the west. It is for this reason that our troops did not storm Orel, as was the case with Bolkhov, but entered and liberated the city without a fight, except for small skirmishes with the enemy rearguards on its outskirts.

Noting the great importance of the Battle of Borilov in

409

operational-strategic plan, the following points should be singled out, if you like, the lessons that were taken into account by the Soviet command in all subsequent operations, with the participation of large armored and mechanized units in them.

As a result of the Battle of Borilov, when the tasks were generally solved and the goal achieved, it should be recognized that the operation from the very beginning went against the plans of the Soviet command and that the following reasons contributed to this.

1. During the preparation of the operation, due to the unsatisfactory work of all types of Soviet intelligence, significant miscalculations were made in assessing the forces and capabilities of the opposing enemy: the defense turned out to be stronger, there were more troops, and by that moment they were more mobile, better controlled, more professional prepared for

combat operations than our formations, and therefore the formations of the Badanov group failed to break through the front of the defense of the German troops immediately and to its entire depth, enter the operational space and quickly overcome those 50 km that separated them from the Orel railway and highway — Bryansk. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command set the task of speedily motorizing rifle formations: the horse, as the main means of transportation for rifle divisions, had to give way to the car. SITA's help in supplying the Studebaker truck under Lend-Lease was extremely important and provided on time.

2. During the conduct of this largest army front offensive operation, our air forces not only did not provide any support to the ground forces, but also allowed German aviation to storm our tank and mechanized columns with complete impunity. In subsequent operations of this magnitude, ground troops were purposefully and reliably provided with air cover and more precise interaction between ground and air units.

3. Insufficiently powerful artillery support, which consisted in weak processing of fortifications against

410

nick in the breakthrough area before the advance of the tankers and then already in the course of their advance to the south. From that moment on, the production of self-propelled artillery mounts of various calibers was immediately increased, and the issue of producing the T-34 tank with an 85-mm gun was raised sharply, in tight deadlines.

4. Rifle formations, due to their small number and due to large losses in the previous continuous and intense hostilities, did not provide the help to the tankers, which was intended for them and which they counted on when breaking through the first line of the enemy's defense, and then in battles to overcome the next two milestones. . In subsequent major operations with the use of tank formations, it was planned that fresh rifle and mechanized corps would be required and adequately involved in them.

5. Extremely rugged terrain, the presence of three transverse water barriers with wide swampy floodplains of the Ors, Nugr and Mokhovitsa rivers, and the absence of the required number of engineering and pontoon-bridge units limited the maneuver of the army and did not allow for the massive use of tank formations. As a result of such a formulation of the question, our Supreme High Command demanded that the engineering troops be reorganized in a short time, when engineer-sapper brigades, engineer-pontoon regiments appeared, which were attached to the fronts and armies, and first of all to tank ones.

The experience of hostilities once again confirmed that the tank

armies should make a breakthrough by combined arms armies, and where combined arms armies are not able to provide a breakthrough for a tank army, it is necessary to reinforce the tank army with rifle formations, artillery, give it an independent breakthrough sector, entrusting the provision of flanks to combined arms armies.

The enemy turns all the efforts of his aviation into strikes against tank troops, trying to tie down their actions. To ensure free maneuver, it is necessary for tank armies to have strong air cover by fighter aircraft.

411

In any conditions of the actions of a tank army, it is necessary to have its own artillery as part of an artillery division.

Summing up the above arguments and facts, it should be recognized that both the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the Red Army have learned lessons for themselves.

First of all, they demanded from the leadership of the armies and corps a detailed report on the operation, with all its pluses and minuses - I drew attention to the real statistical data given in the reports about my losses and the losses of the enemy.

All subsequent operations, where tank armies were used, were carefully prepared. In Soviet operational art, there appeared, or rather, from that time on, such a concept as a strategic pause, necessary for training troops for major frontline operations, began to operate.

EPILOGUE

COMBAT ACTIONS IN THE KHOTYNETS DIRECTION

By the beginning of the offensive in the new direction (Khotynets Kom), the troops of the shock tank group of the Badanov army included: 25th tank corps, 6th guards mechanized corps, 11th tank corps, 30th tank corps, 1545 self-propelled artillery regiment, 51st separate motorcycle regiment and 51st separate reconnaissance armored battalion.

Due to heavy losses, the 5th Panzer Corps was withdrawn to the command reserve.

5th motorized rifle brigade of the 5th tank corps

08/03/1943, after participating in military operations in the northern sector of the Orlovsky bridgehead, it was withdrawn from the fighting and concentrated in the Lokna, Rozhkovo area. The brigade suffered losses during the period of fighting: 78 percent in personnel, up to 50 percent in armament, and up to 25 percent in vehicles.

On August 4, 1943, the 24th Tank Brigade was withdrawn from the battle to the Shemyakino area.

The 41st tank brigade, in accordance with combat order No. 021 of 08/12/1943 of the headquarters of the 5th tank corps, made a march as part of the corps and on August 13 concentrated in the Medvedka area (12 kilometers north of Tula) for additional recruitment.

413

The 70th tank brigade, according to the entry in the historical logbook "on August 3, 1943, received a combat order from the headquarters of the corps: by the end of August 4, it was withdrawn to the location area: Sukhochevo, Borilovo (northern), Borilovsky (southern) and occupied the line of defense along Nugr river - headquarters - bank (ravine) southwest of Sukhochevo.

<...>

12.08. advanced to Tula and on August 13 arrived in the forest 9 km east of Tula to form "I".

25 tank corps

From August 3 to August 10, units of the corps fought successfully in close cooperation with units of the 8th Guards. sk. During the period of joint actions from the 8th Guards. The sk corps from the districts of Volobeevo, Plekhanovo, Kareevo, Annikovo successfully advanced in fighting to the south and southwest for 70 km, on the morning of 8.08 they cut the railway for the second time. vr-not Cr. Nov, went to the border of the river. Lubna and on the night of 9 to 10.08 a blow from the south to the rear was assisted by the shaft of the 5th Guards. sd capture st. Hotynets.

The 175th tank brigade during 1 and 2.08.43, having entered the new Peshkovo concentration area and the north-west forest. 1.5 km Peshkovo, continued to put in order vehicles, personnel and prepared to receive combat materiel.

Until 20.08, the brigade stood in Peshkovo, then it was transferred to Sun. Spasskoye, where she stood until 11.09, then south-west. Volkovo, and then, on 16.11, by rail. - at st. New Darnitsa.

From the Information about the combat path of the 162nd tank brigade (from 06/05/42 to 08/10/43):

"On August 6, the 162nd tank brigade received an order: acting in the main direction of the corps, advance in the direction of Uzkoie, Plekhanovo, Volobeevo, Gnezdilovo, Samoryadovo, Li-

povka, Bol. Ryabinki, Cr. Ryabinki, Cr. Nov; cut the railway vr-not Cr. Nov - Konevka and together with the connections of the corps, in cooperation with parts: guards. sd master st. Hotynets.

The offensive began at 11:00 on August 6, 1943.

1 TsAMORF, f. 3404, op. 1, d. 68.

414

The infantry attack at the Gnezdilovo line bogged down, and by the decision of the commander of the 5th Rifle Division of the corps brigade, they were brought into battle.

162 Tank Brigade, breaking through the enemy defenses, entered Gnezdilovo twice, leading the lagging infantry. From August 6 to August 10, with swift attacks and skillful maneuvers on the battlefield, showing courage and courage, tankers in close cooperation with the infantry of the 5th Guards. SD successfully moved forward, destroying the enemy retreating with battles.

On the morning of August 9, the brigade, as part of the corps, cut the railroad for the second time. Eagle - Bryansk vr-not Kr. New and, continuing to destroy the pr-ka, took possession of the Konevka settlement.

As a result of a swift blow, the roads of the west were cut. Konevka and intercepted a column of local residents, which the Germans, under escort, took away to the west to their rear.

With the release of the brigade in the Konevka district, the task was received to assist 1 TC in the capture of Khotynets.

For the period from 14.07 to 10.08 for mastering Art. The Hotynets brigade inflicted the following defeats on the enemy: 3,650 soldiers and officers were killed; different guns - 28, mortars - 35, machine guns - 25, motor vehicles - 118, all-terrain vehicles - 12, tractors - 2, bicycles - 150.

During the period of the Oryol operation, the brigade fought more than 230 km, freeing dozens of troops and thousands of Soviet citizens on its way.

A characteristic feature of the hostilities in the Oryol operation is the massive display of heroism by the fighters, commanders and political workers. People fought to the last breath, but did not surrender alive to the enemy.

So, for example, the senior assistant to the chief of staff for special communications, Captain Pospelov (aka the party organizer of the brigade headquarters) on July 22, 1943, with a group of fighters and spacecraft commanders in the amount of 9 people, performing a combat mission on the T-70 tank, VNP Kr. Ryabinki ran into a German ambush - an unequal battle ensued, the tank hit a mine, move

couldn't go further. Shooting back to the last bullet, many

415

some of them died a heroic death, Captain Pospelov and Jr. survived. lieutenant Chupakhin. Chupakhin fought back with grenades, and when the grenades ran out, so as not to be captured by the brutal fascists, he blew himself up with the last grenade. Captain Pospelov, being wounded and unable to hold a weapon in his hands, began to fight off with his teeth from a German officer who was trying to take him prisoner. Encountering fierce resistance, the Germans finished him off.

When returning from the rail, the T-34 tank stopped due to a technical malfunction in the Lokna region, a group of Germans began to surround the tank and fire at it. The crew of the tank and paratroopers opened heavy fire under the Germans. When the tank ran out of ammunition, the crew blew up their tank and crawled into the rye with a group of paratroopers. The Germans attacked a group of brave fighters and commanders up to a company of infantry. Having let them in at close range, the machine gunner Krasnokutsky opened destructive fire from his machine gun. The surviving group of Germans hastily retreated. The second attack of the infantry of the pr-ka was supported by a tank, but this time the Germans were unable to break the resistance of a small handful of brave men. The fight lasted until night. As a result of an unequal battle, the commander of a machine-gun platoon, lieutenant Yakovlev, foreman Popov, sergeant Tarasov, and a Red Army soldier Morozov heroically died. One Comrade survived. Krasnokutsky. Having shot all the cartridges, he buried his machine gun and for 6 days, eating only rye, made his way to his own.

After the advance of our troops for Lokna comrade. Krasno Kutsky delivered a machine gun to his unit.

A heroic death behind enemy lines killed the commander of 2 TB-on Captain Panteleev and the commander of the 2nd company of 1t6-on Zagorodnikov and a number of other soldiers and commanders three times decorated.

Commander of the 25th TC, Major General of the Tank Troops Aniku Shin

Chief of Staff Colonel Voronchenko.

1 TsAMORF, f. 3228, op. 1, d. 1, l.6-8.

416

Conditions in the new area

"a) The enemy units of the TD "SS" "VG" and 253 PD after unsuccessful offensive battles [of our units], pushing the war-

ska 11 A, 1.8 reached the line:

TD "SS" "VG" - Obelna, Alekhino, Izmorozn,

253 PD - Ilyinskoye, Brezhnevsky, Uspensky, in an effort to prevent the interception of the main escape routes of 9 A and 2TA in the Khotynets area, at the beginning of the operation, hastily began to transfer 9, 18 TDi 25 MD to the area of operations. TD "SS" "VG" again from 5 to 6.8 was replaced by units of 10 MD and transferred to the south in the Akhtyrka area.

6) In front of the 4th TA front, units of 18 TD and 253 PD defended themselves with the task of preventing the breakthrough of the Red Army troops in the direction of Khotynek at any cost and ensuring the withdrawal of the main forces from the Oryol Bulge to Khotynets.

c) The enemy, using rough terrain, created a strong anti-tank defense at the turn:

1) Studenka, Kitaevo, r. Nugr;

2) r. Moshchenko, Kalinino, vys. 258.3, p. Dry Eaglet; Z)r. Lubna.

In addition, resistance centers were fortified: Ilinsky, Brezhnevsky, Volosatovo, Glotovo, Gnezdilovo.

OFFENSIVE

"1. At 12.40 6.8.43, after artillery and aviation processing of the front edge of the troops of the 11th Guards. And they went on the offensive and at 13.30 they moved forward 3 km. A further attempt to move forward was not successful. At 15.30, the commander of the Bryansk Front gave the signal "4 TA to enter a breakthrough to develop the emerging success of the 11th Guards. A".

2. Troops of the 4th TA, going on the offensive, met stubborn enemy resistance at the Brezhnevsky-Slobodka line. At the cost of huge losses, the enemy managed to hold on at the turn of the south. env. Krasny Yagodnik, elev. 226.0, Sev. env. Glotovo. On the night of 6 on 7.8 30, the TC threw back the enemy kr. Nugr.

417

On the night of 06/07/08, the enemy hastily began to withdraw his troops from the Bolkhov-Orel direction in a southwestern direction. At the same time, units of the 9th TD are being transferred to the line of Koskovo, Gavrilovo with the task of delaying the further offensive of our troops.

3. During 7.8 4 TA, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy at the turn: Moshchennoye, Krasny Voronets, vys. 227.2, Olypanets, Samoryadovo, by the end of the day mastered: Kuban, Ivanovsky, Androsovsky, high. 228.8.

In the offensive zone of army troops 7.8, the presence of units 253 PD, 9 and 18 TD was established, the task of which was: at any cost to hold the Moschenoe line, high. 258.0 Olysha German.

On the night of 7 to 8 August, the enemy reinforces his active troops with units of 25 MD and accelerates the withdrawal of the main forces and military equipment from the Naryshkino region to the southwest.

By the end of August 8, 1943, the army troops, having advanced 14-16 km, reached the north-east. bank of the river Eaglet.

7.8 at 13.35 troops of the 11th Guards. armies broke through the defenses only to a depth of 3 kilometers and subsequently had no success.

4. Fulfilling the order of the Military Council of the Bryansk Front, on the night of 8 to 9.8 4 TA regrouped and from the morning of 9.8 went on the offensive.

Knocking down the enemy from the river. Dry Orlitsa, army troops reached the line by 23.00:

bgv. MK - Kopytets, Konevka (suit.), Cretaceous.

30 shopping mall - Cretaceous, Chalishchevo.

ITC - (suit.) Chalishchevo, Gorki, cutting the railway. Eagle - Bryansk.

Shtarm - forest 1 km west. Mal. Shakhovo.

5. On the night of 9 to 10.8, the troops of 4 TA again regrouped, organized interaction with ZA and at 14.00 10-8 went on the offensive.

Bypassing the Hotynets node of resistance from the south and southwest, they crossed the river. Lubna ik 11.00 11.8 mastered:

bgv. MK - Pechkinskiye Vyselki,

ZO TK - Verbnik,

11 TC fought for Krivoshevo.

418

Contributing to the advancement of the 11th Guards. A, advancing from the east and north-east. to Karachev, by 13.00 12.8. 4th TA cut the Shablykino-Karachev road and with its right flank went 8 km south. Karachev, having mastered the border: Ducks but, Artyukha, Lodeynoye, Pavlovka.

From the report of the 4th Panzer Army:

"Fulfilling the order of the Military Council of the Bryansk Front, the army troops regrouped on the night of 4 to 5.8,

made a fifty-kilometer march and by 12.00 5.8.43 concentrated in the area:

ITK - Korytino, Sizenki, Kalinka, (suit.) Clearance;

30 DTK - Dernovo (claim.), Brezhnevsky, Volobeevo, Korneevo, Shestakovo;

bgv. MK - (claim.) Peshkovo, (claim.). Nizina, Kashcheevo.

On the night of 5 to 6.8.43, the troops of the army of the 11th TK and 6th Guards. Cr. MK. occupied their former position.

30 DUTK went to the area - Vyazovaya, Korobetskaya, Shestakovo.

On the work of intelligence agencies of the 11th tank corps at the second stage of the corps' combat operations from 6 to 10 August 1943.

"1. The intelligence agencies of the corps conducted reconnaissance in the direction of Gnezdilovo, Rogozino, Sorokino, Bol. Rowan, Red. Rya binki, Tulupovo, Arkhangelsk, st. Shakhovo, Shakhovo with the task of establishing:

a) the presence and nature of enemy defenses at the lines: Kitaevo, Samoryadovo, Gora Vysokaya, Rogozino, Bol. Rowan ki, Ladygino, Krasn. Ryabinki, Tulupovo, Star. Markovo, Arkhangelsk, Radoml, Shakhovo;

6) the composition, grouping and numbering of enemy units;

c) establish the approach of the enemy's reserves and their direction of movement.

2. At the beginning of the actions of the corps units, it was established: in the Glotovo-Gnezdilovo sector, the defense was occupied by 464 infantry regiments (253 infantry divisions) with 253 artillery divisions, in the Gnezdilovo area there were about 4 minbatteries, in the Kaskovo, Kitaevo area up to 5 artillery battalions

1 TsAMO RF, f. 4th Guards ta, op. 4756, d. 12, l. 15-18; f. 323, op. 4756, d. 4. l.4-6.

419

ray, in the direction of Gnezdilovo, Bol. Ryabinki was observed up to 70 enemy tanks.

The second defensive line passed along the line of Grachevka, Studenka, Bulgakovo and beyond. Nugr.

The Gnezdilovo area was covered by anti-aircraft artillery. To the right of Gnezdilovo, the defense was occupied by 10 MP 9td with an anti-tank division. In companies of 10 MP, there were up to 30-35 people.

To the left of Glotovo, the defense was occupied by 453 points (253 front).

3. Orb 26 was used in reconnaissance in the main direction and alerted units on the flanks of the corps with data.

For reconnaissance, rg [reconnaissance groups], ords [separate reconnaissance patrols] and reconnaissance companies were allocated, night searches were also carried out with the task of capturing a control prisoner.

4. 903 mtsb in reconnaissance was used by small groups of motorcyclists from 3 to 5 motorcycles, the tasks were set for reconnaissance on the flanks and checking the presence of the enemy at separate points!

30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps

"4.08.43, 10.00. Order of the commander of the troops of the 4th TA on the transition of the corps and its concentration by 4.00. 5.08. in the area of Peshkovo, Ivanovsky, Zuevka, Shumovsky, Sizenki.

From 11.00 a reconnaissance and engineering reconnaissance of the new concentration area was organized.

20.00. Formations and parts of the corps in small groups marched to move to a new area along two routes:

Right route: Red, Stolbchee, Krasnikovo, Kamensky, Kamenka, Peshkovo.

Left route: Gorki, Bulgakovo, Burgovo, Sizenki, Ivanovsky.

5.68.43 7.00. Formations and parts of the corps were concentrated in the area: Peshkovo, Ivanovsky, Zuevka, Shumovsky, Sizensky. During the day, formations and parts of the corps brought materiel and armament to combat readiness and carried out reconnaissance of probable directions.

1 TsAMO RF, f. 3412, op. 1, d. 66, l. 27.

420

16.00. The order of the corps commander on the transition of formations and parts of the corps to the initial area in the breakthrough: (claim.) Kobylskaya, Korovetskaya, Shestakovo.

20.00. Formations and parts of the corps marched to move to the starting area.

6.08.43 4.30. Formations and units of the 30th TC with attached corps artillery units concentrated in the initial area for entry into the breakthrough:

a) 197 brigade concentrated (suit.) Kobylskaya, Vyazovka;

6) 243 brigade concentrated in the hollows of the sowing. Korovetskaya;

c) 244tbr concentrated Korovetskaya;

d) 30 MSBR concentrated in the hollows southeast of Shes such.

Until 15.00, formations and units of the corps carried out reconnaissance of the front line of the enemy's defense, whether they linked interaction with the infantry breaking through the defense tivnik.

The entry of the corps into the gap was supported by: a howitzer brigade and guards. mortar regiment. The combat composition of the formations and parts of the hull before entering the breakthrough:

a) 197 brigade, tanks - 34;

6) 243 brigade, tanks - 23;

c) 244 brigade, tanks - 31;

d) 30 MSBRs and MSWs of tank brigades had losses of up to 70%;

e) artillery units had insignificant losses.

The formations and parts of the corps were introduced into the gap on the front with a length of 4-6 km by two routes.

According to the plan of the corps commander, the lead brigades, accompanied by artillery, were not to be carried away by the pressure of the remaining firing points and individual guns on the way of their movement, but to smash the retreating enemy units with a swift forward movement and reach the area by the end of the day: Shakhovo, Lukino, Mal. Shakhovo, cutting the railway. Eagle - Bryansk.

The main grouping and the mobile anti-tank reserve of the corps commander were in the right column.

15.00. A signal was received to enter the hull into the breach.

At 15.30 formations and parts of the corps began to move in

421

breakthrough at the turn: high. with elev. 226.6 - Brezhnevsky, met with stubborn resistance from the enemy.

As a result of this connection, the corps were forced to turn around for battle and briefly organize an offensive nie:

a) 197 brigade, having met enemy fire resistance from the areas: Volosatovo, Krasny Yagodnik, turned around for battle and launched an offensive, bypassing Volosatovo and Krasny Yagodnik from the northwest. After a 1.5-hour battle, the enemy

left Volosatovo, Krasny Yagodnik and withdrew in a southerly direction. By 21.00, the brigade approached the northern outskirts of Koskovo, dodging under the influence of enemy artillery fire to the left, and during the night of hostilities did not lead.

As a result of the battle, the brigade lost 5 tanks burnt out and knocked out. The enemy suffered damage: 2 tanks, 2 self-propelled guns, 4 cannons, 2 vehicles and up to 300 soldiers and officers were destroyed.

6) 243 brigade came out for 197 brigade and due to the fact that 197 brigade was moving slowly, overtook her at 22.30 went out with one brigade and small brigade to the southern outskirts of Lopatinsky, the second brigade - to the northern outskirts of Zuevsky

Continuing to develop the success achieved, the brigade continued the offensive during the night and by 0400 on 08/07/43, having captured Ivanovsky, approached the north. env. Paved, where she was met with strong artillery fire and fire from self-propelled guns and Kov tanks.

The success achieved by the 243rd brigade was not reinforced by the infantry and was not supported by artillery. As a result of this, the brigade retreated to the sowing valley. Ivanovsky.

Ivanovsky was abandoned because the enemy was conducting strong aimed fire from high. 1 km west Ivanovsky.

As a result of the battles, the brigade lost 6 tanks, of which: 4 burned out and 2 knocked out.

Personnel: killed - 12 people, wounded - 25 people.

c) 244 brigade, having met enemy fire resistance at the line Brezhnevsky - Slobodka, turned around for battle and launched an offensive in the direction: Glotovo, Koskovo, An

422

Drosovsky. By 18.00 I approached the sowing. env. Kaskovo and zap. env. Glotovo and until 24.00 fought for the capture of Koskovo.

During the night, the brigade conducted reconnaissance and in the morning, having resumed hostilities, together with the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade, captured Koskovo, Kitaevo, by 7.00 approached the north. env. Androsovsky.

As a result of the battle, the brigade lost 8 tanks knocked out and burned.

The enemy suffered damage: 2 tanks, one self-propelled gun, 8 anti-tank guns, 2 vehicles were destroyed; 25 bicycles, several rifles and machine guns were captured.

_D) 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade, deploying at the Brezhnevsky-Slobodka line, from 16.00 attacked behind 244th brigade and by the end of the day, together with it, fought for Koskovo, Kitaevo, having mastered them

night.

The 197th and 243rd brigade fought for the capture of Ivanovsky, but under heavy artillery fire and the constant influence of enemy aircraft, they were not successful.

244 brigade from 30 msbr, having captured Bulgakovo, Androsovo, from 7.00 attacked from the line of sowing. env. Androsovsky - south. env. Androsovo in the direction of high. with elev. 227.2, Sorokino, by 21.00 we went to the southeast. slopes without a name. high 2 km west Rogozin, repulsing 2 infantry counterattacks with the support of 25 - 30 tanks.

As a result of counterattacks undertaken by the enemy during their reflection, the following damage was inflicted on the corps: 14 tanks were knocked out and burned.

We suppressed 3 artillery batteries; captured: 2 guns from sleep in rows, a mortar with mines, several rifles and machine guns.

The enemy left 123 people killed on the battlefield.

7.08.43

The decision of the corps commander by the end of the day:

In connection with the emerging success on the left flank:

1. 244th Tank Brigade and 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade to continue the offensive in the direction of Sorokino, Krasnye Ryabinki, Shakhovo and by the end of the day on August 7, 1943, reach the Shakhovo, Lukino, Mal. Shakhovo, cutting the head of the railway Eagle - Bryansk.

Transfer 2.197 brigade and 243 brigade to the left flank [of the corps] and advance behind 244 brigade, developing its success.

3. 30 mebr consolidate the success of 244 tbr by interacting with her.

423

8.08.43 8.00. Advance in the direction of Sorokino, Krasnye Ryabinki, Shakhovo.

244th brigade and 30th brigade from the south-east. slopes without a name. altitude 2 km west. Rogozin launched an offensive in the direction of Sorokino, Krasnye Ryabinki.

In Yu.30, Bol was occupied by part of the forces. Ryabinki, later by the end of the day the Red Ryabinki took possession and by 06.00 on 9.08.43 the Red Ryabinki concentrated.

243 brigade with six tanks operated together with 244 brigade.

197 brigade, advancing from behind the right flank of 244 brigade, captured the high. with elev. 220.7 and later, having overtaken the 244 brigade in the Krasnye Ryabinki region, by 07.00 on 08.09.43 the railway station left. 1.5 km north-west Shakhovo.

On the railway Eagle - Bryansk canvas blown up.

The 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade, continuing to advance behind the 197th Tank Brigade, by 07:00 on 08/09/43, the Shakhovo district came out.

The artillery units of the corps acted jointly with the brigades.

When occupying Art. Shakhovo liberated up to 5,000 civilians guarded by German troops.

On August 9, 1943, all formations and units of the corps concentrated in the area of Shakhovo, Lukino and Golovino.

From the memoirs of the Hero of the Soviet Union Vasily Zaitsev:

"On August 5, the 4th Panzer Army concentrated in the Peshkovo-Gnezdilovo-Ilyinskoye area. North of Ilyinsky was the 30th UDTK. He was given the task of entering the gap from the Ilyinskoye-Gnezdilovo line, advancing together with units of the 11th Guards Army, capturing the Shakhovo station and, cutting the Orel-Bryansk railway, cutting off the path of the retreating enemy.

The offensive began on 6 August. In the afternoon our brigade overtook the battle formations of the infantry units that had broken through the enemy's defenses and was soon bombarded with heavy artillery fire from the Volosatovo area. The battles for Volosatovo, Krasny Yagodnik, Koskovo, which the brigade

1! TsAMO RF, f. 30 UDTK, op. 1, d. 34, l. 18-20.

424

led in cooperation with the 243rd tank and 30th motorized rifle brigades, lasted more than a day.

On the night of August 7, a squad of auto-matchers under the command of senior sergeant A. Kompaneyts went to reconnaissance. Submachine gunners secretly entered the enemy's location and went through the cutting area beyond the settlement. The enemy discovered our reconnaissance, surrounded it and offered to surrender. The submachine gunners did not lose their heads, quickly took up all-round defense in two pits located nearby and fired back at the enemy until the brigade captured this point.

On the morning of August 7, the commander of the battalion of submachine gunners, Captain Firsov, used the following cunning trick. On his orders, a smoke screen was placed on one of the sectors of the front in order to draw the attention of the enemy there. Meanwhile, in another place, using ravines, a platoon of submachine gunners led by the company commander, senior lieutenant Nikolaev, penetrated into the rear of the enemy. As agreed in advance

In the meantime, the enemy was attacked from the rear and from the front, faltered and fled from Volosatovo. At the same time, the 243rd Tank Brigade liberated the settlements of Krasny Yagodnik and Koskovo. Thus, the enemy's defense center on the way to the Shakhovo station was liquidated. The enemy left on the battlefield more than 600 corpses of soldiers and officers, many machine guns, cannons and wrecked tanks. In this battle, the commander of a platoon of submachine gunners, Lieutenant Molokov, was killed, who was the first to rush to the attack with the exclamation "For the Motherland, forward!".

At dawn on August 8, the brigade launched an attack on the Shakhovo station. The tank battalion was in the first echelon of the brigade. The battalion commander was in the forefront of the battalion, for reconnaissance. I was with him. I have just received an assignment from the corps commander, General G.S. Homeland - with a tank battalion, quickly go to the Shakhovo station and cut the Orel-Bryansk railway.

When approaching the Dry Orlitsa River, the battalion came under mortar and artillery fire. We learned from local residents the places where it is possible to organize the crossing of tanks. However, the preparations for the crossing were somewhat delayed, and in order to cheer up the tankers, I decided to take advantage of the news that I had just received on the radio about the withdrawal of Italy

425

from the war. Turning to the tankers assembled for briefing, I said: "We are obliged to act more energetically than the allies and intensify the blows against the enemy, quickly drive him out of our homeland, and here we are trampling in front of some small river."

I did not expect that the tankers would take my words so close to their hearts. As soon as the signal was given to kataka, despite enemy fire, they crossed the river without loss and brought down the blows of tank guns and machine guns on the enemy. Continuing the rapid movement, the battalion on August 8 at 12 o'clock went to the siding west of Shakhovo station, which we immediately reported on the radio to the commanders of the corps and brigade.

During the offensive, we learned about numerous facts of the inhuman attitude of the Nazi invaders towards the local residents. During the retreat, the enemy burned down all settlements, blew up brick houses, drove the civilian population to the west, and at the slightest deviation from this he mercilessly shot. Roads were mined, bridges were blown up. When we reached the Orel-Bryansk railroad crossing, which is west of the Shakhovo station, we saw traces of barbarian destruction: all the rails were blown up literally every meter and could not be used in the restoration of the railroad. The sleepers were turned out and also completely unsuitable for use for road repair.

In the direction of the Shakhovo station, to the south of it, Lieutenant Zinchenko was sent on reconnaissance in his tank. When approaching the Shakhovo station, it was fired upon by artillery. Destroying the

Three firing points of the enemy behind his cannon, Lieutenant Zinchenko bypassed the Shakhovo station to the south and reported by radio on the results of reconnaissance. The crew received orders to return to the battalion. At that moment, the soldiers saw a column of Soviet people emerge from the hollow under the escort of German soldiers. Having sent several shells into the tail of the Nazi convoy and put it to flight, the tank rushed to the column. But at that moment an enemy self-propelled gun came out of the grove. With two shots, Lieutenant Zinchenko set fire to the enemy self-propelled gun, and the tank again rushed towards the hijacked column. The Nazis, fleeing the machine-gun fire of the tank, rushed into the middle of the crowd of Soviet people. female

426

The women, children, old people (they made up the column) began to snatch weapons from the soldiers, beat them with rifle butts and fists. Then the soldiers ran into the rye, but few of them escaped the tank's machine-gun fire. Thousands of hands of grateful Soviet people reached out to the saviors, to their blackened tank with dozens of dents in its armor. Thus, thousands of Soviet citizens were saved from captivity.

While we were inspecting the road and reporting by radio to the command about the results of the battle, suddenly a wagon appeared from somewhere, in which there were a man and two women. At first I wanted to stop them and ask who they were and where they were going. But since the fascists drove our people away strongly and they fled from them at the first opportunity and returned to their ashes, I did not detain these people, and they headed towards the crossing. A young woman with a white comb in her lush hair, sitting in the back of the cart, caught my eye. Suddenly, a strong explosion was heard in the area of the crossing. When we approached, we saw a deep smoking crater from a landmine planted by the Nazis, and in place of a wagon with passengers, only a comb was whitening on the burnt ground.

zhzh*zhkh

The combat logs of the brigades and the 4th Panzer Army as a whole do not reflect human and material losses. The memories of the participants in the battles, with rare exceptions, also do not give us a complete picture of the drama of the unfolding battle. And only reporting documents, especially information about losses, allow us to understand at what cost the liberation of the city (large settlement), which played a key role for the warring parties, was paid. Take, for example, the district center of Khotynets, which was of paramount importance. Thanks to archival materials, we can trace how much effort and human lives it cost our troops to free him.

book publishing house, 1989. Pp. 26 - 29.

427

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We see Jacques, in the battles in the Khotynets direction, the Badanov army lost 2667 people, of which 772 people were irretrievably lost. These are mainly fighters from tank crews and motorized rifle battalions.

From the above table we see that on August 6 there were 515 units of mobile armored vehicles.

All losses in battles during this period exceeded the availability of armored vehicles of the army - 575 units.

From August to September 5, army units irrevocably lost 13 T-70 tanks, 91 T-34 tanks, 11 MK-3 tanks, and 6 SAU-122 self-propelled guns. Irretrievable losses amounted to 110 armored vehicles, or 22 percent.

In total, in the Oryol operation, units of the 4th Tank Army of Badanov (excluding the losses of the 5th and 25th Tank Corps) irretrievably lost 47 T-70 light tanks, 297 T-34 tanks, 11 out of 16 MK-3 tanks (Valentine), 13 NovOkK self-propelled mouths.

Thus, in the operations to liberate the Orlovsky bridgehead, the 4th Panzer Army irrevocably (burned down and exploded) lost 369 armored vehicles out of 764 vehicles (taking into account replenishment with tanks from the reserve - 31 units) available, or 48 percent.

The largest percentage of irretrievable losses was among the T-34 tanks - 299 out of 568 units, or 52.6%.

In "Information on the movement of the material part of 4 TA from 16.07. to 30.08.43" it is written that "according to the list of serviceable tanks as of 08/30/43, there are: 143 T-70 tanks, 55 T-34, KV-1 - 1, Su-122 - 16, Su-152 - 11.!

1 TsAMORF, F. 323, op. 4756, d. 4, l. 76.

429

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From the combat log of the 49th Guards Brigade of the 6th Guards
Mechanized Corps (verbatim entry by an unknown staff officer):

"6.08. 21.00. The sun was gradually disappearing behind pockmarked patches of clouds scattered across the sky, and the heat, from which it was stuffy during the day, significantly decreased; it was getting colder in the forest. Darkness came quickly. Commander Guards. Lieutenant Colonel Jabot, twice awarded by the government for exemplary performance of tasks, with his quick movements of a well-trained cavalryman, warmly, with great attention and paternal care, meeting the unit commanders, spoke and laughed with them.

Bending his legs, he sat down on the grass, reminiscent of the Tatar custom of receiving the best guests of the tribe. The commanders were scattered around him. He apparently remembered the partisan life, which is full of this kind of evenings before the battle and which he personally experienced.

— Comrade officers! We have received a very important and honorable task," he said in a quiet and calm voice. It was quiet and dark around, everyone was alert, as if he was starting an interesting story. "People, the party requires us to honestly serve the Motherland, therefore, in fulfilling this task, we must give all our strength, and if necessary, our lives. I hope that we will complete the task with honor. If death is near, then we will die with glory, fighting the enemy until the last minute of our lives.

He was silent for a long time. Anxious minutes passed.
"Questions?" - he asked. There were no questions. It was clear to everyone that with such a commander it was possible to carry out any tasks, and everyone knew that the order received by the brigade would be full.

<...>

8.08. At 20.00 the brigade commander of the guards. Lieutenant Colonel Zhabot, with a communications officer, Lieutenant Onoprienko, and a senior military assistant, Trufanova, left on the "jeep" to select the NP. As a result of carelessness, he drove up to the front edge of the German

431

which defense and machine gunners fire, the pr-ka was killed along with lieutenant Onoprienko and military officer Trufanova. In the evening I called Mrs. Major General Akimov!, demanded a rose from the ska brigade commander. All measures taken to search for him did not give positive results. At 06:00 09:08, the brigade commander's driver arrived at the checkpoint, who, being wounded, crawled out at night from the field of the brigade commander's tragic death.

The news of the death of the brigade commander flew around all parts of the corps with lightning speed. Each soldier of our brigade learned about the tragic death of his beloved commander. When informed Mrs. Major General Akimov about the tragic death of the brigade commander, the severity that seized him was so strong that he scolded everyone for not being able to save the life of the brigade commander.

War... There are no deaths in war. Everyone knew this. But every conscious warrior was tormented by the thought that death, which ended his glorious life so quickly and thoughtlessly, had nothing to do with his personal feat in the last minutes of his life. His death was inglorious (I would say careless. - E. Shch.) - this insult tormented everyone who only understood the meaning of the real bloody struggle of the Russian people with the barbarians of the Middle Ages - the Germans.

ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE FRONT

From the memoirs of the commander of the 26th Infantry Division, General of the Infantry Wiese.

From July 14-18, 1943, units of the 26th Infantry Division of the 2nd Army were transported by rail from the city of Sumy through Bryansk to Orel. As a result of the explosion of the partisans on our railway tracks, we suffered losses. But we can say that we are lucky. When a few days later

1 Commander of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps, which was subordinate to the 49th Guards. mechanized brigade.

2 TsAMORF, f. 3346, op. 1, d. 3, l. 12-13.

3 Sepega! Patschene a O.E. Meuse. Ge ZsMasNe t Ogeyuorep t Shi ipa Airiz 1943.

From the memoirs of the commander of the 26th Infantry Division, General of the Infantry Wiese (VA-MA VN 26-26 85).

432

the Grossdeutschland division crossed the same section of the track, the rails were blown up in 70 places.

When I arrived on 17.07. to Colonel-General Model, he greeted me most cordially. The order was given to the division from July 19 early in the morning to launch an offensive 50 km from Orel - near Bolkhov.

The soldiers were well rested and in excellent spirits. Thanks to intensive combat training, the unit was in excellent combat readiness.

The position of our troops on the Oryol Bulge was threatening. On July 11, the Russians began a large-scale offensive operation against the 2nd Panzer Army. In two days, they made wide and deep (up to 10 km) breakthroughs: east of Orel - in the area of \u200b\u200baction of the XXXU army corps, east of Bolkhov - in the area of \u200b\u200boperation of the Sharmeisky corps northwest of Ulyanov.

Already by July 17, it became known that the enemy's operational goal was to break into the entire Oryol Bulge and eliminate our bridgehead inside it. On the same day, Operation Citadel was suspended. At a critical moment, command of all forces located inside the Oryol Bulge (including the 2nd Panzer Army) was transferred to Colonel General Model (from July 14. - E. Shch.).

On the evening of July 17, the 26th Infantry Division received an order to prepare to repel an enemy attack on its intermediate line southeast of Bolkhov. The 112th Infantry and 12th Panzer Divisions were also brought in to complete the mission. They had at their disposal 8.8 cm anti-aircraft guns and Ferdinands. The main task of the 26th division, reinforced by these units, was to defeat the enemy troops on the frontal ledge near Bolkhov and prevent their breakthrough through Odnoluky (on the south-east of Bolkhov) to the Azarovo-Milchino road.

In any case, the initial position of the advancing at the time of the start of hostilities looked like this: reserves are behind the main forces, heavy artillery

433

Riya will be able, if necessary, to support the offensive, and anti-aircraft guns of 8.8 cm caliber and "Ferdinands" will become their reliable cover.

19.07. Massed artillery fire at 9 o'clock begins our offensive. It is noteworthy that the Russians immediately launched a massive attack on the Bolkhov-Orel highway. Our swift attack greatly surprised the Russians. Inspired by success, they could not even admit the thought of a possible German attack.

The advancing Russian units came under concentrated artillery fire, which preceded our attack, and suffered heavy losses. Our counterattacking units were slowly but steadily moving forward. The fight was hard and stubborn. Every bush, every section of the forest had to be cleared of the enemy. The situation of the battle demanded the utmost composure from everyone. The enemy artillery also gave us a lot of trouble. Our faithful comrades-in-arms accompanying the offensive - anti-tank guns, Ferdinanda self-propelled artillery mounts with 8.8-cm cannons, large-caliber giants - 15-cm assault guns in direct infantry support - destroyed some pockets of resistance and knocked out several tanks. It should be noted that the latter were first used during Operation Citadel. According to the order, self-propelled assault guns could not be used on the front line together with the attacking infantry, in order to avoid losses and capture them by the enemy. So they stood like little forts behind the attackers, watching for targets, ready to open fire. Their armor was so powerful that artillery and armor-piercing shells hitting them left only small dents. Under the fire of our assault guns, the enemy artillery was forced to retreat. Because of the confusion that had begun, the Russians suffered heavy losses. Our offensive is moving swiftly along the entire frontier and promises complete success. At the very peak of our progress, disturbing news arrives. General-pol appears at KNP

434

Kovnik Model and with a heavy heart gives the order to stop the offensive and go on the defensive at the lines reached. The reason for this was the rapid, threatening Orel Russian attack on the XXXU army corps, which was to our right. Units of the 12th Panzer and 112th Infantry Divisions are immediately dispatched to the city. We survived the shock: our 26th Infantry Division, without any pressure from the enemy, suddenly went on the defensive.

And yet we dealt a heavy blow to the Russians. Their breakthrough in the direction of the Bolkhov-Orel highway was thwarted. Evidence that the enemy suffered serious losses in manpower and equipment can be considered the following figures - about 450 killed, left lying on the battlefield, 220 prisoners. From military equipment and weapons, Russians

lost: 5 tanks, 13 anti-tank guns, 2 howitzers, 47 light and 29 heavy machine guns, 7 light and 4 heavy mortars, etc.

In the Völkischen Beobachter (Berlin) dated 02.08.43, an article by one of the war correspondents appeared, which occupied a whole column, entitled "The Magnificent Division in the Battle of Orel."

From 20 to 31.07. heavy defensive battles continued on the arc of the front southeast of Bolkhov. The center of hostilities on the Orel ledge moved here. As expected, the Russians committed reinforced units, a large number of tanks, with significant air support in the direction of the Bolkhov-Orel highway. Here they intended to make a breakthrough by any means necessary. The same difficult times have come for us as during Operation Vihhr, which took place northwest of Bolkhov in August 1942, and as during the fighting in January-February 1943: fierce battles and numerous losses.

Our infantry occupied the anti-tank line of defense, prepared by engineering and sapper units. It included three lines. The first line of defense in the trenches was taken up by machine gunners and grenade launchers, who were armed with anti-tank grenade launchers "Pan

435

perfaust!. On the approaches, all tank-accessible places were mined with disk anti-tank mines. The second line of defense, located 1.5-2 km from the first, was a network of fortified strongholds on high ground, equipped for combat with 8.8-cm anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guns of various calibers. This zone proved to be particularly effective. The third line of defense was represented by heavy self-propelled artillery, including Ferdinand launchers. Each firing position was located on the ground so that direct shots from guns could hit enemy tanks along the entire front.

The weather still left much to be desired. The whole area, especially the roads, became practically impassable. Significant enemy forces and T-34 tanks attack us again and again. On July 28, the assault engineer battalion of the 78th Infantry Division, under our command, repelled a powerful Russian strike north of Polzaimishche.

On the night of July 29, units of the LI corps across the Orel-Bolkhov highway near Tatinka (20 km south of Bolkhov) break through from an almost complete encirclement and occupy the line of defense along the Nugr River. In conditions of impassability and incessant rain, holding back the Russian advance was a rather difficult task for the soldiers of the corps. On July 31, next to the Masalskaya-Dolbilovo road, our division

destroyed 30 T-34 tanks. The 25th motorized division had a hard time. She was pushed hard around eighty Soviet tanks.

On July 31, 1943, by order of the highest authority, our division began to withdraw to a new front defense sector. Until August 17, the combined units of the 9th Army were to carry out a systematic withdrawal of their troops from their positions in the Oryol Bulge. Along the way, it was necessary to harvest and transport it behind the front line, as well as

! The first mention of the use of this anti-tank grenade on the Eastern Front. - HER(.

436

livestock and warehouses. It was necessary to mine and blow up bridges, roads, houses on the streets, to destroy an extensive communications network. But this is only part of the tasks additionally shouldered by the soldiers.

August 4 Orel was surrendered. Even earlier, the 26th Infantry Division, as part of the Garpe group XXXXI of the tank corps, went on the defensive on the Nugr River. We were all very surprised by the telegram received on August 7, according to which, even before the end of the withdrawal of troops to the Hagen defensive line, I was appointed commander of the XXXU army corps.

AFTERWORD BY THE AUTHOR

Truthful coverage of the bleeding events of the fateful years of the war must be carried out with all seriousness and responsibility to the present and future generations, so that it becomes a decisive condition for learning lessons.

My next popular science research is based on an objective consideration of all the factors that determined the nature of a military operation on a strategic scale, taken for detailed coverage. Until now, it has been a "blank spot" in domestic and foreign historiography.

When choosing material, I, as before, was guided by the method that was the main one in my previous books: the integration of a documented fact with the presentation of events by their participants.

In the process of working on the publication, a huge documentary material was collected, I mean primary sources: documents from the military archives of Russia and Germany. A very limited circle of people helped me. First of all, this is the daughter of Ekaterina Egorovna, who looked for the necessary documents.

You are in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Podolsk). Of particular note is the work of Sergei Plakhov, who made copies of the schemes of combat operations stored in the archive. His wife, Lyudmila Yuryevna, checked every figure in the tables of the composition and losses of the opposing groups with the primary sources.

A large number of archival documents, publications of a military-historical nature, reflecting the fighting

- 438

actions of the Nazi troops on the Oryol land, translated from German for the first time. In this regard, I express my gratitude to the Associate Professor of the German Language Department of the OSU, Candidate of Philological Sciences Skripkina Galina Vasilievna, with whom we purposefully went to the Federal Military Archive of Germany (Freiburg) to search and select operational documents testifying to the events of ten days of participation in the battle of German units and formations. I also thank her former students Oksana Nikolaevna Filimonova and Ekaterina Yurievna Savenkova, who translated a large number of documents from German.

This edition for the first time details the events of the operation, which played a key role in the Battle of Oryol. I will be glad to receive all remarks, advice and wishes that will come to us in order to take them into account in subsequent publications.

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VA-MA KN 20-9 / 339 AOK 9 ((In Shise Uepize).

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VA-MA VN 20-9/446. AOK.9. AM. 1a Uepize (9. Agtee).

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VA-MA VN 24-23/124, 125.135, 135K, 143, 277, 371 (23ak).

VA-MA VN 24-23/126. AB 1a Me@uph yot 3.7.1943; Meaiph 10.
Rapgegogepaegamyupt 1.8.1943; Hmmapaseiswe Raptergogepa Ffega
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VA-MA VN 24-23/371. Sep.Kdo. XXSH. AK / On Weyzteldipz y 1943.

VA-MA KN 24-35/60.

VA-MA KN 24-35/69.

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VA-MA VN 26-6/52. Atarebapa U git Klerzarebisv Mg. 7. 76. shashchepedmyup.

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443

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VA-MA KN 27-9/15(a). 9. Rapkheg@mzyup / Rap2egtevitepe 33. 1.7.1943.
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VA-MA KU \ U / b / \ 574 (Vize Uetsiyae).

VA-MA EN 209/135, KN 209/339. AOK 9 (Wshize Wenice).

CONTENT

The Battle for Oryol - the decisive battle of the summer of 1943 5 Operation
Kutuzov: the goal, plan and actions of the parties 22 The Orlovsky bridgehead is an
impregnable bastion of the Germans. 36 The composition of the groupings before
the battle of Oryol 40 The troops are ready for the battle for the Eagle
eeee nnaya 77 The situation in the Bolkhovsky sector front 98 The crisis of
the operation "Kutuzov" her eee 113 Preparing for the battle her nenie
121 Prologue of the Battle of Borilov — a raid on the rear of the
enemy 131 Chronology of the Battle of Borilov 151
Combat actions: the day before eeee. 166 Results and CONCLUSIONS- eeee
anna 351 Analysis of the battle- eeee nn 391 Lessons of the Borilov
battle- ..- 405 ENILOGUE il vase yyy 413 Afterword
of the author eee nnnne + 438

List of sources and references 440

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part in this grandiose battle on both sides - much more than at
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War, was decided.

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the German command

not to hastily withdraw troops from the Orlovsky bridgehead.

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